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107 Part I Introduction 
The  need  for 
Community legislation 
Throughout the Community, a debate has  been 
taking place  for  some time concerning the laws 
applicable  to  enterprises,  and  to  companies  in 
particular.  The debate has been broad in scope, 
but  the  recurrent  central  theme  has  been  the 
decision  making  structure  of  enterprises,  and 
especially the role of an enterprise's employees in 
relation to  that structure.  In each of the Mem-
ber  States,  these  issues  have bern the subject of 
political discussion, often animated, and of pro-
posals  for  reform,  sometimes  of a  far  reaching 
character.  At  the  Community level,  proposals 
have been made which have played an important 
part in  the debate, notably the original proposal 
for  a  Statute  for  the  European  Company,
1  the 
proposal  for  a  fifth  directive  to  coordinate the 
laws  of  Member States  as  regards  the structure 
of 'societes anonymes'/ and the amended propo-
sal  for  a  third  directive  on  coordination  of 
safeguards  in  connection with mergers  between 
'societes anonymes'.
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At  the  outset,  certain  fundamental  questions 
require  an  answer.  Why  has  the  Commission 
proposed  Community  legislation  in  relation  to 
the  undeniably  controversial  and  difficult  issue 
of  the  role  of  employees  in  relation  to  the 
decision-making  structures  of  companies?  Is 
this  not  an  issue  which  should  be  left  to  the 
Member States to handle in  their own particular 
ways  as  an  essentially  domestic  matter?  Cer-
tain! y,  there  has  been  no  shortage  of  critics 
challenging the need for Community legislation. 
The answer to  these  questions involves  a  consi-
deration,  first,  of  the  reasons  for  proposing 
Community legislation creating a  common mar-
ket  for  companies  at  all,  and  second,  of  the 
Commission's role as regards the development of 
economic and social policy in the Community. 
If progress  is  to  be  made  towards  a  European 
Community  in  the  real  sense  of  the  words,  a 
common  market  for  companies  is  an essential 
part of the  basic structure which must be  creat-
ed. 
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The  corporation  with  limited  liability  and  a 
share capital  is  the  typical form adopted by the 
majority  of  the  Community's  most  important 
industrial  and  commercial  enterprises.  They 
have  become the  principal buyers and sellers of 
goods,  the  major  borrowers  and  lenders  of 
capital, and  the  most significant developers and 
users  of  new  technology.  They  are  the  main 
producers of wealth, and as employers, they have 
an immediate impact on the lives  of large num-
bers of the  Community's citizens.  In sum, they 
are  institutions  of  strategic  importance  in  rela-
tion  to  the  economic and social  systems  of the 
Community. 
At the  present time,  these  companies are incor-
porated  under  the  separate  laws  of  the  nine 
Member States.  There are  substantial differen-
ces  between  these  national  laws,  relating,  in 
particular, to the internal structure of companies, 
the  powers  of directors,  the  rights  of sharehol-
ders  and of the employees.  This situation con-
stitutes a  real  barrier to cross-frontier activities, 
both for  those who might deal with a  company 
and for the companies themselves. 
Those  invited  to  deal  with or invest  in  a  com-
pany  incorporated  under  foreign  laws  with 
which  they  are  not  familiar  will  naturally  be 
reluctant to do so because at present no common 
legal  standards, even on matters of great impor-
tance,  can be  relied  upon for  the  prevention of 
loss or hard- ship.  Moreover, a company trad-
ing  in  a  foreign  State  through  a  branch often 
does  not  offer  those  doing  business  with  the 
company the same assurances and guarantees in 
1  Submitted to  the  Council on 30 June 1970.  Sup-
plement to Bull. EC 8-1970. 
2  Presented  by  the  Commission  to  the  Council  in 
October 1972.  Supplement 10/72- Bull. EC.  The 
approximate equivalents  are the 'societe anonyme' in 
Belgium,  France  and  Luxembourg,  the  'aktieselskab' 
in Denmark, the  'Aktiengesellschaft' in  Germany, the 
'societa  per  azioni'  in  Italy,  the  'naamloze  vennoot-
schap' in Belgium and the Netherlands, and the 'public 
limited  liability  company'  in  [reland  and  the  United 
Kingdom. 
1  Submitted  to  the  Council  on  4  January 
1973.  Bull. EC 1-1973, point 2113. 
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question.  On  the  other  hand,  if  a  company 
seeks  to overcome these problems by setting up a 
subsidiary  incorporated  in  another  Member 
State,  the  subsidiary  will  have  a different struc-
ture  from  the  parent.  For  an  enterprise  which 
wishes  to operate in all Member States, the  result 
is  a complex, expensive and  inefficient organiza-
tion.  Admittedly,  enterprises  are  able  to  oper-
ate internationally under these conditions, partic-
ularly if  they have ample resources, but only at a 
cost which is substantially higher than it need  be. 
Moreover, since  every  company  is  incorporated 
under  a  particular  national  system, serious  bar-
riers  prevent  the  rational  restructuring of enter-
prises  to  take  advantage  of  markets  which  are 
Community-wide  rather  than  national.  For 
example,  a  company  cannot  normally  transfer 
from  one  Member  State  to  another  without  a 
drastic  dissolution  and  reconstruction.  More 
seriously,  a  company  is  in  virtually  all  cases 
incapable of  merging with a company incorpor-
ated  in  another Member  State.  Each  company 
is  in  a  sense  imr·risoned  within  its  national 
system  and  cannot  expand  or  combine  with 
another company beyond its national frontiers in 
the  same  way  and  with  the  same  freedom  as  it 
can  inside  the  Member  State  in  which  it  is 
incorporated. 
Approximation  of  national  laws  applying  to 
companies,  through  the  adoption  of  suitable 
directives, and  the  creation of wholly new  Com-
munity  company  law,  such  as  the  European 
Companies Statute
1 and the Convention on Inter-
national  Mergers/ will  enable these  obstacles to 
be  overcome.  Enterprises  will  then  be  able  to 
pursue  their  affairs  throughout the  Commu~ity 
with a  facility  similar  to  that which  they  enJOY 
within  the  boundaries  of  a  single  Member 
State.  As  a  result,  industrial  and  commercial 
activity  will  be  free  to  develop  fully  across  the 
boundaries  of  the  Member  States,  and  the  pre-
sent  free  trade  area will  have  an  opportunity to 
mature  into  a  robust commercial and  industrial 
Community. 
The question of why there should be  Community 
legislation  concerning  the  role  of  employees  in 
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relation  to  the  decision  making  structures  of 
companies  is  in  part  answered  by  these  same 
arguments.  In view of the central importance of 
this  issue,  for  the  companies  themselves,  for 
employees and their representative organizations, 
and  for society at large, the arguments in favour 
of  a  convergence  of  national  laws  and  the 
creation  of  Community  law  have  special 
force.  In  particular, a greater degree of  conver-
gence  between  the  laws  regulating  the  role  of 
employees  in  the  decision  making  structures of 
companies  will  facilitate  the  restructuring  of 
enterprises within the  Community on an interna-
tional  basis.  Up  to  the  present, the  differences 
between the systems in force  in different Member 
States  have  constituted  a  particularly  serious 
obstacle  to  the  rational  reorganization  of  the 
legal  structures  of  enterprises  across  national 
frontiers,  which  has  been  overcome  only  with 
considerable difficulty and  by  the  use of relative-
ly  complex  legal  devices,  such  as  the  arrange-
ments  adopted  by  Hoesch  AG  and  Koninklijke 
· Nederlandsche  Hoogovens  en  Staalfabrieken 
NV  to  form  Estel  NV  and  its  two  operating 
companies. 
In  addition,  the  establishment  of  a  common 
market for  companies should not be  approached 
as  if  it  were  a  politically  neutral,  essentially 
technical  matter.  The  way  in  which  a  legal 
system  structures  industrial  and  commercial 
enterprises  is  intimately  connected  with  funda-
mental  elements  in  the  general  social  and  eco-
nomic  policies  adopted  by  the  society  in  ques-
tion.  At  the  Community level, it is  necessary, in 
order to construct a common market for  compa-
nies,  to  ensure  that  the  Community framework 
will  take  proper  account  of  the  way  in  which 
relevant social  and  economic policies  are  devel-
oping  in  the  Member  States.  Furthermore, the 
1  Supplement 4/7  5 - Bull. EC. 
2  Work  is  currently  proceeding in  a  working group 
under  the  Chairmanship  of  Mr  Berthold  Goldman, 
Professor  at  the  University  of  Law,  Economics  and 
Social Sciences of Paris, to adapt the Draft Convention 
on  the  International  merger  of  'societes  anonymes' 
(Supplement  13/73  - Bull.  EC),  following  the 
enlargement of the Community in  1973. 
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not  an  end  in  itself.  It  is  only  one  means  of 
achieving  the  Community's  fundamental  objec-
tives  which  include  a  harmonious  development 
of economic activities, including a fairer distribu-
tion  of  economic  activity  between  the  various 
regions  of  the  Community, an increase in  stabil-
ity,  and  the  improvement  of  the  living  and 
working  conditions  of  the  Community's  citiz-
ens.  Accordingly,  in  constructing the  common 
market,  the  Community  must  necessarily  take 
steps  to  approximate  relevant  economic  and 
social  policies  in  a  way  which  will  ensure  that 
sufficient  progress  is  made  as  to  the  realization 
of the Community's fundamental objectives in all 
Member S~ates. 
In  the  view  of  the  Commission, it  is  clear from 
the  developments  which  have  been  and  still  are 
taking  place  in  many  Member  States,  that  the 
time  is  ripe  for  the  reform  of  certain  social 
institutions, companies included, to take account 
of  some  important evolutions  which  have  been 
gathering momentum for some time. 
The  first  evolution  is  the  increasing  recognition 
being  given  to  the  democratic  imperative  that 
those  who.  will  be  substantially  affected  by 
decisions  made  by  social  and  political  institu-
tions  must  be  involved  in  the  making  of  those 
decisions.  In  particular, employees  are  increas-
ing! y seen  to  have  interests in the functioning of 
enterprises  which  can  be  as  substantial  as  those 
of  shareholders,  and  sometimes  more  so.  Em-
ployees  not only derive their income from  enter-
prises  which  employ  them,  but  they  devote  a 
large  proportion  of  their  daily  lives  to  the 
enterprise.  Decisions  taken  by  or in  the  enter-
prise  can  have  a  substantial  effect  on  their 
economic  circumstances,  both  immediately  and 
in  the  longer  term;  the  satisfaction  which  they 
derive  from  work;  their  health  and  physical 
condition;  the  time  and  energy  which  they  can 
devote  to  their  families  and  to  activities  other 
than  work;  and  even  their  sense  of  dignity and 
autonomy as  human beings.  Accordingly, cont-
inuing  consideration  is  being  given  to  the  pro-
blem  of  how  and  to  what  extent  employees 
should  be  able  to  influence  the  decisions  of 
enterprises which employ them. 
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The  second  is  a  growing awareness of  the  need 
for  institutions which can  respond effectively to 
the  need  for  change.  This  awareness  is  based 
upon  the  perception  that the  present era  is  one 
characterized  by  change,  and  that  this  feature 
may  well  become  more  pronounced  in  years  to 
come.  Changes  in  the  economic  environment, 
sometimes  of  a  radical  nature,  like  the  recent 
sharp rise in energy prices, are bound to confront 
the  Community  in  the  future,  probably  with 
increasing frequency.  As far as industrial affairs 
are concerned, the difficult situations which have 
arisen in several Member States as a result of the 
impact  of  basic  technological  changes  on  long 
established  industries  and  their  associated  com-
munities  have  dramatically  emphasized  the 
trend.  And  it  is  clear  that the  completion and 
operation of the  European Community will itself 
involve  structural  changes  of  a  substantial 
kind.  All  Member States without exception are 
thus faced  with the  prospect of having to  imple-
ment  changes, sometimes of  a radical  nature, as 
regards  their  economic  and  social  structures, 
both immediately and for the foreseeable future. 
In  some  ways,  there  is  a  degree  of  tension 
between  these  two  developments.  Changes 
which  are  desirable from  a broad economic and 
social  point  of  view  may  appear  to  be  more 
difficult  to  implement if those concerned, partic-
ularly  those  with  a  vested  interest  in  existing 
systems  and  structures, are  to  participate  in  the 
decision  making.  However,  for  sophisticated, 
industrial societies, there  is  no alternative, if they 
are  to  retain  a democratic  character.  Difficult 
problems of  industrial  relations  will  be easier to 
solve  properly,  fairly  and  with  a  minimum  of 
wasteful  confrontation,  if  there are  mechanisms 
which  involve  those  closely  affected  in  the  pro-
cess  of  finding  solutions.  For  while  such 
mechanisms  cannot  always  produce  complete 
agreement,  they  can  at  least  help  to  ensure  a 
reasonable  degree  of  understanding,  and  an 
adequate level of acceptance. 
Accordingly,  in  all  Member  States,  and  in  the 
Community,  different  methods  exist  and  are 
being  considered  for  bringing about a  dialogue 
between  the  social  partners  and,  where  appro-
priate, with  public  authorities,  at  various  levels 
9 of the  economy.  The  enterprise, being an insti-
tution in which fundamental decisions are taken, 
cannot  escape  this  re-organization  of  the  rela-
tionships  between those  who  have  the  power to 
make  decisions  and  those  who  must carry them 
out.  And  the  reform  of  laws  relating  to  the 
decision  making  structures  of  companies  inev-
itably involves  consideration of  these  broad and 
fundamental  issues  of  human  and  social  rela-
tions. 
In  making  its  proposals  aimed  at  creating  a 
common market for  companies, the  Commission 
must  necessarily  take  account  of  these  develop-
ments,  and  ensure  that  proposed  Community 
legislation  adequately  reflects  them.  It  must 
also  seek  to  ensure  that measures  taken  in  the 
Member  States  are  not  so  divergent  that  they 
themselves  become  obstacles to the  development 
of  a  genuine  industrial,  commercial  and  social 
Community. 
In  addition, the  Commission  has  its  responsibil-
ity  to  ensure  that  its  proposals  will  make  a 
contribution  to  the  realization of  the  Commun-
ity's  fundamental  objectives.  In  particular,  the 
Commission  must  seek  to  ensure that proposed 
legislation will  tend  to  improve living and work-
ing  conditions  throughout  the  Commun-
ity.  Too great a divergence  in  the  laws  regulat-
ing  the  role  of  employees  in  relation  to  the 
decision  making structures of  companies consti-
tutes  not only  a  barrier  to  cross-frontier  move-
ments  of companies, capital and  employees, but, 
more  fundamentally,  it  is  also  a  denial  of  the 
idea  of  a  Community  as  far  as  employees  are 
concerned.  If the  Community  is  to  be  a reality 
for  employees,  as  well  as  for  companies and  the 
holders of capital, then the rights and legal status 
of  a company's employees  cannot be  allowed to 
remain  well  developed  in  some  Member  States, 
but limited or rudimentary  in  others.  A degree 
of convergence is  required which will ensure that 
an  employee, wherever  he  is  employed, enjoys a 
legal  status  in  relation  to  the  company  which 
employs  him  which  is  not  radically  inferior  to 
that  enjoyed  by  employees  elsewhere  in  the 
Community.  Accordingly,  the  Commission 
must seek to  ensure that the laws of the Member 
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States  regulating  the  rights  of  employees  in 
relation  to  the  decision  making  structures  of 
companies  develop  within  a  Community  fra-
mework which guarantees an adequate degree of 
convergence  between  the  systems  in  force  in 
different parts of the Community. 
A sufficient convergence  of social  and economic 
policies  and  structures  in  these  areas  will  not 
happen  automatically  as  a  consequence  of  the 
integration of  Community markets.  Conscious 
political  decisions  are  required  to  ensure  that 
reforms  decrease  present  disparities  and  that  a 
common  market  for  companies  is  created  in  a 
way  which  takes  proper account of  the  manner 
in  which  economic  and  social  institutions  and 
policies  are  evolving.  Action  taken  at  the 
national level which does not take account of the 
European dimension may well  be  harmful to the 
development  of  the  new  European  industrial 
society.  In  this  field  as  in  others  however, the 
goal  is  not  instant  uniformity  for  uniformity's 
sake,  nor  is  it  desired  to  place  a  restraint  on 
positive  developments  which  are  in  progress  in 
certain  countries.  The  objective  is  the  gradual 
removal  of  unacceptable  degrees  of  divergence 
between the  structures and policies of  the  Mem-
ber States. 
The  current period  of  profound  economic  and 
social  change  in  the  world, characterized  by  the 
need  to  pay several  times  more  for  basic energy 
supplies,  emphasizes  the  necessity  for 
action.  Enterprises  must  produce  more  effi-
ciently, both in order to ensure their own surviv-
al  and  to  help  the  Member  States'  balance  of 
payments.  Consequently,  the  need  for  indus-
trial  reorganization  to  establish  rational  and 
efficient  industrial  structures  has  been  greatly 
·increased.  At  the  same  time,  economic expan-
sion  has  slowed, and  in  certain areas  come  to  a 
halt or even  been replaced by contraction.  The 
scope  for  real  increases  in  incomes  has  dimin-
ished  or disappeared, and unemployment contin-
ues  to  grow.  As  a  result,  industrial  relations 
have  been  placed  under  stress.  Conflicts  of 
interest are more acutely felt  not only as to wage . 
increases,  but  also  of  course  in  relation  to 
industrial  reorganization,  in  the  interests  of effi-
ciency, competitiveness and future prosperity. 
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with  its  reduced  possibilities  for  growth,  has 
emphasized  the  need  for  mechanisms which will 
adequately ensure the  pursuit of goals other than 
economic  growth,  such  as  the  improvement  of 
the  quality  of  life  and  working conditions,  the 
protection of  the  environment and  the  interests 
of  the  consumer.  The pursuit of such goals can 
probably  be  secured  only  by  the  existence  of 
decision  making  processes  in  enterprises  which 
have  a broader, more democratic base than such 
processes often have at present. 
On the  other hand, it is  also  clear that adequate 
allowance must be  made for the fact that existing 
structures  differ  from  one  Member  State  to 
another  because  of  the  varied  development  of 
their  economic  and  social  histories,  and  their 
diverse  legal  traditions.  Community legislation 
must  seek  to  assist  convergent  developments  in 
the  future,  while  recognizing  that the  divergent 
developments  of  the  past  impose  certain limita-
tions, as  regards both the definition of Commun-
ity  objectives, which  must  be  as  broad  as  possi-
ble,  and  also  the  speed  with which  those objec-
tives can be approached. 
For  this  reason,  the  draft Statute  for  European 
Companies, which has recently been amended in 
accordance  with  the  opinion  of  the  European 
Parliament
1  and  presented  to  the  Council/ does 
not,  in  the  view  of the Commission, constitute a 
prototype for  a directive approximating national 
laws.  The  Statute  proposes  to  create,  for  the 
benefit of certain companies with a transnational 
character, an  entirely optional  alternative  to the 
use  of  different  national  laws.  Accordingly,  it 
contains  a  single,  comprehensive  set  of  rules, 
with advantages and also obligations not known 
to  national systems.  That is essentially different 
from  a directive which, since it will apply to nine 
national laws  under which companies  are  alrea-
dy  constituted, will  necessarily have  to  be  more 
flexible.  The  requirement  is  for  a framework, 
which will  be  viable,  both now  and  in  the  long 
term, and  which will  be elastic enough to include 
those developments which are  convergent within 
a  broad  range  of  mutually  compatible  sol-
utions.  There  1s  also  a  clear  need 
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for  adequate  transitional  arrangements  for  cer-
tain  changes  which  are  required,  since  they 
concern  the  operation  of  institutions  firmly 
anchored in their particular traditions. 
By  publishing  a  'green  paper' at this  time,  the 
Commission intends to  make a new contribution 
to  the  debate  in progress.  The  publication has 
two  main  functions.  The  first  is  to  give  an 
account  of  the  principal  positions  and  trends, 
political  and  legal,  which  are  discernible  in  the 
Community.  The  second  is  to  focus  attention 
on what appear to  be  the  fundamental questions 
which  must  be  answered,  and  the  possible  ans-
wers  to  those  questions,  if  the  current debate  is 
to  be  brought to a useful  conclusion for the time 
being at the  European level.  In particular, it  is 
hoped  that  the  publication  will  facilitate  the 
preparation  of  the  Opinion  of  the  European 
Parliament on  the  Proposal  for  a fifth  directive 
on the  structure of 'societes anonymes', in order 
to  adapt the  Proposal  to  current circumstances, 
and make it more flexible.  · 
The first part of the  paper will begin with a brief 
summary of  relevant Community programmes to 
date.  The  heart  of  the  report  consists  of  a 
general  account  and  analysis  of  the  principal 
positions and  trends discernible in the Commun-
ity  with  regard  to  the  issues  of  company struc-
ture  and  employee  participation.  This  con-
cludes  with  a  consideration  of  the · concrete 
problems  to  which this  situation presently gives 
rise  at  the  Community  level,  and  of  certain 
possible  approaches  to  those  problems.  The 
second  part of the report is  a country-by-country 
survey giving a picture of the situation in each of 
the  Member  States  of  the  Community,  being a 
summary  of  the  information  which  formed  the 
factual  basis  for  the  preceding  general  account 
1  Opinion on the proposal for a Regulation embody-
ing a  Statute for  the  European Company, OJ C93 of 
7.8.1974, p. 22. 
2  Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation on the 
Statute  for  European  Companies.  Submitted  by  the 
Commission  to  the  Council on  13  May 1975.  Sup-
plement 4/7  5 _.:_  Bull. EC. 
11 and  analysis.  Finally,  the  special  problems 
p_ose~ by !he implementation of employee parti-
cipation  m  groups  of  companies  have  been 
treated  in  Appendix  I,  and  the  functions  of  a 
European  Works  Council,  as  proposed  in  the 
European  Companies Statute,
1  are  considered  in 
Appendix II. 
To  summarize,  in  the  view  of  the  Commission, 
the  development  of  Community  legislation  in 
this field  constitutes an  important guarantee of a 
necessary degree of convergence in the social and 
economic  progress  of  our  time.  While  not 
inhibiting further developments, it will constitute 
an  important part of a common structural foun-
?ation upon the evolution of which the  prosper-
tty  of  each of the  Community's citizens  in  large 
part  depends.  The  legislation  must  therefore 
create  a framework which takes  proper account 
of  current  developments,  social,  economic  and 
political,  and  of  the  diverse  traditions  of  the 
Member States. 
The political importance of such an evolution for 
all  Member States can hardly be  denied, both as 
regards  their  relationships  with  each other, and 
their relationships with  the  rest of the world.  If 
there  is  not a sound economic and  social  struc-
ture  for  the  Community  as  a whole,  there  is  a 
serious  danger  that,  sooner  or  later,  the  needs 
and  interests of  certain  parts of  the  Community 
will  be  so  different  from  those  of  other  parts, 
that  the  existing  Community arrangements  will 
be  insufficient  to  to  take  the  strain.  Similarly, 
only by developing a common structural founda-
tion can  the  Member States hope to  adopt more 
united  policies  as  to  the  world  outside.  If the 
underlying  structure  is  made  up  of  elements 
which  are  disparate  and  even  inconsistent, then 
so  will  be  the  policies  pursued  by  the  Member 
States.  Failure to  make progress in  constructing 
a  common  economic and social  foundation  will 
not  only  make  it  impossible  to  contemplate 
economic  and  monetary  union,  but will  consti-
tute. a continuing threat to what has already been 
achteved.  The  Community's  foundation  must 
be  completed for otherwise it may well  collapse. 
1  Supplement 4/75- BulL  EC. 
12 
Community  programmes 
and  proposals 
Up  to  the  present,  Community  initiatives  have 
been taken concerning the decision making struc-
tures  of  enterprises  and  the  employees'  role  in 
relation  thereto  in  two  main  areas:  first  in 
connection  with  the  social  action  progra~me 
adopted  by  the  Council  in  its  resolution  of 
January 1974
1  and  second, in the  context of  the 
approximation  of  company  laws  and  the  crea-
tion  of  European  company  law.  In  the  near 
future,  new  initiatives  will  be  taken  in  the 
particular context of the  special problems posed 
by the activities of  multinational enterprises.
2 
As  for  the social action programme, the  Council 
resolved  in  January  1974 that measures  should 
be  taken  in  the  immediate  future  to  involve 
workers  or  their  representatives  in  the  life  of 
undertakings  in  the  Community.
1  In  this  con-
nection, in February 1975 the Council adopted a 
directive  on  collective  redundancies
3  which 
requires  the  Member States  to  oblige  employers 
contemplating  large  scale  dismissals  of  their 
employees  to  enter  into  consultations  with  the 
employees' representatives with a view  to  reach-
ing  an  agreement.  These  consultations  are  to 
cover  wa~s  and  means  of  avoiding  collective 
redundancies  or  of  reducing  the  number  of 
employees  affected,  and  mitigating  the  conse-
quences.  The  employees'  representatives  must 
be  supplied  with  all  relevant  information  con-
cerning  the. redundancies.  Furthermore,  proj-
ected  collective redundancies are to  be  notified in 
advance  to  a  competent  public  authority,  and 
1  Council  Resolution  of  21.1.1974  concerning  a 
social  action programme, OJ C13 of 12.2.1974, p. 1, 
Supplement 2/74- Bull. EC. 
2  The problem of the role of employees in relation to 
m  ultina~ion~l enterprises has already been considered 
1n. Multmatzonal undertakings and Community Regul-
ations.  Communication from the Commission to the 
Council, presented on 8 November 1973, Supplement 
15173- Bull. EC. 
·1  Council Directive on the approximation of the laws 
of  the  Member States  relating to collective redundan-
. cies (75/129/EEC), OJ L48 of 22.2.1975, p. 29. 
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thirty  days  has  expired  during which  time  the 
public  authority  is  to  seek  solutions  to  the 
problems raised by the projected redundancies. 
The  Commission  has  also  proposed  a  directive 
on the  retention of the rights  and advantages of 
employees in  the  case of  mergers, takeovers and 
amalgamations generally.'  The proposed direc-
tive  would apply to international mergers taking 
place  under  the  terms of  the  proposed  conven-
tion on international mergers to which reference 
has  already  been  made,  and  to  all  internal 
mergers, takeovers and amalgamations involving 
a  change of employer, other than those covered 
by  the  third  directive  on  the  coordination  of 
safeguards  in  connection with mergers  between 
'societes  anonymes'.
2  The  proposal, as  amend-
ed,  requires  each  enterprise  concerned,  before 
carrying out a projected operation, to inform the 
representatives  of  their  respective  employees  of 
the  reasons which led  them to  consider such an 
operation,  and  also  of  the  legal, economic and 
social  consequences  which  it  entails  for  the 
employees,  indicating what measures  are  to  be 
taken on their behalf.  If the employee represen-
tatives  so  request,  negotiations  shall  take  place 
immediately concerning these measures. 
In  addition,  if  the  employees'  representatives 
consider  that  the  operation entails  prejudice  to 
the  employees'  interests,  the  enterprises  con-
cerned must engage in negotiations for the esta-
blishment of a social plan consisting of measures 
to  be  taken  on  the  employees'  behalf.  If  no 
agreement is  forthcoming on this  matter, either 
party  can  put  the  matter  before  an  arbitration 
authority which will decide in  the  last resort on 
the  measures  to  be  taken  in  favour  of  the 
employees.  This authority is  to be composed of 
equal numbers of members designated by each of 
the parties who in turn are to co-opt a president. 
These provisions are in  harmony with the views 
expressed by the European Parliament on 8 April 
1975.-
1 
Similar  rules  have  been  included  in  the  revised 
proposal for a European Companies Statute, and 
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in  the  third  directive  on  mergers  between 
'societes anonymes' in  the form approved by the 
European  Parliament, both of which are discus-
sed  in  the  context of  Community legislation on 
companies below. 
Furthermore,  work  is  proceeding to  encourage 
the  development  of  collective  bargaining  at 
European  level.  The  European  Card  Index  of 
Collective  Agreements  is  being  compiled,  and 
joint  sectoral  committees  have  been  set  up  to 
bring the  two  sides  of  particular industrial  and 
economic  sectors  together  at  the  Community 
level.  Developments in  this area probably can-
not  be  particularly  rapid  owing to the  difficult 
organizational problems and the  need to respect 
the  autonomy of each of the  parties.  But it  is 
hoped  that  in  the  long  run  these  programmes 
will  facilitate  the  conclusion of  collective agree-
ments  at the  European level.  In  particular, the 
conclusion  of  such  agreements  constitutes  an 
essential  part  of  the  solution  to  the  problems 
posed by the multinational enterprise.
4 
Reference  should also  be  made at this  point to 
those  programmes of the  Community which are 
not concerned directly with the role of employees 
in  relation to the decision making of enterprises, 
but  which  seek  to  involve  employers  and 
employees in decision making at the Community 
level,  such  as  the  consultative  function  of  the 
most  general  kind  performed  by  the  Economic 
and  Social  Committee  and  the  more  specific 
1  Proposal  for a  Directive of the Council on harmo-
nization  of  the  legislation  of  Member States  on  the 
retention of the rights and advantages of employees in 
the  case  of  mergers,  takeovers  and  amalgama-
tions.  Submitted  to  the  Council by  the  Commission 
on 21.6.1974.  OJ C104 of 13.9.1974, p.  1. Amend-
ed proposal submitted to the Council by the Commis-
sion on 18.8.1975, Bull. EC 7/8-1975, point 2235. 
2  Bull. EC 1-1973, point 2113, see also below. 
3  Opinion on the  proposal for a Directive on harmo-
nization  of  the  legislation  of  Member States  on  the 
retention of the rights and advantages of employees in 
the case of mergers, takeovers and amalgamations, 0] 
C95 of 28.4.1975, p. 17. 
4  See  Multinational  undertakings  and  Cqmmunity 
Regulations.  Communication  from  the Commission 
to  the  Council,  presented  on  8.11.1973,  Chapter 
IIIB.  Supplement 15/73- Bull. EC. 
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European  Social  Fund  Committee,  the  Standing 
Committee  on  Employment,  and  the  joint  sec-
toral committees.  Participation in the enterprise 
and  participation  in  Community  decisions, 
together  with  national  programmes  which  seek 
to  promote  participation  in  governmental  deci-
sion  making within  Member States, are comple-
mentary  responses  at  different  levels  to  the 
same  requirements  of  economic  and  social 
policy.  Accordingly, Community measures  and 
proposals concerning participation in relation to 
enterprises should not be  considered in isolation, 
but  as  an  important  part of  a  broad  range  of 
developments  which  have  the  same fundamental 
purposes. 
As  for  the  future,  preparatory  work  has  been 
commenced,  in  accordance  with  the  Council's 
resolution  of  January  1974,
1  to  establish  an 
action  programme  for  employees  aimed  at 
'humanization of their living and working condi-
tions'  which  will  have  an  undoubted  impact on 
the  role  of  the  employee  in  relation  to  the 
decision making of enterprises.  Employee parti-
cipation in the decision making of companies has 
an  obvious  relevance  to  such  programmes,  and 
for  this  reason,  these  matters  should  not  be 
considered  completely  separately  from  each 
other. 
Turning to  the  approximation of  company laws 
and  the  creation of  Community company laws, 
the  most important initiatives taken to date with 
regard  to  the  decision  making  structures  of 
enterprises  and  the  employees'  role  in  relation 
thereto, are the  proposals to  which reference has 
already  been  made,  namely  for  a  European 
Companies  Statute,  for  a  third  directive  on 
coordination  of  safeguards  in  connection  with 
mergers  between  'societes  anonymes', and  for  a 
fifth  directive  to  coordinate the  laws  of Member 
States  as  regards  the  structures of  'societes ano-
nymes'.  Preparatory  work  has  also  begun  in 
relation  to  takeovers  and  groups  of  companies 
which  will  probably  result  in  the  making  of 
further  proposals  having  an  effect  on the  deci-
sion  making  structures  of  enterprises,  and  the 
role  of employees in  relation thereto.  The diffi-
cult  problem  posed  by  groups  of  companies  m 
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relation  to  employee  participation,  namely  the 
need  to  ensure both effective central control and 
at  the  same  time,  real  employee  influence  on 
decision making, is discussed in Appendix I. 
The  proposed European Companies Statute will 
constitute the directly applicable Community law 
under which enterprises which wish to engage in 
certain  kinds  of  cross-frontier  activity  will  be 
able,  if  they  wish, to  form  European  companies 
and thereby adopt legal forms appropriate to the 
scale  and  requirements  of  the  European market 
in which they wish to operate. 
The  structure  which  the  Statute  provides  is 
sophisticated  and  comprehensive.  European 
companies would  have  in  addition to  the  share-
holders'  general  meeting,  a  two  tier  or  dualist 
board system  with a management body responsi-
ble  for  managing and representing the company, 
and  a supervisory body  responsible for  appoint-
ing,  supervising  and  if  necessary,  removing  the 
management  body.  The  management  body 
would  be  obliged  to  obtain the  prior consent of 
the supervisory body to  certain matters of  major 
importance to the company, such as programmes 
of  expansion  and  contraction,  organizational 
changes  and  long term  arrangements with other 
enterprises.  Further  specific  matters  requiring 
· the  supervisory  body's  prior  consent  could  be 
specified  by  the  terms  of  the  company's 
articles.  Moreover,  provision  has  been  made 
for  the  employees  of  a  European  company  to 
influence  the  decision  making of  the  enterprises 
in a number of ways. 
First, the  conditions of  employment which are to 
apply to  the  employees  of  the  European compa-
ny  may  be  regulated  by  European  collective 
agreements  made  between  the  company and  the 
trade unions represented in  its establishments. 
Second,  a  European  works  council  is  to  be 
formed  in  every  European company having esta-
blishments  in  more  than  one  Member  State, 
which  is  to  be  responsible  for  representing  the 
interests of all  the employees of the  company on 
1  OJ C13 of 12.2.1974, p. 1. 
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or  several  establishments.  This  Council  will 
have  the  following rights: to  be  informed on the 
company's  affairs,  to  discuss  those  affairs  with 
the  management  body,  to  be  consulted  by  the 
management  body  before  the  making of  certain 
important decisions,  and to  give  or withhold  its 
consent  as  regards  certain  other  aspects  of  the 
company's  affairs  which  affect  employees  very 
closely, such  as  the  settlement of  social  plans to 
deal  with the consequences of contractions in the 
enterprise. 
However,  in  general,  employee  representative 
bodies  formed  in  the  establishments  of  a  Eur-
opean  company  under  national  laws  are  to 
continue  to  exercise  their existing functions  and 
powers.  Likewise, trade unions will continue to 
play  their  customary role  as  far  as  the  represen-
tation of  their members  is  concerned, and indeed 
the  primacy of all  collective agreements has been 
specifically guaranteed. 
Finally,  the  employees  are  to  have  the  right  to 
participate in the appointment of the members of 
the  company's  supervisory  body.  The  original 
proposal  required  that  the  employees  should 
appoint at least one  third of  the  members of  the 
supervisory body, the  remainder being appointed 
by  the  shareholders'  general  meeting.  Follow-
ing the opinion of the European Parliament given 
in  July  1974,
1  the  Commission  has  amended  its 
proposal  which  now  requires that the  sharehol-
ders  should  elect  one  third of the  members,  the 
employees  the  second  third, and  that these  elec-
ted  members should  together co-opt the  remain-
ing members, who  are to  be  independent of both 
employees  and  shareholders,  and  to  represent 
general interests.
2 
The proposal for  a third directive on  the  coordi-
nation of safeguards  in  connection with mergers 
between 'societes anonymes' and analogous com-
panies, as  it  will  be  amended  in  the  near future, 
following  a  resolution  of  the  European  Parlia-
ment/  will  embody  principles  concerning  the 
participation  of  employees  in  relevant  decision 
making similar to those of the proposed directive 
on  the  retention of  the  rights  and advantages of 
employees  in  the  case  of  mergers, takeovers and 
amalgamations generally. 
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As  stated  above, the  proposed fifth  directive,  in 
contrast to the European Companies Statute, will 
not  provide an  optional  company structure, but 
will  bring  about  a  coordination of  the  laws  of 
Member  States  as  regards  the  structures  of 
'societes  anonymes'  and  analogous  corporate 
forms.  The original proposal, like the proposed 
European  Companies  Statute,  requires  that  all 
companies  within  the  scope  of  its  provisions 
would  have  to have, in addition to the sharehol-
ders'  general  meeting,  a  two  tier  system  with a 
supervisory  and  management  body.  Certain 
important transactions  would  require  the  super-
visory  body's prior consent, and  national law  or 
a  company's  articles  could  add  to  the  list  of 
operations requiring prior authorization. 
Furthermore,  for  all  such  companies  with  five 
hundred or more employees, the  Member States 
would have  to  require that the employees should 
be  able  to  participate  in  the  appointment of  the 
members  of the supervisory body.  The Member 
States  are  given  the  choice  of  providing  either 
that at least one third of  the  members  are to  be 
appointed  by  the  employees  or their  representa-
tives,  or  that  the  members  of  the  supervisory 
body must be  acceptable to  the employees.  Un-
der  the  latter system, the  members  of the super-
visory  body  are  to  be  co-opted,  but  either  the 
general meeting or the employees' representatives 
can· object  to  the  appointment  of  a  proposed 
member on  the  ground that the  proposed candi-
date  lacks  the  ability  to  carry  out his  duties or 
that his  appointment would  cause  an  imbalance 
in  the  supervisory  body's  composition  having 
regard  to  the  interests  of  the  company,  the 
shareholders  and  the  employees.  The  proposal 
would  also  permit Member  States which choose 
a system  of  direct appointment by the employees 
1  Opinion on the proposal for a Regulation embody-
ing a  Statute for  the  European Company, OJ C93 of 
7.8.1974. 
2  Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation on the 
Statute for European Companies, Supplement 4/7  5 -
Bull. EC. 
·1  Resolution  on  the  amended  proposal  for  a  third 
Directive on coordination of safeguards in  connection 
with mergers between 'societes anonymes', 0] C 9 5 of 
28,4.1975, p.  12. 
15 or  their  representatives  to  further  provide  that 
some  of  those  members  of  the  supervisory body 
who  are  not appointed  by the employees should 
be  appointed otherwise than by  general meeting, 
for example to represent the general interest. 
The task ahead  is  to ensure that the proposal for 
a fifth  directive  is  amended  so  that Community 
objectives  can  be  defined  and  approached  in  a 
way  which  takes  proper account of  the  manner 
in  which,  in  each  Member  State,  the  relevant 
laws,  practices  and  policies  have  become  esta-
blished, and are developing. 
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Company structure 
The  problem 
The  distinctive  characteristic  of  large  and 
medium -sized  commercial companies throughout 
the  Community  is  that  such.  companies  are 
normally  owned  by  a  disparate  and  relatively 
numerous group.  In  fact, one of the fundamen-
tal  economic  purposes  which  the  'societe  ano-. 
nyme'  and  analogous  corporate  organizations 
have  fulfilled  is  the  bringing  together of  capital 
from  numerous sources for the  mutual benefit of 
those  who  have  contributed and  of  society as  a 
whole.  In  the  interests  of  efficiency  however, 
such  contributors  of  capital  must  necessarily 
hand  over  the  management  of  the  company's 
affairs  to  a  smaller  group  capable  of  relatively 
quick  and  continuous  decision  making.  This 
also  permits  the  company's  affairs  to  be  placed 
in  the  hands of those who are equipped with the 
special  abilities and skills which are necessary for 
effective  management and which many sharehol-
ders may not themselves possess. 
However,  having  handed  over  the  management 
of  the  company's  affairs  to  a  small  group,  the 
shareholders  have  had  to  have  some  way  of 
ensuring that the  'managers' act in  the  interests 
of  the  shareholders  as  a whole  and  not in  their 
own  or  some  other  extraneous  interest.  The 
managers  must  be  aware  that  their  conduct  is 
subject  to  scrutiny.  The  legislations  of  all  the 
Member States  have  grappled with this problem 
of  designing  company structures which  provide 
for  the  managers  to  be  controlled.  An  examin-
ation  of  these  solutions  and  their  evolution, 
varied  in  some  respects  as  they  are,  reveals 
certain  common  features  and  trends  which  can 
serve  as  useful  guidelines for  the  development of 
Community legislation on companies. 
Approaches to the problem 
The board of directors 
and the  general meeting 
The  early  solution  to  the  problem  adopted  in 
several  countries  was  for  the  law  to  permit the 
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handed  over  normally  to  a  'board' or 'council' 
and to make the board directly answerable to the 
shareholders  in  general  meeting.  The  underly-
ing assumptions of  the legislators appear to have 
been  that the  members  of  the  board would  be 
personally  involved  in  the  management  of  the 
company's  affairs  and  that  the  shareholders, 
astute  in  the  pursuit  of  their  own  interests, 
would  scrutinize  the  progress  of  the  company's 
business  and  if  necessary  be  able  and  willing to 
call  their  managers  to  account  through  the 
power  of  the  general  meeting  to  replace 
them.  Where  these  assumptions have  been  jus-
tified, a simple structure of  this  kind has worked 
effectively and  in  all  probability still can.  How-
ever, while these assumptions were once justified 
perhaps,  they  are  justified  increasingly rarely as 
companies' shares become widely distributed in a 
society, and  as  their operations become complex 
and technical. 
The  increasing  complexity  of  business  affairs 
tends  to  produce  situations  in  which  the  direc-
tors  or  some  of  them  delegate  their  functions, 
perhaps  extensively.  The  company  laws  of 
several  Member States at a certain stage of their 
development  reflected  this  requirement  and 
began  to  provide  for  delegation  by  the  board of 
its  functions  to  committees, managing directors, 
executive  directors  and  others.  Thus,  in  the 
United  Kingdom,  one  finds  first  the  recognition 
of a power for the  board of directors to delegate 
its  functions  to  committees/  followed  by  recog-
nition  of  a  power to  delegate  to  managing and 
executive directors.
2  Similar powers were grant-
ed  by French and Italian law. 
The strength of the underlying forces which have 
stimulated this kind  of delegation can  be  gauged 
by  considering  the  position  in  Belgium  and 
Luxembourg.  According to the law, the 'conseil 
d'administration' can  delegate  only the  manage-
ment of day to  day  affairs,  but this  limitation is 
in  fact  widely  ignored,  particularly  in  larger 
enterprises,  and  extensive  powers  are  delegated 
to  an  executive  committee  of  the  'conseil  d'ad-
ministration'.  The  improper  delegation  is 
tolerated  by  all  interested parties since  it enables 
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the  company  to  operate  effectively  m  modern 
conditions. 
However,  delegation  by  the  board  or  council, 
necessary  as  some  of  it  may  be,  can  have 
negative  consequences  as  far  as  shareholders' 
control is  concerned, for the  non-executive direc-
tors  are  no  longer  so  intimately involved  in  the 
company's  affairs.  Moreover,  the  extent  to 
which the  non-executive directors effectively sup-
ervise  the  managing or executive  directors  may 
well  be  limited.  This  will  be  particularly  the 
case  if  the  managers are  in  a position where the 
other  members  of  the  board  are  for  various 
reasons  dependent  on  them  and  not  primarily 
interested  in  vigorously  protecting the  interests 
of  the  shareholders as  a whole.  In  fact,  in  this 
situation, the  notion that the executive directors 
are  the  delegates  of  the  board  or  council  as  a · 
whole,  and  operate  under  its  supervision,  no 
longer  represents  the  reality.  The  executive 
directors are running the  company essentially on 
their  own.  Moreover,  even  where  a  non-exec-
utive  or passive  director is  truly independent of 
the  managers,  he  may  well  find  it  difficult  to 
supervise  adequately  the  activity of managing or 
executive  directors  who  are  at  the  strategic 
centre  of  the  enterprise  and  therefore  enjoy 
advantages as  to  access to information, company 
resources  and, possibly, effective  proxy machin-
ery. 
As  for  the  assumed  willingness  and  ability  of 
shareholders  to  scrutinize  the  company's affairs 
and  to  call the  managers to account, the problem 
becomes  more  difficult  as  the  number  of  the 
shareholders increases.  A large, disparate group 
of  shareholders  will  not  be  able  to  intervene  as 
effectively  as  a  small,  coherent  group.  More-
over,  the  effectiveness  of  their  supervision 
depends  on  the  expertise  and  time  which  they 
can  devote  to  the  company's  affairs.  Small 
shareholders  in  a  large  modern enterprise often 
lack  sufficient  time  and  expertise  to  ensure 
adequate, continuous control on their behalf. 
1  Companies Clauses Act 1845, section 95. 
2  Companies Act  1948,  lst Schedule, Table  A,  Art. 
107. 
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attempts  to  solve  this  problem.  Emphasis  has 
sometimes been  placed  upon the  need  to inform 
shareholders  fully  of  the  progress  of  the  com-
pany's affairs, and upon formal requirements for 
the  directors  to  seek  the  approval  of  the  share-
holders  in  general  meeting before taking specific 
actions of great significance, such as  issuing new 
shares  or  disposing  of  the  company's 
assets.  Such  principles  are  to  be  found  in  the 
laws  of  several  Member States,  for  example  the 
laws  of  France  and  Germany.
2  Recent  propo-
sals  to  strengthen the  law  along these  lines  have 
been  made  in  the  United  Kingdom.
3  However, 
this  kind  of  approach,  though  a  desirable 
attempt  to  reinforce  the  traditional  role  of  the 
shareholders and  the  general  meeting,
4  does have 
limitations.  On  the  one  hand,  it  would  not be 
efficient  to  burden  those  managing  a  company 
with obligations to  inform the shareholders or to 
secure their consent on an impossibly wide range 
of matters.  On the other hand, as we have seen, 
the small shareholder has limited time and ability 
in  any  event  to  devote  to  supervision  of  the 
company's  affairs.  The  approach  needs  to  be 
complemented by other techniques. 
A separate supervisory function 
Accordingly,  legislators  in  many  Member States 
have  attempted  to solve  the  problem of supervi-
sion  more  radically  by  introducing  into  the 
company's  structure  a  new  element:  a  body 
distinct  from  either  the  general  meeting  or the 
managing  board  or  council  which  has  as  its 
function  the  supervision and control on behalf of 
the  shareholders  of  those  managing  the  com-
pany. 
The  earliest form  which  this  solution took may 
well  have  been the  commissioners ('commissaris- · 
sen')  of  Dutch  law  and  practice, who  might  be 
appointed  by  the  shareholders  to  supervise  the 
executive  directors'  conduct.  In  forms  more 
limited  in  practice,  the  idea  was  also  given 
expression  in  Belgium, France, Italy and  Luxem-
bourg.  In  these  countries, the  law  has required 
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the  appointment  of  commtsstoners  ('commis-
saires'  or  'sindaci'),  but  their  function  has  nor-
mally been limited to  controlling the  accuracy of 
the  company  accounts  and  the  legality  of  the 
company's activities. The Scandinavian sharehol-
ders' committee is also the same basic concept. 
However, it  is  in  Germany  and  the  Netherlands 
that the  idea has  received  its  fullest development 
in  the  form  of  mandatory 'dualist' structures for 
certain kinds of company.  The  German law  on 
stock  companies  (' Aktienrecht',  'Aktiengesetz') 
since  1870  has  required  the  stock  company 
(' Aktiengesellschaft') to have two bodies in addi-
tion to the general meeting:  a supervisory council 
('Aufsichtsrat')  and  a management board  ('Vor-
stand').  The  members of  the  supervisory coun-
cil  with  the  exception  of  those  members  who 
represent  the  company's  employees,  are  today 
normally appointed by the shareholders in gener-
al  meeting and  can  be  removed  by  them.  The 
supervisory  council  in  turn  appoints  a  manage-
ment board, the  members of which it can replace 
for  good  cause.  A member  of  the  supervisory 
council  may  not  be  simultaneously a member of 
the board of management. 
'  Loi  No  66-537, Article  170 (right of shareholders 
to  'documents  sociaux')  and  Articles  180  and  215 
(right of shareholders to determine increase and reduc-
tion of capital). 
2  Aktiengesetz  1965,  paragraph  17  5{2)  (annual 
financial  statements,  management  report,  report  of 
supervisory board, proposal as to  retained earnings to 
be  made available for inspection by shareholders) and 
paragraph  119  (shareholders  to  determine  inter  alia 
raising or reduction of capital). 
'  Companies Bill  1973, clauses 54 and 55. 
4  Such requirements have  been incorporated both in 
the proposed Statute for European Companies (see e.g. 
Articles 8 3 and 90), Supplement 4/7  5 - Bull. EC, and 
in  the  proposals  for  Directives  concerned  with  the 
approximation of company laws (see e.g. Article 30 of 
the  Proposal  for  a  Fifth Directive on the Structure of 
Societes  Anonymes,  Supplement  10/72 - Bull.  EC, 
and  Articles  16  and  22 of the Proposal for  a  Second 
Directive  on the  Formation of Public Companies and 
the  Maintenance  and  Alteration of  their  Capital, OJ 
C48 of 24.4.1970). 
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bodies,  the  board of  management directs  and  is 
responsible for  the  management of the company, 
while  the  supervisory  council  supervises  the 
management.  Accordingly,  the  board  of 
management has specific and detailed obligations 
as  regards  reporting on the  company's affairs to 
the  supervisory  council.  The  law  requires  a 
relatively  continuous  flow  of  information  to  be 
transmitted  by  the  management  to  the  supervi-
sory council on the  state of the  company and on 
envisaged  management  policy.  Moreover,  the 
supervisory  council  has  the  right  to  investigate 
the  company's affairs on its own initiative and  in 
so  doing,  it  may  inspect  the  company's  books 
and  records,  and  require the management board 
to  make  specific  reports  and  answer  specific 
questions.  The  supervisory  council  cannot  be 
charged  with  management  functions,  but  the 
company's  articles,  or  the  supervisory  council 
itself  may  require  that specified  measures of  the 
management board  receive  the  prior  consent of 
the  supervisory  council.  If consent  is  refused, 
then  the  management board  can  only proceed  if 
it  can  secure  a  three  quarters  majority  of  the 
votes at a shareholders' meeting. 
In  the  Netherlands,  the  law  of  1971  on  the 
structure  of  companies  prescribes  a  somewhat 
similar  system  for  most  large  public  compa-
nies.  The  companies  must  have  a  supervisory 
council  ('raad  van  commissarissen')  and  a 
management  board  ('bestuur'),  the  latter  being 
appointed  and  removed  by  the  former.  The 
supervisory  council  is  self  perpetuating,  but the 
shareholders and  the  employees have the right to 
challenge  a  proposal  to  nominate  a member on 
the  ground that the  appointee is  not qualified or 
that the council would not be properly composed 
if he were nominated. 
The division of function prescribed by law  is  that 
the  management board carries out and is  respon-
sible  for  the  management  of  the  company's 
business under the  supervision of the supervisory 
council.  The supervisory  council  must  be  kept 
informed  by  the  management, and  management 
decisions  closely  affecting  the  life  of  the  enter-
prise cannot be  carried out without the approval 
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of  the  supervisory  council.  Such  decisions 
include,  for  example,  large  new  investments  on 
the one hand, and closures on the other. 
Moreover,  even  when  a  Dutch company  is  not 
required  to  have  a  dualist structure of  the  type 
described, it  is  a Dutch practice of  long standing 
for  companies  of  substantial  size  to  have  a 
dualist  structure  under  the  terms  of  their  sta-
tutes.  Normally in such cases both the supervis-
ory  and  management  bodies  are  appointed  and 
removable by the shareholders' general meeting. 
Similar systems  have  been  made available on an 
optional basis  in  France, and may  become avail-
;able  in  Luxembourg.  In  Belgium, a commission 
of  experts  has  completed  a  draft  law  for  the 
Ministry of Justice which provides for a mandat-
ory dualist system,  consciously derived from  the 
law  in  force  in  Germany,  for  Belgian  'societes 
an9nymes'.  The  Council  of  State  ('Conseil 
d'Etat')  has  approved  the  draft save  for  certain 
matters  of  detail.  The  recent  Danish  law  on 
stock  companies  (' Aktieselskaber')  imposes  on 
larger  stock  companies  a  structure  which  is 
similar  in  many  ways,  though  the  management 
body  is  given  a  less  autonomous  role,  and  the 
board of directors ('bestyrelse')  has management 
functions. 
The  distinctive  feature  of  these  systems  is  that 
the  shareholders  have  an  opportunity  to 
influence the  composition of a body which has as 
its  function the exercise of  general and  relatively 
continuous  control  and  supervision  over  the 
activities  of  those  managing  the  company's 
affairs.  The  members  of  the  supervisory  body 
have the  opportunity of scrutinizing the  manage-
ment of  the .company on behalf of  the sharehol-
ders  in  a  way  that  shareholders  themselves, 
particularly small shareholders, normally cannot. 
Obviously,  there are limitations.  Persons  hold-
ing  substantial  blocks  of  shares  or  perhaps 
exploiting  proxy  machinery  may  be  able  to 
secure the election of members of the supervisory 
board whose  first  allegiance  may  not  be  to  the 
shareholders as a whole but to a particular group 
of  shareholders.  Conversely,  where  shares  are 
w.idely distributed among a very large  number of 
19 small  shareholders, the  members of the  manage-
ment  board may  succeed  in  proposing for  elec-
tion to  the supervisory board persons whose role 
is  to  give expert advice to  the management board 
rather than to exercise  an  independent supervis-
ory  function.
1  Analogous  problems  can  arise 
under one  board  systems.  A possible  solution, 
at least in part, would be to require companies to 
operate  systems  which  guarantee  a  degree  of 
representation  to  minorities  instead  of  relying 
upon simple majority voting which is  the normal 
practice at present throughout the Community. 
Despite such limitations, however, the separation 
of  the  supervisory  function,  by  making  those 
responsible for supervision of management more 
visible,  obviously  tends  to  reinforce  their  inde-
pendence.  On the  other hand, separation of the 
management function  emphasizes where respon-
sibility  for  that  function  lies  and  thereby  pro-
motes management efficiency. 
Even  when  companies  do  not  have  a  formal 
dualist  structure,  the  division  of  directors  into 
executive  and  non-executive  groups  can  operate 
so as  to produce a similar separation of function, 
with  the  non-executive  directors  exercising  a 
supervisory function in relation to the conduct of 
the  executives.  This  phenomenon  has  been 
observed  in  France, Italy, Ireland  and  the United 
Kingdom.  However, it  is  clear that an informal 
separation of function does not provide the same 
guarantees  as  a  formal  separation.  Moreover, 
in  many  cases  non-executive  directors  do  not 
have supervisory functions at all, and would find 
it very difficult to exercise such functions even  if 
they  wished  to  do  so,  by  reason  for  example of 
their  minority  position,  their  lack  of  time  and 
information,  or  their  dependence  in  fact  upon 
the executive directors' good-will.
2 
Finally,  there  appears  to  be  a  connection 
between the emergence of a separate supervisory 
body  for  companies  and  the  development  of 
techniques whereby employees can participate in 
the  appointment  of  members  of  the  decision 
making bodies of companies.  The connection is 
certainly  not  inevitable,  for  supervisory  bodies 
have existed without employee participation, and 
on  the  other  hand,  such employee  participation 
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has occasionally been  organized within the  con-
text  of  single  board  systems.  But  as  we  shall 
see,  the  development  of  employee  participation 
in  relation  to  the  decision  making  bodies  of 
companies appears to  have been most marked in 
Member States which require companies to  have 
a dualist or two tier system.  An  important part 
of  the  explanation  may  well  be  that  a  formal 
separation of function enables the representation 
of a plurality of  interests to  be  combined with a 
homogeneous  management  in  a  way  which 
unitary  systems  find  it  difficult  to  dupli-
cate.  Further  discussion  of  this  matter  will  be 
found  in  the  part  of  this  paper  dealing  with 
employee  participation  in  companies'  decision 
making bodies.
1 
1  See  Part  III,  section  9  of  the  Report  of  the 
Commission of Experts charged by the government of 
the  German Federal Republic in  1968 with a study of 
co-determination,  published  in  1970  under  the  title 
'Mitbestimmung im  Unternehmen', Deutscher Bundes-
tag,  6.  Wahlperiode,  Drucksache  Vl/334  (hereafter 
called the Biedenkopf Report after its chairman}. 
2  See  The  Board  of Directors,  Management Survey 
Report No  10 carried out by Political  and Economic 
Planning  (PEP)  for  the  British  Institute  of  Manage-
ment, 1972. 
.l  p. 30. 
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General 
Defined  generally  as  the  various  ways  in  which 
employed  persons  influence  the  decisions  of  the 
enterprises for  which they work, employee parti-
cipation  is  a  political,  legal  or  social  reality 
throughout  the  Community.  There  seems  also 
to be  a fairly  broad measure of consensus that in 
this general sense participation is  desirable.  On 
the other hand, as will  become clear subsequent-
ly,  participation  takes  a  great  number  of  forms 
both  in  the  Community  as· a  whole  and  in 
individual  Member States.  These forms  vary  in 
many ways, and  in  particular, as to  the nature of 
the  decisions  which are  influenced  and  as  to  the 
means  whereby  the  influence  is  exercised.  It is 
accordingly  necessary  to  examine  carefully  the 
main approaches which exist and are developing 
in  the  Community.  Once the  general character-
istics  of  the various forms have been isolated, the 
question  of  what  action  should  be  taken  in 
relation  to  company  law  at the  European  level 
will  become clearer and easier to answer. 
This  paper will  examine the  main approaches to 
employee  participation  under  four  headings: 
negotiation of collective  agreements;  representa-
tive  institutions  which  are  informed,  consulted 
and  approve certain measures; participation in a 
company's  decision  making  bodies;  and  share 
participation.  However,  the  use  of  four  head-
ings  should  not  be  thought to  imply either that 
there  are  four  separate  and  alternative  methods 
in  the  Community  of  achieving  precisely  the 
same objectives, nor on the other hand that there 
are  four  forms  with  entirely  distinct  objectives 
and characteristics.  In  practice, as  we shall see, 
the  approaches  are  often to  be  found  employed 
together  in  various  combinations, while  what is 
achieved  by  one  approach  in  one  country  or 
enterprise  may  on  occasion  be  achieved  by 
another approach elsewhere.  Indeed, it may be 
difficult  to  assign  a  particular  institution exclu-
sively  to  one  category or another,  for  example, 
the  Italian works council  ('consiglio di fabbrica') 
or the  British shop steward, both of which act as 
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collective  bargaining agents and also as represen-
tative  institutions.  Nevertheless,  consideration 
of  the  broad, complex field  of  employee partici-
pation under these  four  headings enables certain 
useful  generalizations  to  be  made  which  can 
serve  as  guide  lines  for  the  development  of 
sound, practical Community policies. 
The  main approaches 
Negotiation of collective agreements 
In  all  Member States,  the  negotiation of collec-
tive  agreements,  defined  broadly  as  any  agree-
ment  between  one  or  more  employers  and  a 
group  of  employees,  is  an  obvious, and  in some 
the  most important manner  in  which employees 
influence  the  decisions and conduct of the enter-
prises in which they work. 
As  far  as  the  substance of  collective  agreements 
is  concerned,  traditionally  in  all  Member States 
they  have  dealt  for  the  most  part with  matters 
which affect employees very directly.  Typically, 
collective  agreements have dealt with issues  such 
as  remuneration, hours of work and holidays, or 
they  have  established  procedures for  negotiating 
further  such  agreements  or  for  dealing  with 
disputes.  However,  in  recent  years  in  some 
Member States,  the  scope  of  collective  bargain-
ing  has  been  increasing substantially.  In  partic-
ular, in these countries, bargaining is increasingly 
taking place concerning the  economic policies of 
enterprises and their methods of  organizing their 
industrial and commercial affairs. 
In  Italy,  from  the  late  1960s  collective  agree-
ments,  negotiated  at  plant and  enterprise  level, 
began to lay emphasis on the improvement of the 
total  working environment, including for  exam-
ple  provisions  as  to  the  intensity and  quality of 
work.  More  recently,  agreements  have  been 
concluded  which  also  deal  with  the  investm~nt 
and  development  policies  to  be  followed  by 
certain  enterprises,  notably  by  major  industrial 
employers such as  Fiat,  Montedison and  Olivet-
ti.  The  Montedison  agreements  of  April  1973 
and  1974, for  example,  contained  clauses  com-
mitting  the  company  to  extensive  investments 
21 and to  the maintenance of employment levels in 
the  context of  a  continuing reorganization and 
modernization scheme.  The growing difficulties 
resulting from  the  energy crisis  led  Fiat and the 
Metal Workers' Federation (FLM) to conclude a 
collective  agreement  in  November  1974 which 
· contemplates, among other things, that manage-
ment  and  the  union  will  jointly  examine  the 
continuing effects  of the  crisis  on the  transport 
sector  with  a  view  to  reaching  specific  agree-
ments  on  such  matters  as  investments  in  the 
South,  hours  and  methods  of  work,  volume  of 
production,  and  re-allocation  of  the  work 
force.  Once  again,  the  company  also  gave  an 
undertaking  to  maintain  employment  levels  at 
least  until the  end of  1975.  These  agreements 
with major industrial employers are much more 
sophisticated  than  the  average  collective  agree-
ment in  Italy.  But they are part of the general 
pattern of development in  the scope of collective 
bargaining and will probably influence the gener-
al development of Italian collective agreements in 
the future. 
In  the  United  Kingdom,  the  most  significant 
trend  in  recent years  has  also  been  the  growing 
scope  of  enterprise  and  plant  level  agree-
ments.  In many sectors, since the second world 
war,  local  employees' representatives  have  been 
in  a position to bargain effectively not only as to 
remuneration  and  the  like,  but also  concerning 
conditions  and  methods  of  work.  During  the 
1960s, a  number of enterprises engaged in  what 
became  know  as  'productivity  bargaining' whe-
reby  employees  agreed  to  changes  in  working 
practices, such as  overtime, interchange of tasks 
between work groups, manning or shift wmking, 
in  return for  increases  in  pay or other benefits. 
Such  productivity  bargaining  has  become  less 
common,  but the  scope  of  bargaining at enter-
prise  and  plant level  has often remained  br?a~, 
and  where  it  has  become  very  developed,  tt  ts 
sometimes referred to as 'joint regulation', and is 
increasingly accompanied by the negotiation of a 
formal  'status quo' clause  in  a  collective  agree-
ment according to which the management agrees 
not to  take decisions  affecting employees' inter-
ests  until agreement is  reached or certain negot-
iating procedures have been exhausted. 
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In  Ireland, developments  similar to those in  the 
United Kingdom have occurred, though probably 
not to quite the same degree. 
In  other Member States,  the  scope  of collective 
bargaining has not been subject to  development 
in  the  same  way.  In  particular,  bargaining at 
enterprise and plant level  has  not developed so 
obviously.  In Belgium and France, development 
has occurred at the national and industrial levels 
. with  the  negotiation  of  agreements  covering  a 
large  number of enterprises and employees, and 
normally  dealing  with  matters  which  affect 
employees  generally,  such  as  g~aranteed 
incomes, pensions, training and educatton. Else-
where  in  the  Community,  developments  in  the 
scope  of  collective  bargaining  have  been  much 
less pronounced. 
To turn from the substance of collective bargain-
ing,  to  the  means  whereby  the  employees' 
influence  is  exercised, the universal feature to be 
found wherever collective  bargaining occurs is  of 
course  some  organization  representing  the 
employees.  Normally, this  is  a trade union, and 
increasingly in these countries which have  see~ a 
substantial  increase  in  the  scope  of  collecttve 
bargaining at enterprise and plant level, the local 
representatives  of  a  trade  union  who  are 
employed  in  the  enterprise  or  plant  in  ques-
tion.  A  growing  role  of  this  kind  has  been 
played  in  Italy  by  the  members  of  the .works 
councils  ('consiglio  di  fabbrica')  and  m  the 
United  Kingdom  and  Ireland  by  shop  ste-
wards.  In  other  Member  States,  the  full-time 
union officials operating at the national, regional 
or sectoral level have retained a  more prominent 
role,  with  the  result  that  in  those  countries 
collective  bargaining  as  a  process  is  somewhat 
more remote from  the average employee, though 
of course the results of such collective bargaining 
frequently  have  a  direct  impact  upon him.  In 
several  such  Member  States,  fairly  elaborate 
institutional structures have  been set up to facil-
itate  the  bargaining  process,  for  example  in 
Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands. 
Further  development  of  collective  bargaining, 
both  as  to  its  scope  and  as  to  the  machinery 
whereby  agreements  are  reached,  seems  very 
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degree  of  control  which  they  have  over  the 
industrial and commercial environment in which 
they live  and upon which they depend, has been 
a  relatively  constant feature of the development 
of  industrial  relations  in  all  Member  States. 
Employees  and  their  organizations  everywhere 
have  insisted  upon  increasing recognition  being 
given  to  the  human  aspects  of  the  production 
process.  There is  no reason to  believe that this 
insistence will weaken.  On the contrary, higher 
levels of general education in particular are likely 
to  lead  to  its  strengthening.  When  conditions 
permit,  employees  and  their  organizations  will 
no  doubt  seek  to  further  this  development 
through the exercise of their bargaining power at 
various  levels  of  the  economy.  Such develop-
ment  will  occur  whether  or  not  legislation  is 
passed  to  promote  employee  participation, 
though  of  course  reliance  upon  collective  bar-
gaining in  relation to  certain issues may be  less 
frequent in countries in which employee partici-
pation  as  to  those  issues  has  already  been 
secured in some other way. 
In  the  future, collective  bargaining is  also  likely 
to  be  adapted  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the 
systems whtieby the governments of some Mem-
ber  States  seek  to  dire(t  the  development and 
moderni'zation of their economies.  The partici-
pation of employees through their representative 
organizations  in  the  formulation  of  planning 
objectives or economic policy at national, region-
al and sectoral levels  is  already known in several 
Member States, for example in  France, Belgium 
and the  Netherlands among others.  Such prac-
tices can often be fairly described as multi-lateral 
bargaining  between  employers'  organizations, 
trade  unions,  the  State  and  sometimes  other 
interest  groups  as  well.  Further  developments 
in this  area seem  likely.  Recently, in  the United 
Kingdom, for  example, the government has pro-
posed  legislation  which  would  go  substantially 
further.  Employees  and  their  organizations 
would be  intensively involved  in  the negotiation 
and  up-dating of  planning agreements  between 
the  State  and  particular  enterprises.  It  seems 
probable  that  in  so  far  as  State  intervention  in 
the  development  of  industry  and  commerce 
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becomes  more  common,  there  will  also  be  an 
increasing  involvement  of  employees  and  their 
organizations  through  techniques  which  will 
include  adaptations of traditional collective  bar-
gammg. 
Similar  developments  have  also  taken  place  at 
Community level.  The main initiatives taken to 
date to promote participation in decision making 
at Community level,  such as  the  Economic and 
Social  Committee and the joint sectoral commit-
tees,  have  been  noted  already.  In  the  future, 
these  institutions  will  continue  to  operate  and 
develop, permitting trade unions and employers' 
organizations  to  participate  actively  in  the  for-
mation of the Community's economic and social 
policies. 
However,  as  we  have  seen,  there  is  a  wide 
variation  between  Member  States  as  to  the 
contents of collective agreements.  This variabil-
ity is equally apparent within the boundaries of a 
single  Member  State.  Even  in  States  where 
collective  bargaining is  well developed, there are 
often  sectors  of  the  economy  where  collective 
bargaining achieves relatively little, if  it occurs at 
all.  Moreover, despite  the  recent developments 
in  the  scope  of  collective  bargaining  in  some 
Member States, there appear to be limitations on 
the  scope  of  collective  bargaining  which  are 
difficult to  overcome.  The General  Council  of 
the Trades Union Congress  in  Great Britain has 
acknowledged  that  despite  the  developments 
which have  taken place  in  the  United  Kingdom, 
major decisions such as  decisions on investment, 
location,  closures,  takeovers,  mergers  and  the 
product  specialization of an enterprise are nor-
.mally  taken  unilaterally  and  not  subjected  to 
collective bargaining.
1 
The  variability of collective  bargaining, and the 
limitations  on  its  scope  can  be  related·. to  a 
number  of  factors  including,  for  example,  the 
levels at which the agreements are concluded and 
the  traditions prevailing in  particular industries, 
Industrial Democracy.  Report by the TUC Gener-
al  Council  to  the  1974 Trades Union Congress, july 
197  4.  Paragraphs 84 and 8 5. 
23 regions  or  countries.  But  a  more  fundamental 
explanation  often  appears  to  be  limitations  on 
the  bargaining  power  of  employees'  organiza-
tions  in  particular situations.  A labour organi-
zation's  ability  to  bargain  on  a  given  matter 
often depends on  the  credibility of the  organiza-
tion's perhaps unspoken threat to  impose a cost 
on the  employer by  taking industrial action  if  a 
bargain  is  not concluded.  But  in  certain situa-
tions,  the  organization's  threat  is  not  credible 
enough  to  produce  a  substantial  result.  The 
credibility  of  the  threat  appears  to  depend  in 
turn on a number of factors, including the nature 
of  the  issue, the  general economic situation, the 
nature of the enterprise, and the sophistication of 
the  employees'  organization  and  of  the 
employees themselves. 
Situations of  plant closures, of which there have 
been  a  growing  number  recently,  provide  a 
particularly clear example of how  restrictions o'n 
bargaining  power  limit  the  effective  scope  of 
collective  bargaining.  It  is  also  notable  that on 
several  occasions  in  recent  years,  the  employees, 
in  cases  in which a closure of their establishment 
is  threatened,  have  organized  a  'sit  in'  rather 
than  take  industrial  action  in  the  form  of  a 
straightforward withdrawal of  labour.  In  addi-
tion,  it  may  be  observed  that in  certain cases, a 
well-developed  union  organization  has  also  led 
the  employees  to  seek  the  cooperation  of 
employees  in  other  parts  of  the  enterprise  not 
threatened  with  closure,  in  order  to  influence 
decisions of this  kind.  However, in practice, the 
employees' ability to bargain through their union 
often remains limited. 
Restrictions  on  bargaining  power  can  also 
explain  some  of  the  limitations  of  collective 
bargaining  when  a  multinational  enterprise  is 
involved, or in times of economic concentration. 
Similar if somewhat more complex reasoning can 
explain the limited  role  which collective bargain-
ing  has  often  played  in  relation  to  investment 
decisions,  take-overs  and  mergers.  A  relevant 
factor  is  that certain decisions, which may  in fact 
have  important consequences  for employees, are 
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often  not  readily  or  immediately  reducible  to 
issues  which  can  be  included in  a labour organi-
zation's  list  of  demands,  or  expressed  as  an 
obligation  in  a  concluded  agreement.  For 
example,  a  decision  to  invest  in  and  develop  a 
new  technology  may  have,  in  the  medium  or 
long  term,  serious  implications  for  an  enter-
prise's  employees,  but until  the  implications are 
obvious  to  them, it  may  be  difficult for  a union 
to insist upon bargaining about the matter.  For 
under  normal  circumstances,  a  union  may  bar-
gain only about matters which have obvious and 
direct  effects  on  its  members.  In  so  far  as  a 
decision  has  more  remote  or  complex  implica-
tions  for  the  employees,  a  union  often  finds  it 
difficult  to  inform  them properly and as  a result 
to win support for pursuing a claim  in relation to 
the  decision  in  question.  Moreover, even  if the 
enterprise  is  willing to  discuss  the  development, 
it  may  be  some  time  before  it  is  possible  to 
formulate  rights  and  obligations appropriate for 
inclusion  in  a collective  agreement in  relation to 
the problem. 
Experience  thus  suggests  that,  under  certain 
conditions, there  are  constraints on the  capacity 
of  collective  bargaining  to  exteT':  to  particular 
aspects  of  the  decision  makmg  of  enterpri-
ses.  Where  these  conditions  have  not applied, 
or  where  well-developed  union  organizations 
have  existed,  often  associated  with  a  union 
membership  which  is  relatively  sophisticated, 
these  constraints have not been felt, or have been 
overcome,  notably  in  certain  important  indu-
strial  sectors  in  Italy  and  the  United  King-
dom.  Such developments  will  no  doubt contin-
ue  to  occur  in  the  future,  but development will 
not  be  uniform,  and  collective  agreements  will 
continue  to  vary  greatly  depending  on  the  con-
text in which they are made. 
In  addition,  since  collective  agreements  are  the 
product of  a  bargaining process,  it  is  inevitable 
that from time to  time the strength or sincerity of 
one  side  or  another  is  put  to  the  test,  and 
industrial  confrontation  occurs.  While  indu-
strial  confrontation  has  causes,  other  than  the 
internal  dynamics  of  bargaining  situations, 
which  may  often  be  more  important,  such  as 
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expansion  of  the  scope  of  collective  bargaining 
necessarily  increases  the  number of issues which 
may  lead  to  confrontation.  But  industrial  con-
frontation  is  also  wasteful,  and  if  it  occurs  too 
often in a society, every member of that society is 
the poorer including those who are employees. 
Finally, collective  bargaining, being a social  pro-
cess  based  on  the  freedom  and  power  of  the 
parties to achieve the best terms which they can, 
may  be  made  the  subject  of  a  direct  legal 
obligation  only  with  difficulty.  Indirect  regu-
lation or strengthening of the  collective  bargain-
ing  process,  for  example by the  creation of  legal 
obligations to  release  relevant information to  the 
other party,  is  not particularly difficult.  But to 
legislate  for  the  central  obligation  to  bargain, 
either  generally  or  on  specific  topics,  is  much 
more  problematic.  The  content  of  the  obliga-
tion  is  relatively  uncertain,  and  if  an  attempt 
were  made  to  impose  general  obligations  at 
Community  level,  their  interpretation would  be 
bound to  produce difficulties in practice. 
Provision  for  independent  arbitration  in  the 
event  of  failure  to  agree  is  a partial solution to 
the  problem, but is only practicable in relation to 
a  limited  number  of  issues  which  are  of  a 
relatively  clear  and  defined  nature, such  as  the 
terms  of  a  'social  plan'  to  meet  the  needs  of 
employees  affected  by  a concentration, or meas-
ures  to  promote  industrial  safety,  health  and 
hygiene.  To  apply  arbitration  procedures  to 
broader  issues  like  the  economic  forward  plan-
ning  of  the  enterprise  would  be  to  ask  far  too 
much  of  them.  Moreover,  a  general  use  of 
arbitration would probably entail the creation of 
extensive  and  costly  bureaucracies.  In  any 
event, such a development would  be  unlikely  to 
meet  with  the  approval  of  the  social  partners, 
not  least  because  of  the  possibility  that  they 
could lose  ultimate control over important issues 
which might be  decided  by  persons with no  long 
term relationship with either the enterprise or the 
employees.  In  fact,  a system  which  relies  upon 
the  extensive use  of arbitration mechanisms  is  in 
S.  817 5 
inany  ways  the  antithesis  of  free  collective  bar-
gaining. 
Representative  institutions: 
information,  consultation  and  approval 
Procedures whereby employees are informed and 
consulted  about management decisions are  to  be 
found  in  many  Member  States.  The  same 
machinery is  often  used  to  enable the employees 
to  exercise  rights  of  co-determination,  that  is, 
rights  to  approve  or disapprove  proposed  deci-
sions.  As  we  shall see,  however, the procedures 
adopted for  the  exercise  of  rights of co-determi-
nation vary considerably, particularly as  regards 
the  composition of  the body which exercises the 
rights.  This  variation  constitutes  an  important 
qualitative  distinction  between  forms  of 
employee  participation  which  are  superficially 
similar.  Moreover,  in  some  Member  States, 
these  procedures  are  clearly  distinguished  from 
collective  bargaining,  for  example  in  Germany, 
whereas in  others like the United Kingdom, there 
is  no  neat division.  This distinction also  relates 
to  procedures and institutions, rather than to the 
substance  of  the  decisions  which  are  subject  to 
the procedures. 
As  far  as  this  substance  is  concerned,  rights  of 
information and consultation, whether conferred 
by law  or by agreement, tend  to be  broader than 
rights  of  approval  and  apply  in  many  cases  to 
primary economic decisions  such as  closures and 
major  investment  decisions.  The  relevant  Bel-
gian law, for  example, gives  the enterprise coun-
cils  ('conseils  d'entreprise')  to  which  it applies, 
the  right to  detailed  information on the  progress 
of  the  enterprise, including, for  instance, details 
as  to  production  costs  and  plans  concerning 
future  investments.  Further,  the  enterprise 
council  has  the  right  to  be  consulted  on  any 
measure  which  might  alter  working conditions, 
the structure of the enterprise, or output. 
Broadly  similar  rights  are  conferred  by  law  in 
Germany, France, Luxembourg, and  the  Nether-
lands,  and  by  national  agreement  in  Denmark 
25 and  Italy.  There are of course differences in the 
choice  and  definition  of  the  matters  which  are 
subjected to the  regime and with regard to  other 
matters,  not least  the  extent to  which the  law  is 
observed  in  practice.  These  distinctions  are 
more fully developed  in Part II of this paper, and 
it  suffices  to  say  here  that  the  effectiveness  of 
such systems can depend  in  part on the existence 
of  other forms  of  employee participation, and  in 
particular on  effective  employee  participation in 
the decision making bodies of the  company. The 
Bidenkopf  Repore  noted  that there  appeared  to 
be  a relationship  in  Germany between the  parti-
cipation  of  employees  in  the  supervisory  board 
on  the  one  hand, and  on  the  other, the  amount 
of cooperation between the  management and the 
works  council.  The scope of the latter appeared 
to  be  related  to  the  efficacy of  the  former.  In-
deed,  as  a  matter of  principle,  it  seems  reason-
able  that effective employee  participation in  the 
body which appoints and supervises the manage-
ment  should  have  a  positive  effect  on  the 
management's  attitudes  to  other  forms  of 
employee  participation  in  the  life  of  the  enter-
prise.  For  example,  management's  willingness 
to  impart  information  due  to  employees  and 
their  representatives  is  likely  to  be  reinforced  if 
the  managers  know  that their discharge of  these 
obligations  may  be  scrutinized  by  a supervisory 
board some of  the  members of which have  been 
appointed  by  or subject  to  the  approval  of  the 
employees  themselves.  The  inter-relationship 
between  different  forms  of  employee  participa-
tion  is  a matter of  importance to  which referen-
ces will  be  made subsequently in this paper. 
In  the  United Kingdom and Ireland, the giving of 
information by  an  employer and  general consul-
tation  of  this  kind  is  also  practised  in  many 
sectors,  though  it  is  not  required  by  law  or  a 
generally  applicable  national agreement.
2 
·  Con-
sultation  on  safety  is  a special  matter  which  is 
the  subject of more formal obligations in Ireland, 
and  has  just  been  made  the  subject  of  legal 
obligation  in  the  United  Kingdom.  Normally, 
however,  consultation  is  a  relatively  informal 
aspect  of  the  relationship  between  an  employer 
and  his  employees,  sometimes  represented  by 
their trade unions. 
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Rights  of  approval,  when  granted  by  law,  are 
defined  relatively precisely and limited to matters 
which  affect  employees  very  immediately,  and 
are  for  the  most  part aptly described  as  'social 
matters'.  Thus  German  law  gives  the  works 
council  ('Betriebsrat')  the  right  to  approve  or 
disapprove  management  proposals  concerned 
with  job  evaluation,  piece  rates,  wages  struc-
tures,  working  times,  holidays,  personnel  poli-
cies,  social  plans  in  the  case  of  redundancies, 
training, safety, health, housing, and  employees' 
conduct in the work place. 
In  Luxembourg and  the  Netherlands,  the  range 
of decisions subject to  approval  is somewhat less 
extensive,  while  in  Belgium,  France  and  Italy,  it 
is  even  narrower.  In  Belgium, for example, the 
enterprise  council  settles  the  works  regulations 
and administers the social facilities. 
In  Denmark, the national agreement to which we 
have  already  referred,  provides  for  a  right  of 
approval  as  to  the  principles  relating  to  local 
working  conditions,  safety,  welfare  and  staff 
policy.  Furthermore, exceptionally in  the  Dan-
ish  context, legal  powers have  been  conferred  in 
the  field  of safety which permit the enforcement, 
subject  to  a  State  investigation,  of  safety  regu-
lations. 
In  Italy  and  the  United  Kingdom,  trade  union 
activity  in  particular enterprises  and  plants  has 
led  to  situations  developing  in  which  manage-
ment's  freedom  to  act  unilaterally  has  as  a 
matter of  fact  been  restricted as  to  a wide range 
of  decisions.  Moreover,  in  the  United  King-
dom, the  situation will  sometimes receive  formal 
recognition in  a 'status quo' clause in a collective 
agreement  according  to  which  management 
agrees  not to  alter existing practices until  agreed 
1  op. cit., Part III, section 62. 
2  Such an agreement is  currently under discussion in 
Ireland.  In  the United Kingdom, the government has 
proposed the enactment of an Employment Protection 
Bill  which  will  place  a  general  duty on employers to 
disclose  to  trade  union  representatives  information 
requested  for  collective  bargaining purposes, and,  in 
redundancy situations, will oblige employers to inform 
and consult those representatives. 
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with coJiective  bargaining however, the decisions 
which  are  subject  to  this  kind  of  procedure  in 
practice do not often include economic decisions 
of  a  strategic  kind  such  as  investment  and 
closures,  but  are  normally  confined  to  matters 
which  affect  employees'  interests  quite  closely 
such as work methods, for example. 
There  is  a  clear  functional  similarity  between 
such  situations  and  the  formal  legal  rights  of 
approval  or co-determination  to  be  found  else-
where  in  the  Community, though there are  also 
important distinctions to  be drawn as regards the 
procedures and institutions appropriate to each. 
Turning to consider the methods, procedures and 
institutions to  be  found  in  the Community, those 
Member  States  which  grant  rights  of  informa-
tion,  consultation and co-determination  by  law, 
also  provide  normally  for  the  setting  up  of 
institutions  to  represent  the  employees  in  parti-
cular establishments. 
In  Germany,  for  example,  the  members  of  the 
works  council  are  directly  elected  by  the 
employees  in  a  particular establishment,  and  in 
larger  establishments  through  a  systen-:  of  pro-
portional representation.  The members appoint 
their  own  president.  Enterprises  with  more 
than one establishment must also set up a central 
works  council  to  which  other  works  councils 
send  delegates  and  which  deals  with  matters 
concerning  the  enterprise  as  a  whole  or  several 
establishments. 
In  the  Netherlands,  enterprise  councils  ('onder-
nemingsraden')  are  directly  elected  by  the 
employees  in  all  establishments  of  more  than  a 
certain  size  and  they  have  as  their  president  a 
member  of  a  company's  board  of  manage-
ment.  Special  provision  is  made  for  enterprises 
having  a  number  of  establishments,  enabling a 
central  enterprise  council  also  to  be  formed  for 
the enterprise as a whole. 
In  France,  personnel  delegates  ('delegues  du 
personnel')  have  been  required  for  some  time 
even  in  quite small enterprises.  They are direct-
ly  elected  and  have  a more limited  role  than the 
enterprise  committees  which  are  required  in  all 
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enterprises  employing  more  than  fifty  per-
sons.  The members of the enterprise committee 
('comite  d'entreprise')  are directly elected by the 
employees, but the  chief executive ('chef d'entre-
prise') or his  representative  is also a member and 
presides at meetings. 
In  Belgium, the  members of the  enterprise coun-
cil  are  first  elected  by  the  employees of enterpri-
ses  of  more  than  a  certain  size  from  lists  of 
candidates  presented  by  nationaJiy  recognized 
trade  unions.  But the chief executive  is  a mem-
ber of the  council and  can designate delegates to 
assist  him  up  to  the  point at which the  council 
has  an  equal  number  of  employees'  and 
employer's representatives. 
Luxembourg  has  recently  instituted  mixed  com-
mittees  ('comites  mixtes')  consisting of  an  equal 
number  of  employer's  and  employees' represen-
tatives,  the  employees'  representatives  being 
elected  according  to  a  system  of  proportional 
representation.  These  committees  operate  in 
addition to  'personnel delegates' who  have  been 
established  since  the  end  of  the  first  world  war 
and are endowed with essentially limited consul-
tative and representative functions. 
In  Germany,  in  the  Netherlands and  in  Luxem-
bourg as  regards  the  mixed  committees, the  law 
provides  for  arbitration  machinery  to  resolve 
deadlocks  between  management  and  the 
employees'  representatives.  In  Belgium  and 
France,  no  such  provision  is  made.  There  is  an 
obvious  connection,  in  these  countries  between 
the  procedural  arrangements  and  the  substance 
of  the  decisions  which  are  subject  to  the  proce-
dures.  The decisions in question are  not of such 
a  kind  that  failure  to  reach  a  compromise  will 
result in  paralysis  of  the  enterprise as  a business 
organization. 
In Denmark, the  national agreement provides for 
cooperation  committees  ('samarbejdsudvalg') 
which  consist  of  equal  numbers  of  representa-
tives,  appointed  by  the  management on the  one 
hand, and elected  by the employees on the other, 
with  the  proviso  that elected shop stewards are 
ipso  facto  members  of  the  committees.  Provi-
sion  is  made  for  failure  to  agree  to  result  in  an 
arbitration. 
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of  information,  consultation  and  approval  are 
not generally established by law or by a national-
ly  applicable  collective  agreement,  such  works 
councils as are to  be found have  been established 
either  informally  or,  occasionally,  under  the 
terms  of  a  collective  agreement.  Though  the 
systems  vary,  the  employee  representatives have 
normally been elected by all the employees of the 
establishment  or  enterprise  in  question.  The 
functions  of  these  works  councils  have  been 
almost  totally  consultative  with  one  or  two 
isola ted exceptions. 
Recently, however, there has been a tendency for 
consultation  machinery  to  be  union  based  and 
also for  there to be  a single channel for consulta-
tion  and  for  negotiation.  This  channel  often 
begins with the  local representatives of the union 
who  are  employed  in  a particular establishment 
or enterprise.  Known  as  shop  stewards,  these 
representatives are  normally chosen by the  union 
members in  particular establishments under elec-
tion  systems  of  varying  formality  according  to 
the  rules  and  practices  of  the  union  in  q ues-
tion.  The  shop  stewards'  committee  at  plant 
level  has  in  many  sectors tended  to  become  the 
focal  point  of  an  enterprise's  industrial  rela-
tions.  When  this  occurs,  the  distinction 
between  consultation  and  collective  bargaining 
tends  to  become  blurred.  This  is  particularly 
obvious  where there  is  a broadly drafted 'status 
quo'  agreement.  Failure  to  agree  does  not of 
course  lead  to  some  form  of arbitration, though 
it  may  lead  to  traditional  kinds  of  industrial 
action. 
Italy presents a complex picture.  Three kinds of 
separate but overlapping institutions may  have  a 
potential  role  in  a single  enterprise or establish-
ment:  the  obsolescent,  directly  elected  internal 
commissions  ('commissioni  interne'),  the  union 
delegations  ('delegazioni  sindacali'),  and  the 
directly  elected  works  councils  ('consigli di  fab-
brica').  However,  it  appears·  that  in  many 
important  enterprises  the  works  council  is 
~merging as  the  pre-eminent instrument of con-
sultation and negotiation at plant level  similar to 
the  shop  stewards'  committees  in  the  United 
Kingdom.  Its  powers,  like  the  powers  of  shop 
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stewards, have  their basis  not in  law,  but in  the 
bargaining strength of effective labour organiza-
tions. 
Finally, a few  Member States make specific legal 
provision for  trade union representation at esta-
blishment or plant level, or for  certain categories 
of  information  to  be  supplied  to  trade  unions 
which represent an  enterprise's employees; Thus 
in Italy and France, the  law provides that unions 
may  establish  delegations  in  establishments  to 
represent union employees.  In  the Netherlands, 
the  Merger Code of the Social-Economic Council 
requires  representative  trade  unions  to  be 
informed in  advance of any measure constituting 
a concentration of  an  enterprise.  In  the United 
Kingdom,  the  Employment  Protection  Bill  will 
when  enacted,  impose  general  obligations  on 
employers  to  inform  and,  in  redundancy  situa-
tions,  to  consult  trade  union  representa-
tives.  However,  this  kind  of  legislation  is  at 
present the exception rather than the rule. 
Participation in  decision  making bodies 
In  several  Member States,  the law  provides  that 
companies' decision making bodies must include 
members who are appointed by or subject to the 
approval  of  the  employees.  Thus  in  Germany 
for  over  twenty  years,  stock  companies 
('Aktiengesellschaften'),  unless  they  are  family 
companies  employing  less  than  five  hundred 
persons,  have  had  to  have  one  third  of  the 
members  of their supervisory councils elected by 
the  companies' employees.  A form  of employee 
participation  based  on similar  principles  is  also 
required  for  companies  with  limited  liability 
('Gesellschaften mit beschrankter Haftung'), but 
only  if  they  employ  five  hundred  or  more  per-
sons.  In  the  coal  and  steel  sector,  companies 
employing  more  than  one  thousand  persons 
must  have  a supervisory  council  normally com-
posed of eleven members, five  of whom represent 
the  shareholders,  five  the  employees,  the 
eleventh  being  co-opted  by  the  shareholders' 
and  employees'  representatives.  Further,  the 
management board of  these coal  and steel  com-
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appointed  and  dismissed  only  if  the  employees' 
representatives do  not object, and whose respon-
sibility  is  for  industrial  relations  and  personnel 
matters.  In  all  cases, members of  the  supervis-
ory council  are  subject  to  the  same  legal  duties 
regardless of the manner of their appointment. 
Following  the  publication  of  the  Biedenkopf 
Report
1  in  1970,  recent discussion  by  all  major 
· political  groups  in  Germany has  been concerned 
with  possible  methods of extending the  amount 
of  participation  in  companies  outside  the  coal 
and  steel  sector to achieve a degree  of participa-
tion  more  approximate to  that found  within the 
coal  and  steel  industry.  In  February 1974, the 
federal  government proposed the enactment of a 
new  law  to require equality of representation on 
the  supervisory  councils  of  companies  and 
groups  having  more  than  two  thousand 
employees outside the  coal  and steel  sector.  At 
the present time, the  Bill  is  still being considered 
by the legislature. 
In  the  Netherlands, since  1973, the  members  of 
the  supervisory  councils  of  most  public  and 
closed  companies  ('naamloze  en  besloten  ven-
nootschappen')  with  substantial capital  employ-
ing  at  least  one  hundred  persons  have  been 
required to be appointed by a process of co-opta-
tion,  with  both  the  enterprise  council  and  the 
shareholders'  meeting having the  right to  object 
to  a proposal for  a nomination taking effect on 
the  ground  that the  nominee  is  not qualified  or 
that  the  nomination  will  lead  to  an  improper 
board composition.  Once such an objection has 
been  made, the  nomination will  take  effect only 
if  a  committee  of  the  Social  and  Economic 
Council  of  the  Netherlands  (Sociaai-Econom-
ische  Raad), after consulting all  parties involved, 
resolves to overrule the objection. 
In  Denmark,  since  the  beginning  of  1974,  all 
companies employing fifty  or more persons must 
permit their employees, if  they so desire, to  elect 
at least  two  members  of  the  board  of  directors 
('bestyrelse')  in  addition  to  those  elected  by  the 
shareholders,  but  the  latter's  representatives  are 
always to constitute a majority.  The employees' 
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representatives  have  the  same  rights  and  duties 
as other directors. 
In  Luxembourg, a recently enacted law provides 
that  the  employees  will  elect  one  third  of  the 
members of  the  council  of  administration ('con-
sci!  d'administration'),  or  in  the  future,  of  the 
supervisory council  ('conseil  de  surveillance') if a 
company  has  one,  in  all  companies  having one 
thousand  or  more  employees,  or  receiving  the 
benefit of  twenty five  per  cent or more  of  State 
financial  participation, or benefiting from a State 
concession  relating  to  their  principal  acti-
vity.  The  legal  responsibility  of  the  employee 
representatives  is  the  same  as· that of  the  other 
members. 
In France, the law provides that in public compa-
nies  ('societes anonymes') having more than fifty 
employees, delegates from  the enterprise commit-
tee  shall  be  present in  a consultative  capacity at 
the  meetings of the  council of administration, or 
where appropriate, the supervisory council.  De-
pending  on  the  composition  of  the  company 
employees, a delegate  may represent a particular 
group  of  employees  such  as  the  executive  staff 
('cadres'). 
In  February  1975,  a  commission  of  experts, 
appointed  under  the  chairmanship  of  Mr 
Sudreau  following  the  presidential  election  in 
1974  to  study  the  problem  of  reform  of  the 
enterprise,  recommended  that  French  law  be 
amended  to  permit employee  representatives  to 
exercise  a function  of  joint supervision  ('co-sur-
veillance')  on  the  council  of  administration  or 
supervisory  council  of  French  companies.  It 
saw  joint supervision as  the  ultimate element  in 
the  reform  of  the  enterprise  to  be  approached 
through a period of experimentation.  The com-
mission was unanimous that such regimes should 
be  optional for small and medium-sized enterpri-
ses,  but could  not agree as to whether the regime 
should  be  made  obligatory for  large  enterprises 
after the period of experimentation. 
In  other  Member  States,  participation  m  the 
decision  making  bodies  of  companies  m  the 
1  op. cit. 
29 private sector  is  not normally required or  rra~­
tised.  However, throughout the  Commumty It 
is  more  common  for  enterprises  in  the  public 
sector  to  be  required  to  have  a  degree  of 
employee or trade union representation on their 
decision making bodies. 
As  for  the substance of  the  decisions  influenced 
through this kind of participation, by placing the 
employees' representatives on the decision mak-
ing bodies which are at the top of a company's 
decisional hierarchy, the existing systems involve 
the  representatives  in  the  general decision mak-
ing of  the  enterprise.  This  involvement  nece~­
sarily  extends  to  matters  of  general  economiC 
policy such as  expansion and contraction of the 
business.  On the other hand, it is  less  likely to 
extend  to  relatively  detailed  matters  of  day-to-
day management.  In  many cases, participation 
relates to a body with supervisory as opposed to 
management functions.  But even when there is 
participation in  a  body with management func-
tions, the decision making will normally relate to 
less  detailed  matters  than  those  for  example 
which  are  the  concern  of  a  works  council  or 
plant  bargaining.  In  this  sense,.  i~ appears that 
different forms of employee partlCipatwn are to 
an  appreciable  extent  complementary,  rather 
than equivalent alternatives. 
Moreover, experience  in  Germany suggests that 
participation in  a  supervisory body at the  sum-
mit of the decisional hierachy does normally not 
produce serious conflicts of interest for employee 
representatives,  probably  because  of  the  nature 
of its  functions.  There is  here an obvious con-
nection between the issues of company structure 
and employee participation.  A company with a 
unitary  board which is  heavily involved in day-
to-day  mangement  will  probably  find  that 
employee representatives on the board are placed 
in  a  more  difficult  position than their counter-
parts  on  a  board  with  a  supervisory  role,  or 
which  confines  itself  to  more  general  issues  of 
long term policy. 
Turning  to  the  methods  and  institutions  by 
which the employees exercise their influence, the 
systems in force generally permit the whole work 
force  of a  company to participate in one way or 
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another in the processes by which the representa-
tives  are  selected.  With  one  or  two  limited 
exceptions, no  special  role  is  granted by the law 
to labour organizations, though of course where 
trade  unions  are  active,  they  can  and  do  take 
legitimate  advantage  of  the  laws  and  normally 
ensure that members are selected who are accep-
table to them. 
As  far as the  proportion of representatives elect-
ed  by  employees  is  concerned,  all  the  relevant 
systems  in  force,  with  the  exception  of  the 
system  required for German coal and steel com-
panies, give  the workers a right to a minority of 
seats  on the  decision  making body.  Moreover, 
in  France, the  employee representatives are  pre-
sent  only  in  a  consultative  capacity.  Minority 
representation,  and  to  a  much  lesser  extent 
presence in  a  consultative capacity, constitutes a 
two way channel for information and argument 
connecting the  effective  controllers  of an enter-
prise  in  a  direct  and  intensive  way  with  the 
employees.  There is  no fundamental shift in the 
ultimate  balance  of  power  as  regards  decision 
making.  On  the  other  hand,  a  situation  of 
parity,  or  indeed  any  situation  in  which  the 
shareholders'  representatives  cease  to  hold  an 
absolute majority, produces such a shift. 
Finally, reference should be made to the fact that 
in each of the Member States which have imple-
mented  employee  participation schemes  of  this 
·  kind,  provision has  also  been made in one way 
or  another  for  systems  of  general  application 
whereby  employees'  representatives  are  in-
formed,  consulted  and  may  give  or  withhold 
their approval of certain measures.  As  we  h~ve 
seen,  the  effectiveness  of  these  representative 
institutions  appears  to  be  related  in  part to the 
effectiveness  of  the  employees'  participation  in 
the  decision  making  bodies  of  the  companies 
concerned.  The  converse  of this  proposition is 
probably also true.  Representative systems with 
their  foundations  at  plant  level  operate  as  a 
supportfor employee participation in companies' 
decision making bodies.  For example, members 
of a supervisory board who have been elected by 
the  employees  in  a  large  enterprise  might  well 
find  it  difficult  on  their  own  to  remain  in 
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employees  throughout the  enterprise.  They  are 
likely  to  become  isolated, and  as  a result some-
what ineffective.  The  existence of  active  repre-
sentative systems, of whatever kind, makes it far 
easier  for  them  to  remain  in  contact  with  the 
employees'  feelings  and  concerns,  while  at  the 
same time they are probably in a position to take 
a  more  general  view  than the  representatives  of 
particular plants  or  groups  of  workers.  More-
over, active representative institutions provide an 
important  opportunity  for  the  employees  to 
become  informed  and  experienced  as  to  the 
affairs  and  problems  of  the  enterprise  so  that 
there  is  a reservoir  of  qualified  people available 
for  appointment  to  the  supervisory 
board.  They  also  provide  an  opportunity  to 
evaluate  the  performance  of  those  who  are 
involved in  the  representative institutions so that 
potential  candidates  for  board  membership  can 
be  chosen  on  the  basis  of  a  certain  amount of 
knowledge of their characteristics and abilities. 
Share participation schemes 
Participation by  employees in  the  capital and the 
profits of  enterprises  is  to  be  found  to  a limited 
extent  in  many  Member  States,  sometimes 
encouraged  by  tax incentives, and  is  required  by 
law  in  France.  But with a very few  exceptions, 
none  of  the  existing  systems  in  practice  gives 
employees  any  real  influence  over  the  decision 
making  of  the  enterprises  in  which  they 
work.  They are  for  the most part in  the  nature 
of  bonus,  production  incentive  and  personal 
saving schemes,  whether they  are  the  result of a 
management  initiative,  collective  agreement  or 
legal obligation. 
Recently,  proposals  have  been  made  in  several 
countries,  notably  Denmark,  for  systems  inten-
ded  to  give  employees  or  unions  real  influence 
over the  conduct of  enterprises, but no  Member 
State  has  put  such  a  system  into  effect  at  the 
present time.  Such  proposals frequently involve 
the  creation of a fund of some kind which would 
hold shares on behalf of employees and  build up 
holdings  of  increasing  size  in  the  equity  of 
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companies,  which  would  ultimately  give  em-
ployees  a real  voice  in  how the  companies were 
to  be  run.  But up  to the present, organizational 
difficulties, and  in particular the problem of how 
and  by  whom  the  shares  are  to  be  voted,  have 
prevented  the  implementation  of  any  such 
schemes.  · 
31 Convergences 
The  common  features  and  trends  disclose_d  by 
the preceding analysis of company structure and 
employee participation in the Community can be 
summarized as follows. 
Company structure 
The systems of all Member States appear to have 
relied  in  part  on  the  concept  of  supervision 
through institutions other than the general meet-
ing itself. 
The  Italian  'collegia  sindacale';  the  'commis-
saires' whether of the Belgian, French or Nether-
lands variety; the Danish shareholders' commit-
tee  and  the German 'Aufsichtsrat' are all legisla-
tive  responses of varying degrees of effectiveness 
and  sophistication  embodying  the  same  basic 
idea.  The  shareholders  appoint  persons  who 
have  the  function  of supervising those who are 
responsible  for  managing  the  company's 
affairs.  Moreover, even  when the  law has not 
required  the  existence  of  separate  supervisory 
mechanisms,  the  division  of  directors  into  exe-
cutive and non-executive groups has on occasion 
operated  to  produce  a  similar  phenomen-
on.  The  fifth  directive  on  the  structure  of 
'societes anonymes' in  its  present form incorpor-
ates  this basic idea and proposes to take advan-
tage  at  the  European  level  of  the  experience 
gained  by  those  countries  such  as  the  Nether-
lands  and  Germany  which  have  developed  the 
most sophisticated applications of the concept. 
However, while  one can  discern a  general  con-
. sensus in the Community as to the need to assure 
effective  supervision  of  management  decision 
making,  a  significant  number of  interested  par-
ties will  undoubtedly stress that an instrument of 
supervision  need  not  necessarily  be  an  entirely 
separate  organ  of  the  company.  A  board  of 
directors  could  indeed  be  constituted  in  such a 
way that it provided equivalent safeguards to a 
system  based  on  two  formally  separated 
bodies.  An  important element in  such a system 
would be  the establishment of a clear separation 
of  function  between  the  'managers'  and  the 
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'supervisors'  on  the  board.  The  principal 
advantage  of  permitting such  a  solution would 
be that greater allowance would be  made for the 
particular legal  traditions and business practices 
of  certain  Member  States.  It might also  more 
obviously  preserve  some  of  the  virtues  claimed 
for a unitary system such as its coherence and its 
capacity for cross fertilization of ideas  and easy 
communication.  On  the  other  hand,  a  dualist 
system  need  not entail  difficulties  in  these  res-
pects.  It is  indeed common practice in Germany 
for  the  management  and supervisory organs  to 
meet  together.  Furthermore,  in  practice,  an 
equivalent  system  relying  on  supervisory  mem-
bers of a unitary board would probably operate 
in  virtually  the  same  way  as  the  dualist  sys-
tem.  For this  reason, the Commission has not 
up  to the present thought it necessary to propose 
such an alternative. 
Some  have  however  suggested  that  a  legal  so-
lution  to  the  problem  of  supervision  is  in  any 
event  unnecessary  when  there  is  an  informed 
market  dealing  in  the  securities  in  which  a 
shareholder  has  invested,  for  such  a  market 
provides  a  powerful  mechanism  for  the  protec-
tion  of  shareholders'  interests.  The  protection 
which may be provided by an informed market is 
undeniable,  but  it  is  only  partial.  First,  an 
informed  market  does  not  always  exist for  the 
shares  of all  large and medium-sized companies 
in  the  Community.  Second,  in  the  event  of 
mismanagement, the  shareholders'  remedy  is  to 
sell  his  shares.  Perhaps however, the  sharehol-
der would prefer to retain his  interest and see an 
improvement  in  management  efficiency.  A 
supervisory  mechanism  helps  to  provide  an 
option of this kind.  Finally, the small sharehol-
der  may  well  be  at  a  disadvantage  as  regards 
expertise  and  information  in  relation  to  other 
more  professional  participants  in  the  informed 
market.  His  power  to  sell  shares  in  a  badly 
managed  company  is  cold  comfort  if  the  first 
indication given  to  him  of mismanagement is  a 
sharp drop in  the value of his shares.  Reliance 
on  the  market  cannot  be  a  complete  substitute 
for some legal  measures of protection.  A super-
visory mechanism can constitute a useful part of 
such protection. 
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and  general  supervision  are  not  an  absolute 
guarantee of  management efficiency and respon-
siveness,  but the  concept has  a firm  basis  in the 
trend  towards  separate  instruments  of  supervi-
sion discernible throughout the  Community and 
also  appears  to  be  the  most  effective  technique 
developed  to date.  Finally,  as  has already been 
observed, the existence of a separate supervisory 
body  seems  particularly  useful  if  employee  or 
other interests are  to  participate in  the  appoint-
ment of  members of  companies' decision making 
bodies  since  it  facilitates  the  drawing  of  a 
relatively sharp distinction  between  the  function 
of  management on the one hand, and the  super-
vision  or  control  of  management  on  the 
other.  The  managers  can  then  be  left  free  to 
manage,  subject  only  to  the  powers  of  the 
supervisory  body to  replace  them  in  the event of 
a  basic  difference  of  opinion, or  to  disapprove 
certain  proposals  of  an  important  kind.  Con-
versely,  the members of the supervisory body can 
be  given  the  power to ensure that the  managers 
are  adequately performing their  functions  with-
out being caught up  in  the  actual administration 
of the company's affairs. 
Employee participation 
Negotiation of  collective  agreements 
Collective  bargaining  will  continue  to  develop 
throughout  the  Community,  though  more  in 
some  countries  and  industrial  sectors  than  in 
others.  Where  conditions  are  appropriate, col-
lective  bargaining is  likely  to  take place increas-
ingly  in  relation  to  the  economic  policy  'Of 
enterprises,  and  to  their  methods  of  organizing 
their  industrial  and  commercial  affairs.  This 
development  may  be  stimulated  in  some  coun-
tries  by  increasing  State  intervention  in  the 
planning  of  economic  and  industrial  develop-
ment,  and  perhaps  also  by  legislation  requiring 
enterprises to  release  certain  categories of  infor-
mation  to  employees'  organizations.  At  the 
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Community level, developments as to the partici-
pation of  the  social  partners in  decision  making 
are also to be expected. 
Accordingly,  from  time  to  time  collective  bar-
gaining will  cover  topics  which come within the 
normal  competence  of  an  enterprise's supervis-
ory  body  on  which  employees  are  represent-
ed.  This  is  not surprising,  since  both forms  of 
participation  are  based  at  least  in  part on  the 
same  aspiration  of  employees  to  increase  their 
degree  of  control  over  the  economic  organiza-
tions  in  which  they  work and upon which  they 
depend. 
However,  for  a  number  of  reasons,  collective 
bargaining  does  not  seem  to  form  a  suitable 
general  basis  for  Community  legislation  on 
employee participation in the decision making of 
large  and  medium-sized  corporations.  Collec-
tive  bargaining frequently occurs at levels which 
are  somewhat  remote  as  far  as  employees  are 
concerned.  Also,  the  content of  a legal  obliga-
tion to bargain is too uncertain and the provision 
of  independent  arbitration  is  appropriate  only 
for  a  limited  number  of  relatively  well  defined 
lSSUeS. 
Moreover, since the  results of collective bargain-
ing  depend  ultimately on the  relative  bargaining 
power of the  parties, there  is  an inherent variab-
ility  in  these  results  which  renders  collective 
bargaining  inappropriate  as  a  general  means  of 
achieving equivalent standards and safeguards in 
the  various countries which constitute the  Com-
munity.  Indeed,  certain  circumstances  appear 
sometimes to prevent effective collective bargain-
ing  in  relation  to  issues  which  may  be  of  great 
importance  such  as  closures  or  major  invest-
ments.  Finally,  to  some  extent  collective  bar-
gaining will  inevitably continue to  be  associated 
with industrial confrontation. 
However,  there  is  no  doubt that collective  bar-
gaining  has  an  important  role  to  play  at  the 
Community level  in  relation to employee partici-
pation  in  the  decision  making  of  enterprises, 
even  if  it probably cannot form  the general basis 
for  Community legislation.  First, in  relation to 
a limited number of relatively well defined issues, 
33 legal  obligations  can  and  probably  should  be 
imposed  upon  enterprises  to  reach  agreements 
with  their employees'  representatives.  This to-
pic  will  be  further  considered  in  the  more 
appropriate  context of  Community policy with 
regard  to  representative  institutions.
1  Second, 
the  development of collective  bargaining at the 
Community level  can have  important beneficial 
effects particularly in relation to the problems of 
the  multinational  enterprise.  The  Community 
must continue to do what it can to promote this 
development, though it must also  be  recognized 
that  the  primary responsibility for  the  develop-
ment  of  a  trade  union  counter-weight  to  the 
multinational  enterprise  rests  with  the  trade 
unions themselves. 
Share participation 
As  far  as  share  participation  schemes  are  con-
cerned, in  no  Member State  have  such schemes 
been  developed  to  the  point  where  ~mployees 
generally  can exert substantial  influence  on the 
decision making of large and medium-sized com-
panies.  Proposals which may in  time have such 
an effect are under discussion in several Member 
States, and possibly  in  the  future  some form  of 
Community legislation will  be  appropriate. That 
time  has  not  yet  come.  However,  it  should  be 
noted that in  the  more general context of Com-
munity action to promote a fairer distribution of 
income and wealth, the Commission will shortly 
present to the Council a report on systems in the 
Member States which create incentives  for  asset 
formation  by  employees,  as  indicated  in  the 
Commission's  'Guidelines  for  a  social  action 
programme'.
2 
Representative institutions 
The  various  systems  whereby  employees  are 
informed,  consulted  and  on  occasion  approve 
and disapprove proposed management decisions, 
present  a  more  complicated  problem.  These 
forms  of  participation  tend  to  be  concerned 
primarily with the  representation of employees' 
interests  and  views  in  relation  to  management, 
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and  therefore with matters which have  a direct 
impact  on  the  employees,  for  example,  those 
matters  sometimes  described  as  'social  mat-
ters'.  They operate mostly at plant or establish-
ment  level.  Representative  institutions  of  the 
works  council  type  do  exist  at  enterprise  or 
group  level,  often for the  purpose of coordinat-
ing employee  representation in  relation  to  mat-
ters  which affect all  employees of the  enterprise 
or group equally.  But to give such institutions a 
major direct say  in  the economic decision  mak-
ing of large enterprises is  not easy. 
Plant  level  institutions  tend  to  have  local  and 
partial  perspectives which render them inappro-
priate  for  employee  participation  in  decision 
making  which  affects  the  enterprise  as  a 
whole.  A  committee of employees'  representa-
tives  from  various  plants  can  be  formed  at 
enterprise  level  to  permit  certain  employees' 
representatives to be  informed of the enterprise's 
economic position and  to  discuss with manage-
ment  proposed  decisions  and  pro-
grammes.  Such  a  committee  can  be  directly 
appointed  by  the  employees,  or  indirectly 
through  plant  level  representative  institu-
tions.  However,  in  view  of  the  fact  that such 
committees  are  external  to  the  decision making 
bodies  of  the  company,  their  effectiveness  may 
well  be  questioned.  On the other hand, to give 
strong legal  powers to  such  institutions  in  rela-
tion  to  the  enterprise's  economic decision mak-
ing,  for  example  rights  of  veto,  is  to  risk 
paralyzing the enterprise as  a business organiza-
tion.  Representative  institutions  alone  thus  do 
not  appear  to  be  the  most  suitable  for  giving 
employees a  real say in  an enterprise's economic 
decision  making.  To give  the  employees  of an 
enterprise  the opportunity to influence the deci-
sion  making of the enterprise taken as  a  whole, 
they need  to be  complemented by other institu-
tions. 
This is  not, however, to deny the importance of 
representative  machinery which is  based  on the 
1  See  below. 
2  Presented by  the Commission to the Council on  19 
April 1973, Supplement 4/73- Bull. EC. 
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essential  both  for  employees  and  for  manage-
ment,  if  decisions  which  affect  the  employees 
immediately  ar  to  be  properly  considered  and 
smoothly implemented.  Even  in  relation to  the 
enterprise's  economic  decision  making,  such 
machinery  has  a part to  play  in  communicating 
local concerns and ideas to the management, and 
the  central  management's concerns  and  ideas  to 
the  employees  in  particular  plants.  And  in  so 
far  as  emphasis  must  be  placed  on  the  human 
aspects  of  the  production  process, these  institu-
tions  have  a  vital  part  to  play.  Finally,  the 
effectiveness  of  employee  participation at board 
level  appears to  depend  in  part on  the  existence 
of effective representative institutions which foc-
.us  employee  concerns  and  prevent those  on the 
board from  becoming too isolated. 
Accordingly, there  seems  to  be  a strong case for 
arguing  that  Community  legislation  concerned 
with  the  role  of  the  employee  in  the  decision 
making  of  enterprises  should  deal  with  the 
question  of representative  institutions, given  the 
important  functions  which  they  perform.  In-
deed,  some  of  the  Community  measures  des-
cribed  in  the  chapter  on  Community  pro-
grammes  and  proposals  already  contain  provi-
sions  relating  to  the  question.  The  proposals 
for  a  European  Companies  Statute,  a  third 
directive  on  mergers,  and  a  directive  on  the 
retention  of  the  rights  and  advantages  of 
employees,  together with  the  directive on  collec-
tive  redundancies  recently  adopted,  all  contain 
such  provisions,  the  most  comprehensive  being 
those  in  the  European  Companies  Statute. 
Moreover,  while  there  are  differences  between 
the  systems  prevailing in  Member States, partic-
ularly  as  between  those  States  having  a  highly 
developed  legal  system  and  those  relying on less 
formal,  extra-legal  relationships  between  enter-
prises  and  employees,  all  Member  States  do 
appear  to  have  systems  whereby  employees' 
representatives  are  informed,  consulted  and  on 
occasion  approve  or disapprove  proposed  deci-
sions.  If it is  accepted that these systems are an 
important  part of  the  way  in  which  employees 
influence  the  decision  making  of  large  and 
medium-sized  public  companies,  it  follows  that 
s.  8/75 
Community  legislation  concerned  with  bringing 
about a desirable convergence  of law  and pract-
ice  in  this  area should contain provisions relating 
to these systems. 
While  there  may  be  limits  as  to  the  degree  of 
convergence  which  can  be  realized,  it should  be 
possible to provide  that the  management bodies 
of  public  companies  employing  more  than  a 
specified  number of  persons  should have  certain 
legal  obligations to  inform, consult and possibly 
reach  agreement  with  the  representatives  of  the 
employees.  Such a regime would in a sense  be a 
generalization  of  the  principles  contained  in  the 
directives  and  proposed  directives  mentioned  in 
the  preceding  paragraph.  The  proposed  Euro-
pean  Companies  Statute's  provisions  as  to  the 
topics  upon  which the  European Works Council 
must  be  informed, consulted, and  give  its  agree-
ment  form  a useful  starting point for  consider-
ation  of  what  matters  should  be  included  in 
provisions  to  be  contained  in  an  amended  fifth 
directive.  The  proposed  rrovisions,  as  revised 
on  the  basis  of  the  opini.on  of  the  European 
Parliament,  have  accordingly  been  summarized 
in  Appendix  II  of  this  p<i.per.  Some  of  these 
provisions  may  well  be  more  appropriate  than 
others for  inclusion in a directive which will have 
an effect on the laws of each Member State. 
The  argument  sometimes  heard  that  all  provi-
sions of this  kind are in principle not suitable for 
inclusion in  legislation on company law  is funda-
mentally  unpersuasive.  Indeed, such provisions 
have  not traditionally been included in 'company 
law',  but  if  at  all,  in  laws  with  other  titles. 
However,  to  argue  that company law  can there-
fore  never  include  such  provisions  is  to  urge 
that  legislators  bind  themselves  to  formalism. 
Moreover,  behind  the  formalist objection, there 
lies  an  important issue  of substance.  Company 
laws  of  the  traditional  pattern  have  not  con-
tained  such  provisions  in  the  past  precisely 
because they were  based on economic and social 
policies which saw employees' relationships with 
companies  as  essentially  contractual.  In  so  far 
as  economic  and  social  policies  come  to  regard 
the  company  as  an  enterprise  in  which  labour 
and  capital  combine  in  their  own  and  society's 
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sooner  or  later  have  to  reflect  this  change  of 
underlying  philosophy  and  include  provisions 
expressly dealing with  relationships  between the 
providers  of  capital,  the  management  and  the 
employees,  irrespective  of  whether they are  for-
mally deemed to  be 'company law' or not. 
Finally,  it  may  be  felt  that  the  obligations  to 
inform,  consult  and  secure  the  approval  of 
employees'  representatives  should  not  be  con-
fined  to employers having a legal form analogous 
to  the  'societe  anonyme'  in  the  interests  of 
fairness,  both  as  between  employees  who  may 
work  for  enterprises  having  a  different  legal 
form,  and  as  between  enterprises  them-
.selves.  There  is  of  course  nothing  to  prevent 
~uch  obligatio~s. being  applied  more  generally, 
JUSt as the proviSions of Article 6 of the proposed 
third directive on mergers of  'societes anonymes' 
may  be  given  broader  application  in  the  pro-
posed  directive  on  the  retention  of  rights  and 
advantages of  employees  in  the  case  of  mergers, 
takeovers  and  amalgamations  generally.  But 
the  possibility  of  such  a  generalization  should 
not  prevent  the  adoption  of  a  directive  on  the 
dec_ision  making structure of 'societes anonymes' 
whtch  responds  comprehensively to  the  require-
ments  of economic and  social  policy  concerning 
the  role  of  employees  in  relation  to  the  compa-
nies for which they work. 
Participation in decision  making bodies 
A study of the  laws of the Member States reveals 
that  in  the  recent  past  a  growing  number  of 
States  have  adopted  systems  permitting 
employees  to  participate in  the  decision  making 
bodies of enterprises.  Until  1971, Germany and 
France  were  the  only  Member States where  the 
law  gave  employees  a  say,  to  very  different 
degrees,  in  the  decision  making  processes  of 
companies,  though  several  Member  States  pro-
vided  for  limited  forms  of  employee  or  trade 
union participation as  to  the  decision making of 
enterprises  in  the  public  sector.  By  1974,  the 
Netherlands,  Denmark  and  Luxembourg  had 
adopted legislation providing for employee parti-
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cipation  in  the  appointment of  members  of  the 
decision making bodies of companies, particular-
ly as regards larger companies. 
Moreover,  in  those  Member  States  which  have 
had  such systems  for  some  time,  in  recent years 
there  has  been  a growing debate  as  to  whether 
and  how  the  systems  should  be  developed.  In 
Germany, all  major political parties appear to  be 
agreed  in  principle on  a further development of 
the  la_w  as  to  participati~:m  in  the  supervisory 
councils  of  large  compames  which  are  not sub-
ject to the regime  prevailing in the coal  and steel 
sector.  Discussion  currently centres  around the 
Bill_ tabled  by  th~ government in  February 1974 
whiCh seeks to  g1ve  equal rights ('Gieichberechti-
gung')  and  equal  weight  ('Gleichgewichtigkeit') 
to both production factors, labour and capital  in 
the  dec~sion  making  processes  of  such  la~ge 
compa!1Ies  and  groups  of  companies.  At  the 
same time, the opportunity was taken in 1972 to 
strengthen  the  position of German works  coun-
cils.  In  France,  in  recent years  several  leading 
political  figures  have  suggested  that  the  two 
emplo_yee.  representative~  admitted  to  company 
councils  m  a  consultative  capacity  should  be 
given  full  voting  rights.  The  Sudreau  commis-
sion in its recent repore regards joint supervision 
through  the  representation  of  employees on  the 
decision  making  bodies  of French companies as 
the  ultimate  element in  the  reform  of  the  enter-
prise  to  be  approached  in  France  through  a 
period of experimentation. 
In  Ireland and the United Kingdom too, which in 
general  have  in  the  past  provided  only  for 
somewhat limited forms of trade union represen-
tation  in  the  public sector, proposals have  been 
made  recently  which  would  implement systems 
of employee participation in the decision making 
bodies of  enterprises much more extensively.  In 
Ireland,  the  government  has  announced  that 
employee  representation on the  boards of public 
enterprises  will  be  introduced  progressively.  It 
is  seen as  an essential component of any compre-
hensive  approach to  worker participation.  The 
development  of  works  councils  is  also  to  be 
I,  Rappr:rt  du  Comite  d'etude  pour  Ia  reforme  de 
l e:ztrepnse,  February  1975,  La  Documentation fran-
c;:a•se. 
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public  sector  will  promote  greater  employee 
participation in  private enterprises.  In  the  Uni-
ted  Kingdom,  both the  Trades Union  Congress 
and  the  working  group  of  the  Labour  Party's 
sub-committee  on  industrial  policy  have  pub-
lished  reports which propose the  introduction of 
two tier boards for  British companies with equal 
numbers  of  employee  and  shareholder represen-
tatives,  the  employee  representatives  being 
appointed through trade union machinery.  The 
government  has  announced  that  legislation  to 
put worker directors on the  boards of companies 
will  be  introduced  during  the  Parliamentary 
session  of  1976  and  1977,  and  has  set  up  a 
committee  of  inquiry  to  advise  on  the  best 
method of doing so. 
It  should  also  be  observed  that in  several  Euro-
pean  countries  which  are  not  members  of  the 
Community, there have  been  important develop-
ments  concerning employee  participation  in  the 
decision  making bodies of enterprises.  Systems 
have been  introduced by  law  in Austria, Norway 
and  Sweden  for  example, and  a serious political 
debate has commenced in Switzerland. 
Of  course, there  is  more than one  view  as  to  the 
desirability of  these systems.  They are opposed 
by  important socio-economic  groups  mainly  in 
Belgium,  France,  Italy,  Ireland  and  the  United 
Kingdom, 'and  to  a lesser  degree  in  other  Mem-
ber States. 
Certain trade unionists are opposed because they 
consider  that these  systems  will  substitute  class 
collaboration for  the  class  struggle.  Others fear 
that they  will  at  least  compromise  the  indepen-
dence  of  trade  unions  as  bargaining  organiza-
tions.  They  wish  to  be  fully  informed,  to  be 
consulted, and  to  be able to bargain over as wide 
a  range  of  issues  as  possible  on  behalf of  their 
members, but they do not wish to  be  involved in 
the  management of  privately owned enterprises, 
or to be  in any sense responsible for the decisions 
taken by such enterprises.  They are also critical 
of  the  creation of  machinery for  the  representa-
tion  of  employee  interests  which  is  independent 
of  the  trade  union  movement, for  they  fear  that 
it  will  be  used  to  undermine  their own influence 
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with  employees  and  consequently to  limit  their 
effectiveness  as  representative  organizations. 
Certain  industrial,  commercial  and  financial 
interests are also opposed, for reasons which are 
in  many  ways  the  converse  of  the  trade  union 
fears.  They  consider  that  the  systems  will  be 
used  to  further  the  class  struggle, perhaps deci-
sively, or that at least enterprises will  be serious-
ly  weakened  in  their  dealings  with  organized 
labour.  They also fear  that employee participa-
tion will  have  an  adverse effect on the long term 
viability  of  private! y owned  enterprises.  Their 
concern  as  to  the  efficiency  and  strength  of 
enterprises  is  particularly strong as  regards  pro-
posals  for  employee  participation which  would 
give  employees'  representatives  the  power  to 
block  unilaterally  the  implementation of impor-
tant  economic  decisions.  They  point out  that 
such  regimes  are  still  wholly  exceptional  phe-
nomena,  having their origin  in  special  historical 
circumstances,  and  that it  is  unsafe,  or at least 
premature,  to  apply  such  systems  generally  by 
law  to  enterprises  operating  in  very  different 
contexts. 
Most  of  these  critics  favour  reforms which will 
not involve employees or trade unions directly or 
substantially  in  the  administration  of  private 
enterprises  though they  are of course not agreed 
on what the  reforms should be.  On the  contra-
ry,  the  policies  suggested  by  these  trade  unions 
and  industrialists  are  frequently  poles 
apart.  Certain  trade  unionists  tend  to  favour 
programmes  of  'worker  control' which  at their 
most developed amount to State ownership com-
bined  with a radical  decentralization of decision 
making.  Less  developed  programmes  involve 
the  'conditioning'  of  private  enterprise  through 
the  extensive  exercise  of  bargaining  power  or 
perhaps through the  granting of  legal  veto  pow-
ers  to  employees  on  important  matters.  An 
important element in most trade union proposals 
is  the  creation  of  legal  obligations  requiring 
enterprises  to  give  employees and  their represen-
tatives extensive  information as  to  the affairs of 
the  enterprise.  Such  information is  regarded as 
an  important  guarantee  in  itself  of  effective 
consultation  and  bargaining.  The  industrial, 
commercial  and  financial  interests  seem  to  be 
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sophisticated forms of consultation. 
However,  these  dissenting  voices  notwithstand-
ing,  there  is  clearly  a  trend  towards  greater 
employee  participation  in  the  decision  making 
bodies  of  enterprises  which  can  hardly  be 
ignored.  Moreover,  since  several  Member 
States already make provision for such participa-
tion, while others do not, to make no provision 
at all for the matter at the European level would 
be  to  fail  in  a  significant degree  to ensure that 
the  laws  of  the  Member  States  provide  for  · 
equivalent safeguards and obligations. 
Furthermore,  the  introduction  of  a  system  of 
employee  representation  need  not  interfere 
adversely with other forms  of employee partici-
pation existing or planned in Member States.  A 
minimum  requirement  would  ensure  the  intro-
duction  of  the  system  throughout the  Commu-
nity  without  restricting  those  Member  States 
who  wish  to  have  more  stringent  require-
ments.  The introduction of a  system  in  Mem-
ber  States  where  none  existed  before  need  not 
inhibit the  continued development in  that State 
of more traditional forms of employee participa-
tion such as collective  bargaining or representa-
tive  institutions  such  as  works  or  enterprise 
councils,  as  recent  reforms  in  the  Netherlands, 
Luxembourg  and  Germany  have  shown.  On 
the  contrary,  by  complementing  these  institu-
tions,  employee  representation  on  company 
boards  may  well  contribute  to  their  effective 
operation and development. 
Indeed, an important part of the attractiveness of 
employee  participation  in  company  boards  is 
that such participation  appears to  have  a  gene-
rally  positive  effect  on  the  other  forms  of 
employee participation existing in relation to the 
companies  in  question.  The  manner  in  which 
employee participation at board level  both rein-
forces  and  is  reinforced  by  effective  representa-
tive  institutions  with their  foundations  at plant 
level  has  already  been  the  subject  of  com-
ment.  Similarly,  employee  participation  at 
board level,  by  increasing the  amount of  infor-
mation available, and  improving the experience 
and understanding of those affected, is  also likely 
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to  have  a  positive,  if  indirect,  effect  on  the 
process of collective  bargaining.  Finally, social 
programmes  aimed  at  emphasizing  the  human 
aspect  of  the  production  process,  whether  at 
national  or  Community  level,  are  likely  to  be 
easier  to  implement  and  develop  if  employees 
participate in  the appointment of those who are 
sitting on the company's board, and influencing 
the manner in which its policies evolve. 
Participation  in  the  body  which  supervises  a 
company's  decisional  hierarchy  gives  the 
employees as  a  whole an opportunity to partici-
pate  generally  in  the  decision  making  of  an 
enterprise,  including  the  decision  of  economic 
questions  of  a  strategic  nature  such  as  pro-
grammes of expansion and contraction.  More-
over,  it  is  the  only  existing form  of  employee 
participation  which  necessarily  provides  this 
opportunity,  though  other  methods  may  do so 
exceptionally.  Further, the opportunity to  par-
ticipate is  available to the employees of enterpri-
ses  subjected  to  the  regime  regardless of limita-
tions  on  their  ability  to  bargain  arising  from 
economic  or  other  circumstances  beyond  their 
control. 
Finally,  employee  representation  on  company 
boards, alone among existing forms of employee 
participation,  provides  an  opportunity  for  the 
employees of an enterprise to  be  involved  on a 
relatively  continuous  basis  in  the  process  of 
strategic  decision  making  at  the  highest  level 
of  the  enterprise  by  which  they  are 
employed.  This  is  clearly  distinguishable from 
participation  whether  through  collective  agree-
ments  which  are  the  product  of  a  process  of 
bargaining at arms' length, or through represen-
tative  institutions  which,  being  organized  pri-
marily  for  the  representation  and  defence  of 
employees'  interests  at plant level, tend to  have 
more limited preoccupations and perspectives. 
The argument is  sometimes made that the intro-
duction of employee participation will  necessar-
ily  have  adverse  consequences  as  regards  indu-
strial  efficiency,  and  therefore  on the  ability of 
the  companies  concerned  to  attract  invest-
ment.  Employee  representation,  it  is  said,  will 
lead  to  emphasis  being placed on the  preserva-
S.  8/75 tion  of  existing structures  and  jobs  rather  than 
on  innovation  and  improvements  in  efficiency, 
which,  by  increasing  profits,  attract  invest-
ment.  However,  if  one  compares  the  positions 
in different Member States, it certainly cannot be 
said  that  there  is  an  apparent  correlation 
between  regimes  of  employee  participation and 
situations  of  low  efficiency,  low  profits  and 
inadequate  investment.  If anything,  these  pro-
blems  seem  more  closely  associated  with  the 
existence of industrial relations systems  in which 
there  is  little  or  no  formal  employee  participa-
tion, and a relatively high  incidence of industrial 
confrontation.  Though  a  causal  connection 
cannot be  scientifically established, this observa-
tion would suggest that social  conflict, resulting 
in  part  from  the  exclusion  of  employees  from 
decision making,  is  a greater threat to efficiency 
and  investment than a degree of employee parti-
cipation. 
Moreover,  in  this  connection, a somewhat broa-
der definition should  be  taken of  the  concept of 
efficiency than the  traditional concept of  relative 
financial  returns on the capital invested in partic-
ular  enterprises.  From  the  point  of  view  of 
society  as  a  whole,  other  elements  need  to  be 
included  in  the  calculation,  as  regards  both 
inputs  and  outputs,  not  least  the  cost  of  indu-
strial confrontation, not just for  the enterprise in 
which  it  occurs, but for  the social and  economic 
system  as  a whole.  As  the  calculus  is  extended 
in  this  fashion,  the  argument  that  increased 
employee  participation  will  necessarily  lead  to 
decreased  efficiency  appears  to  be  ill-found-
ed.  However,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the 
problem  of efficiency  may  become  more  acute  if 
employee  participation  is  organized  in  a  way 
which  permits  the  employees'  representatives 
unilaterally  to  block  the  implementation of maj-
or economic decisions.  · 
To  suggest  that  the  introduction  of  systems  of 
employee participation in  the supervisory bodies 
of enterprises will  instantly and  completely solve 
the  present problems of  damaging and  unneces-
sary  industrial  confrontation would  be  to  claim 
too  much.  But  experience  of  the  operation of 
such  systems  of  employee  participation suggests 
S.  8/75 
that,  as  part of  a broad  programme which  also 
embraces effective representative institutions and 
encourages  the  development  of  collective  bar-
gaining, they  can make a unique contribution to 
improved industrial relations through the elimin-
ation  of  unnecessary  confrontations  in  enterpri-
ses, and the  resolution without undue damage of 
those  confrontations  which  necessarily  occur  in 
healthy societies.  They appear to  offer a useful 
basis  for  Community  legislation  which  seeks  to 
establish common structures which will  be a step 
towards  a  more  integrated,  democratic society, 
in  which  employees  as  well  as  the  providers  of 
capital  and  managers  can  influence  the  decision 
making of those industrial and commercial enter-
prises  which  play such an  important role  in  the 
economies of  the  Community and the  lives  of its 
citizens.  · 
39 Flexible  approaches 
Although the  convergent developments just sum-
marized appear to  constitute the proper basis for 
Community  legislation  in  this  field,  adequate 
allowance must also be made for real divergences 
in  existing  systems  deriving  from  variations  in 
the  evolution of  the  social  and  economic histo-
ries of the Member States. 
Company structure 
On two occasions, the Commission has proposed 
the  general introduction for public companies, in 
addition to  the shareholders' general  meeting, of 
a  management  body  and  a  supervisory  body: 
first,  in  the  proposal for  a Statute for  European 
Companies  in  1970,  and  then,  in  the  proposal 
for  a  fifth  directive  on  the  structure of  'societes 
anonymes'  in  1972.  It has  just  reaffirmed  this 
choice  for  the  European  Companies  Statute  in 
presenting its amended proposal to the Council. 
At  the  present stage of the debate in the Member 
States  and  in  the  Community's  institutions,  it 
still  considers that this model  is  the  best adapted 
both  to  the  needs  of  large,  modern  enterprises, 
and  to  the  requirements  of  society  in  general  as 
regards  such  enterprises.  Furthermore,  for  dif-
ferent  motives,  a  number  of  governments  have 
begun  to  reflect  seriously  on  the  advantages  of 
this system. 
However, one has  to  recognize the difficulty that 
there  would  be  for  those  States,  with  strong 
industrial  and  commercial  traditions,  all  of 
whose  companies  have  one-board  systems,  to 
introduce  with  immediate  application,  a reform 
of  such  importance.  The  fact  that  the  reluct-
ance  of  those  concerned  may  be  attributable 
more  to  fears  deriving from  their present lack of 
knowledge  of  the  system  proposed  than to  any 
actual  disadvantages  of  the  system,  does  not 
substantially alter the  difficulty confronting gov-
ernments. 
In  this  situation, it seems to the Commission that 
during the  examination of its proposal for a fifth 
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directive,  there  may  be  less  discussion  of  the 
principle of  the  dualist system  itself,'  than of the 
need  for  a  period  of  co-existence  of  one-board 
and dualist systems in any Member State wishing 
to  maintain  a  one-board  system  for  the  time 
being.  Accordingly,  it seems  advisable to study 
approaches  which  would  permit,  during a first 
stage,  the  co-existence  of  the  one-board  and 
dualist systems in  those States that would like to 
leave open a choice for a transitional period, but 
which  would  ensure  the  realization  of  the  ulti-
mate  objective,  the  dualist  system.  Certain 
Member  States  might  also  consider  whether, 
during this  period, a pi ogressive implementation 
of  a  mandatory  duahst  system,  for  example 
according to the size of companies, would not be 
desirable. 
Defining the length of the transitional period will 
be  a  delicate  but  important task.  Transitional 
arrangements  of  an  appropriate length will  pro-
vide  a period of experimentatil n, apprenticeship, 
and  gradual  adaptation  withou· losing  sight  of 
the  ultimate  objective,  namely  tt.e  existence  of 
comparable  structures  in  the  Member  States: 
shareholders' general  meeting, supervisory body, 
and the management body. 
Employee participation 
The  essential  difficulty  confronting  the  Com-
munity  is  the  reality  of  divergent  historical 
development in  the  Member States in  relation to 
social  traditions,  and  in  particular,  the  trade 
unions.  Granted  that  all  trade  unions  seek  to 
influence,  more  and  more  distinctly,  decision 
making  at different  levels  of  the  economy,  they 
nevertheless  differ  as  to  their  choice  of 
methods.  In  those  situations  where  the  trade 
unions have sought and obtained participation in 
the supervisory or management bodies of compa-
nies,  they are frequently asking for a strengthen-
ing  of  the  degree  of  employee  representa-
1  See  p. 32 however, for a  discussion of the possibil-
ity  of  including  a  supervisory  instrument  within  a 
unitary board. 
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the  introduction  of  such  systems  for  the  first 
time, while  others would  be  prepared to  partici-
pate once the systems were enacted by law.  For 
still others, however, even the  principle of  repre-
sentation is,  purely and simply, opposed.  To a 
certain extent, this situation has  an effect on the 
position  both of  employers,  and  of  the  State  in 
question. 
For the  Commission, the  overall objective, if  not 
the specific approaches of the proposal for a fifth 
directive,  remain  valid  and  reasonably  realistic, 
namely,  employee  representation,  not  merely 
presence in  a consultative capacity, on the super-
visory  bodies of  public companies.  The  task  is 
to  bring about a situation which will  permit the 
introduction,  in  all  the  Member  States,  of  such 
employee  representation,  while  making  proper 
allowance for their divergent social traditions. 
There  should  however  be  no  doubt  as  to  one 
fundamental  issue.  The  representation  of 
employees  on  a  company's  supervisory  body  is 
only one  form  among others for  participation in 
the  economic  and  social  affairs  of  the  enter-
prise.  It  is  additional  to  the  negotiation  of 
collective agreements, and  to  action, normally at 
establishment  level,  through  employees'  repre-
sentative  institutions, whether works councils or 
shop  stewards.  It  complements  these  possibi-
lities of intervention.  Representation on a com-
pany's supervisory body adds a dimension other-
wise  lacking:  an  institution  not  only  for  the 
provision  of  information,  and  consultation  on 
every  important  event,  whether  economic  or 
social,  but  also  the  opportunity  to  influence 
effectively  the  decision  making  of  the  com-
pany  on  a  continuing  basis.  Accordingly,  the 
introduction  of  such  representation  will  in  no 
way  restrict  the  possibilities  for  action  which 
already exist. 
Furthermore, in  view  of  the  divergent structures 
and  attitudes  presently  prevailing  in  the  Com-
munity, a sufficient degree of convergence in this 
field  can  be  achieved  only  after  a  considerable 
period of  time.  In  this situation, it  is  unrealistic 
to  assume  that  the  fifth  directive  can  fix  in 
advance  the  precise  limits  which will  ultimately 
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prevail.  What  is  important  at  present  is  that 
Community  legislation  be  adopted  establishing 
as  a  Community objective  the  adoption of cer-
tain  minimum  standards  as  to  company  struc-
tures,  which  are  as  flexible  as  circumstances 
permit,  and  which  themselves  may  be 
approached  gradually.  Once  these  standards 
have  been  achieved, and, as  a result,  companies 
throughout  the  Community  all  have  structures 
which  incorporate,  in  one  form  or another, the 
basic principle of  employee participation, then it 
may well  prove possible to  go  further and adopt 
legislation  which  will  ensure  the  appropriate 
degree  of convergence  as  regards the intensity of 
employee  participation.  At  present,  only  the 
first  step  can  be  taken.  Thus,  the  harmoniza-
tion  of  the  various  legislative  provisions  of  the 
Member States  in  this  field  will  not, at present, 
impose  restraints  upon  the  approach  of  those 
who  wish  to  develop  their  systems of  participa-
tion.  Accordingly,  only  minimum  equivalence 
can  be  contemplated.  In  fact, the  fifth directive 
in  its  present  form  already  contains  two  basic 
formulas  of  a  very  different  kind  and  thus  is 
characterized by great potential flexibility. 
It  remains  to  determine  the  content  of  the 
provisions  for  a  common  Community  frame-
work,  and  to  consider  how,  in  certain  cases, 
these  provisions  can  be  approached  through  a 
programme of steps. 
The content of a 
Community framework 
The question arises as to whether the formulas of 
the  present proposal  constitute the only possible 
provisions  for  a Community framework, or are 
simply  certain  possibilities  among others.  This 
is  an  issue  which the  debate  on the  green  paper 
can  clarify,  and  the  Commission  will  carefully 
consider any suggestion made as to the matter. 
In  this  connection,  one  major  question  that 
requires examination is  how flexible the directive 
should  be  as  regards  the  methods  by  which 
employees  may  appoint and  remove  members of 
the supervisory body.  Certain interests consider 
that a  Member  State  should  be  able  to  provide 
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ment of  members through trade union organiza-
tions.  The  case  for  providing for  such systems 
is  clearly  strongest when trade unions  represent 
the overwhelming majority of  the employees in a 
particular  enterprise,  and  are  therefore  closely 
connected  with it.  However, problems arise  as 
regards  employees who  are  not union members, 
enterprises  in  which  a  number  of  unions  are 
represented, and enterprises in which trade union 
representation is  not particularly strong.  These 
problems  would  require  national  legislatures  to 
draw difficult lines, but in itself, that is no reason 
for  not leaving  a  Member  State  to  do  so.  On 
the other hand, there are those who consider that 
for  reasons  of  principle,  as  well  as  for  the 
practical  reasons  just stated, all  systems  chosen 
should  include  democratic  guarantees of  a legal 
nature.  Proportional  representation  is  also 
suggested in order to ensure a degree of represen-
tation for minorities. 
The Commission considers that while a directive 
cannot seek  to  impose  uniform  rules  as  to  the 
methods wher.:by  employees' representatives are 
appointed, it should contain certain general pro-
visions which  will  ensure that all  systems adopt-
ed  incorporate  the  common  principles  that 
employee  representatives  are  truly representative 
of  the  employees  of  the  enterprise  in  question, 
and  that all  employees  of  the  enterprise  should 
be  able to  participate in  the  process whereby the 
representatives  are appointed, according to  pro-
cedures  guaranteeing  a  free  expression  of  opi-
nion,  in  a  way  which  will  provide  reasonable 
protection for minorities. 
An  important associated  issue  is  the  question of 
the  legal  duty  which  should  be  placed  upon 
members of a supervisory body.  The suggestion 
is sometimes made that representatives chosen by 
or on  behalf of  employees  should  not be  under 
the  same  kind  of  duty as  the  other members  of 
the  board,  but  owe  their  duty  primarily  to  the 
employees.  However,  certain  critics  of  this 
suggestion  observe  that to  differentiate  between 
the  duties  owed  by  the  members  according  to 
their method of appointment is  in effect to  create 
two  boards  and  place  them  in  an  uneasy  and 
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probably  unworkable  relationship  with  each 
other.  They  argue  that  the  basic idea  underly-
ing employee representation on company boards 
is  a  broadening of  the accepted  purposes of  the 
enterprises  to  include  the  interests  of  both 
employees and shareholders.  Accordingly, there 
seems  to  be  a strong argument  for  a provision 
that the  members of the supervisory body should 
owe  a  duty  to  the  enterprise  as  a  whole,  and 
therefore  have  regard  to  the  interests  of  both 
groups.  Legal  rules  to  that  effect  exist  in  all 
Member  States  where  employee  representation 
on supervisory bodies is organized. 
Consideration should also  be  given  to  the  possi-
bility that a large  proportion of the employees of 
a  particular  enterprise  will  not  wish  to  be 
represented  on  a  company's  supervisory 
body.  If such  is  the  case,  there  indeed  seems 
little  point  in  imposing  any of  these  systems  by 
law.  Indeed, Danish law  requires  half or more 
of the employees to  vote  in  favour of representa-
tion  on  a  company's  board  before  it  is  imple-
mented.  Similarly,  the  European  Companies 
Statute  in  its  amended  form  provides  that 
employees shall not be  represented on the super-
visory board if  a majority so  decide.  Such rules 
have  the  virtue  of  realism  and  it  would  not  be 
difficult  to  incorporate  a  similar  idea  into  the 
fifth directive  if it were thought advisable. 
A transitional solution 
As  for  the  realization  through a  programme  of 
steps  of  the  representation  of employees on  the 
supervisory  bodies  of  companies,  certain  Mem-
ber States are not simply unwilling to  implement 
employee  representation  to  the  degree  which 
would  be  required  by a Community framework, 
but they  are  unable  to  adopt,  in  the  immediate 
future,  the  principle  of  employee  representation 
itself.  Accordingly,  a  study  must  be  made  of 
systems  which,  though  distinct from  the  chosen 
system,  will  be  likely  to  provide  such  Member 
States  with  an  avenue  of  approach:  transitional 
substitutes,  which  can  perform  some  of  the 
functions  of  representation  on  the  superv1sory 
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leading towards such representation. 
An  examination of  the laws and practices of  the 
Member  States  reveals  that  in  many  of  them, 
some  of  the objectives of employee participation 
in supervisory boards are achieved by representa-
tive  institutions  of  one  kind  or  another.  An 
example  is  provided  by  the  Belgian  use  of 
enterprise  councils  which  have  in  recent  years 
been  granted·· extensive  rights  to  information 
concerning the economic situation, development,  . 
and  prospects  of  the  enterprise.  The  law 
requires  that the  information given  must permit 
the  committee  to  understand  the  effect  of  the 
prevailing economic and  financial  conditions on 
the  enterprise  in  relation .  to  organization, 
employment  and  personnel.  It also  deals  with 
precise  items  of  information  to  be  provided, 
which  include  details  as  to  the  costs  of  produc-
tion, and plans concerning future investments. 
Though there are  significant differences, systems 
having characteristics in common with that exist-
ing  in  Belgium,  are  to  be  found  established  by 
law  in  Germany,  France,  Luxembourg,  and  the 
Netherlands.  In  Denmark,  the  matter  is  regu-
lated  by  a nationally applicable collective agree-
ment.  In  Ireland,  Italy  and  the  United  King-
dom, there  is  no  comparable general regime, but 
in  particular  cases,  shop  stewards  and  works 
councils  do  participate  in  extensive  and  intense 
discussions with management, which can involve 
a  fairly  large  measure  of  disclosure  of  informa-
tion by management. 
Such  systems  of  consultation  and  discussion, 
unsupported  by  participation  in  the  supervisory 
board  are  open  to  the  criticism  that  since  the 
representative  institutions  are  external  to  the 
decision  making  bodies  of  the  company,  their 
role,  and  their  effectiveness  may  be  limit-
ed.  While  this  criticism  is  probably sufficiently 
well  founded  to  prevent  the  acceptance  of  such 
systems  as  equivalent  and  therefore  permanent 
alternatives  to  participation  in  supervisory 
boards, it  is  not a decisive objection to the use of 
such  systems  as  transitional  arrangements  for 
Member  States  which  cannot  immediately 
impose  a  general  obligation  to  adopt employee 
s.  8/75 
participation in supervisory boards.  Any transi-
tional arrangement will  probably be less satisfac-
tory than the  regime which constitutes the objec-
tive. 
Accordingly,  consideration must be  given  to  the 
possibility  of  providing,  in  an  amended  fifth 
directive,  that those  Member States  which  can-
not immediately adopt mandatory employee par-
ticipation  in  supervisory  boards  should  be  free 
for  a transitional period, to  release all  or certain 
categories  of  the  companies concerned, from  the 
obligation  in  question,  but should  impose  upon 
those  companies which do  not choose to  imple-
ment  employee  representation  in  the  board, an 
obligation to adopt a system based on an institu-
tion  representing  the  employees  at  enterprise 
level. 
The  possible  Community  provisions  relating  to 
such systems will have to  be carefully considered, 
however.  For  the  various  systems  whereby 
employees' representatives are informed and con-
sulted,  be  they works councils or ~hop stewards' 
committees,  constitute  an  imporr.ant  and  sensi-
tive part of the  living body of industrial relations 
in  the  Member  States.  The  task  is  to  extract 
certain  principles  from  the  existing systems,  so 
that any Community legislation will be  based on 
experience.  An  attempt must be  made  to  build 
upon  the  existing  systems,  where  necessary,  so 
that they  may  perform  some  of  the  functions  of 
participation in supervisory boards. 
In  this  connection,  it  should  be  observed  that, 
while  in  the  majority  of  Member  States,  the 
constitutions  of  employees'  representative  insti-
tutions are  based  on laws, in  Denmark, Ireland, 
Italy and  the  United  Kingdom, they are based on 
arrangements  of  varying  degrees  of  formal-
ity.  Moreover,  in  France, even  though the  law 
prescribes a system of general application, collec-
tive  agreements  may  modify  the  system  in  rela-
tion  to  a  particular  enterprise,  significantly 
enough  in  relation  to  the  manner  in  which 
different  groups  of  employees  are  to  be  repre-
sented. 
The  level  which  is  appropriate for  a representa-
tive  institution which  is  to  involve employees  in 
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decisions  concerning  the  economic  progress  of 
the enterprise taken as a whole, seems necessarily 
to  be  the  level  of  the  enterprise  itself.  In  the 
context of  laws  relating  to  the  decision  making 
of  public  companies, this  means  company level, 
though further provision may  be  necessary in  an 
appropriate  context  to  accommodate  group 
situations.  However, in  view of the  fact that in 
several  Member  States  existing  representative 
institutions operate at establishment level,  it will 
probably  be  necessary  to  leave  Member  States 
free  to  choose  whether the  institution should be 
indirectly  constituted,  being  appointed  by  esta-
blishment  level  institutions,  as  in  the  Nether-
lands, or directly  appointed, as  in  France.  In a 
Member  State  having  a  developed  system  of 
establishment level  institutions,  the  former  pro-
cess might well  be  preferable. 
As  for  the  composition  of  the  representative 
body  and  methods of appointment, it  is  of basic 
importance that all  systems guarantee a substan-
tial  degree  of  independence  to  the  employees' 
representatives.  For  example,  provision  could 
be  made  for  an  institution, consisting entirely of 
employees'  representatives, endowed  with rights 
and obligations to meet and discuss together and 
with  the  representatives  of  management.  On 
the  other  hand,  a  body  of  which  the  chief 
executive of a company is  a member, or even one 
which  is  composed  of  equal  numbers  of 
employee  and  management representatives,  may 
perhaps  ensure  a  sufficient  degree  of  indepen-
dence,  provided  that  certain  powers  and  rights 
are  conferred  upon  the  employees'  representa-
tives.  For  example,  they  should  be  allowed 
adequate time  and facilities  for  meeting together 
to  discuss  and  arrange  matters  on  their  own, 
without  management  representatives  being  pre-
sent.  They should have  an  adequate opportun-
ity  to  express  their  views  fully  to  the  manage-
ment  in  general,  and  to  the  chief  executive  in 
particular.  Finally,  they  must  be  in  a position 
to  take  action  to  enforce  performance  of  any 
obligation  imposed  on  the  management,  and  in 
particular of obligations to disclose certain kinds 
of information. 
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In  view  of the  complexity of the situation which 
can  arise,  as  has  already  been  suggested  in 
relation  to  the  appointment of  employee  repre-
sentatives  to  supervisory  boards,  Community 
provisions  must  probably  be  limited  to  general 
principles  which  will  have  to  be  given  more 
concrete  application  in  the  laws  of  the  Member 
States, and in the  arrangements actually adopted 
by enterprises.  Similar principles to those alrea-
dy  discussed  would  seem  to  be  desirable  in  this 
context  too,  and  specifically,  representatives 
should  fairly  represent  all  the  employees  of  the 
company. 
It should  be  possible to  adopt Community legis-
lation which  obliged a Member State  to  enact a 
regime  applying  generally  to  public  companies, 
but which also left it free to enact that the system 
could  be  modified  by  agreement  between  the 
company  and  the  employees'  representatives, 
· provided  that the  system  still  complied with the 
principles  contained  in  the  directive,  and  poss-
ibly,  provided  also  that the  modifications  were 
approved  by  the  relevant  government  depart-
ment.  Such a directive would permit the  use  for 
transitional institutions of systems having a con-
tractual character, while at the same time ensur-
ing  a necessary  degree  of  consistency, and  com-
pliance  with  minimum  standards.  However,  it 
poses  some  problems  in  relation  to  companies 
with  establishments  in  more  than  one  Member 
State, discussed in greater detail subsequently. 
Finally,  as  far  as  composition  and  methods  of 
appointment  are  concerned,  throughout  the 
Community, the  members of representative insti-
tutions  are,  almost  invariably, employees of  the 
company.  It  would  accordingly  seem  sensible 
to retain this characteristic in this context. 
Turning  to  the  functions  of  these  bodies,  the 
essential  requirement  is  that  they  should  be 
informed  about and  have  ample  opportunity to 
discuss  both  among  themselves  and  with 
management, the same broad range of matters as 
employee  representatives  on a company's board, 
and  in  particular,  the  economic  life  of  the 
company.  They  should  therefore  be  entitled  to 
receive  as  much  information  as  is  practicable 
concerning the  economic progress of  the  compa-
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concerning  the  general  development  of  the  sec-
tors  of  the  economy  in  which  these  enterprises 
operate.  For  example,  the  information  should 
relate to future expectations and plans, as well as 
to  past and  present facts  and situations.  Speci-
fic  transactions  of  importance  which  are  being 
considered should be  brought to  the  attention of 
the  employees' representatives, and discussed, as 
soon as  possible, and certainly in advance of  the 
transaction  being  concluded.  This  should  ap-
ply, for example, to any closure or transfer of the 
whole or a substantial part of  the  enterprise;  to 
any  substantial  curtailment  or extension  of  the 
activities  of the enterprise; to  substantial organi-
zational changes within the enterprise; and to the 
establishment or termination of long term  coop-
eration  with  other  undertakings.  The  relevant 
provisions  of  the  revised  proposal  for  a  Eur-
opean  Companies  Statute,  summarized  in 
Appendix  II,  can  serve  as  a  useful  point  of 
departUre for consideration and discussion of the 
matter,  although  it  must  be  stressed  that  the 
Commission  does  not  suggest  that  the  system 
proposed  for  the  European  Works  Council 
should constitute the transitional solution for the 
whole Community. 
For the  reason alre·1d y mentioned  in  the  general 
discussion  of  reprfsentative  institutions,  to  give 
institutions represwtative of the employees pow-
ers  to  approve  c r  veto  proposed  management 
decisions  of  an  economic  nature  does  not seem 
possible  without  running the  risk  of  paralysing 
the  enterprise as  a business organization.  As  to 
social  matters, the  arguments in favour of rights 
of  approval  and  disapproval  are  more  persua-
sive.  The  Commission has indeed proposed the 
granting of such rights in relation to the drawing 
up  of  social  plans to  deal  with the  consequences 
of concentrations. 
However, the u::e of representative institutions as 
a transitional  a~ proach to  representation on the 
board  is  a  dist.nct  question,  being  concerned 
essentially  with  employee  involvement  in  the 
economic  progress  of  the  enterprise.  For  this 
reason, rights of approval and disapproval in the 
social  field  are more appropriately considered in 
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the  context of  legislation  to  apply  generally and 
indefinitely  to  representative  institutions/  and 
not  in  the  context of  a design  for  a transitional 
approach to participation in supervisory boards. 
Given  that  a  representative  institution  of  the 
kind  described  must  be  entitled  to  receive  a 
broad  range  of  information  concerning,  in  par-
ticular, the economic life  of the enterprise, possi-
ble solutions to the problem of sensitive informa-
tion  require  some  consideration.  For example, 
a right to  receive  information the  publication of 
which might reasonably be  expected to harm the 
enterprise,  would  appear  to  require  the  impo-
sition of  an  associated  obligation to  preserve  its 
secrecy.  This  approach  is  adopted  by  the 
revised  European  Companies  Statute,  and  no 
great difficulty  seems  to  arise  as  to  the  applica-
tion of such principles in  the context of national 
legal  systems.  Consideration must also be given 
to  the  question  of  whether,  and  if  so,  in  what 
circumstances,  management  should  be  able  to 
withhold information from a representative insti-
tution.  Such  provisions  are  incorporated in  the 
systems  in  force  or  proposed in several Member 
States.  In  any  event,  independent  machinery 
would  appear to  be  required  to  resolve  disputes 
as  to  whether  or  not  information  is  sufficiently 
sensitive  for  it  to  be  disclosed  subject  to  an 
obligation of secrecy, or withheld. 
The  particular probkms of  the  company which 
has  establishments  in  more  than  one  Member 
State  remain  to  be  considered.  Up  to  the  pre-
sent,  the  generally  accepted  view  has  probably 
been  that the  law  relating to  institutions  repre-
senting  employees  is  the  law  of  the  State  in 
which an establishment is located.  It is however 
open  to  question  whether, in  the  context of  the 
Community, particularly as regards the represen-
tation  of  employees  at  company  level,  such 
doctrines  can  continue  to  regulate  the  mat-
ter.  For  the  employees  of  a  company  should 
have  th~  same  opportunity  to  influence  the 
decision  making of  that company whether they 
are employed at an establishment in the Member 
1  See  p. 34. 
45 State  in  which  the  enterprise has  been  incorpo-
rated, or in some other Member State. 
A  similar  problem  arises  with  regard  to  the 
possibility  of  permitting  a  Member  State  to 
maintain a  contractual element in  its  system, in 
particular  as  regards  the  composition  and 
methods  of  appointment  of  a  company  level 
representative  institution.  If  the  company  has 
employees  in  another  Member  State,  an agree-
ment will  be  of an international nature, and the 
question  arises  as  to  what  legal  system  is  to 
regulate it. 
However, since  most companies operate abroad 
through  subsidiary  companies,  the  problem  of 
the company with a  branch in  another Member 
State  may  be  sufficiently  marginal  to  be  left 
unsolved, at least in  the  immediate future.  The 
question  of  the  representation  of  employees  in 
group situations, discussed  in  Appendix  1,·  is  in 
many  ways  a  similar  problem,  and  it  may  be 
more  convenient to deal  with both problems in 
the context of Community legislation on groups. 
·Conclusion 
The Commission considers that the basic princi-
ples of the original proposal for a fifth directive 
on the  structure of 'societes anonymes', namely 
the dualist board system and employee participa-
tion  in  the  supervisory  board,  remain  valuable 
and  realistic  objectives.  However,  it  considers 
that the  Member  States  must  be  free  to  adopt 
these  principles  with  the  maximum  degree  of 
flexibility  possible,  and  that  certain  Member 
States  must  be  permitted  to  allow  their  public 
companies  to  approach  the  objectives  in 
stages.  Action  should  also  probably  be  taken 
on the associated issue of employees' representa-
tive institutions. 
The main task therefore is  to construct a frame-
work  which  provides  for  the  objectives  to  be 
reached  in  a way which leaves discretion to the 
Member States  as  to  the  precise  models  which 
they  may  adopt,  and  which  further  defines 
certain  transitional  arrangements  which  can  be 
adopted in  the  near future by the public compa-
46 
nies of those Member States which cannot realize 
the  two objectives immediately.  For the dualist 
system, a transitional period is  probably required 
during  which  the  companies  concerned  can 
choose  between  the  dualist  and one-board sys-
tems.  As  far  as  employee  participation is  con-
cerned,  the  Commission  considers  that a  com-
pany level  representative  institution with appro-
priate  rights  and  obligations  may  well  provide 
companies with the best possibility for a success-
ful  transitional  solution.  Such  institutions 
would  enable  the  employees'  representatives  to 
be  informed about and influence  the conduct of 
the  company's affairs, including major decisions 
of  economic  policy,  without  being  directly 
involved in  the supervisory body itself. 
In  addition, the  creation of a transitional period 
for  the  application  of  the  dualist  system  in 
certain Member States would appear to  necessi-
tate in turn certain consequential provisions as to 
employee  participation  for  the  duration  of  the 
transitional  period.  Thus it seems  necessary to 
provide  that  employee  representation  on  the 
boards  of  companies which choose  to  continue 
to operate under a one-board system may consti-
tute an acceptable transitional alternative.  Con-
versely,  any  transitional  arrangement  adopted 
for employee representation on company boards 
will  have  to  be  available  for  both dualist  and 
one-board  systems.  Accordingly,  during  the 
period  in  which  the  dualist  and  the  one-board 
systems  may  co-exist,  in  a  particular  Member 
State, there  might be  four  alternative structures 
available to  a  company:  the dualist system  with 
employee  representation  on  the  supervisory 
board;  the  dualist  system  with  a  transitional 
arrangement  for  employee·  participation;  the 
one-board system  with employee  representation 
on the  board; and the one-board system with a 
transitional arrangement for employee participa-
tion. 
To  conclude,  the  Commission  hopes  that  this 
green  paper will  produce a  constructive  debate 
which will enable the Community institutions to 
find  solutions which can be  accepted by a broad 
majority of those concerned, though it recognizes 
that  in  this  field  there  are  few  solutions  which 
will receive the unqualified support of everyone. 
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Summary of  the  main  features  of the situations  and 
developments in  the  Member States occurring prior to 
6.8.1975. Belgium 
Employee participation 
Collective  bargaining 
Traditionally,  the  most  significant  collective 
agreements  have  been  negotiated  at  industry 
level  in  joint committees known as 'commissions 
paritaires'  set  up  by  royal  decree.  These  com-
mittees have  an  equal  number of representatives 
from employers' organizations and  trade unions, 
and  an  independent chairman and  deputy chair-
man  appointed  by  the  government.  Together 
they  cover  almost  the  total  Belgian  working 
population.  National  collective  agreements  are 
concluded for particular industries and are legal-
ly  binding on all employers represented and their 
employees.  They can even be extended by order 
to  cover all  enterprises within the industry if  the 
committee  makes  a  unanimous  declaration  to 
this effect. 
Since  1960 however,  important multi-industrial 
agreements  have  been  concluded  aimed  at  gene-
ral  improvements  in  the  standard  of  living  of 
employees.  These  agreements,  know  as  'social 
programming',  are  negotiated  by  the  FEB 
('Federation des entreprises belges') and the three 
most  representative  trade  unions.  They  apply 
to  all  branches  of  industry.  Moreover,  since 
1968, the  National  Labour  Council,  composed 
of  representatives  drawn equally from  the repre-
sentative  trade  unions  and  employers'  associa-
tions,  has  been  able  to  conclude  certain  agree-
ments  of  a  general  kind.  For  example,  an 
agreement  has  been  concluded  for  a guaranteed 
income for incapacitated manual workers. 
The  scope  left  for  plant  and  company  level 
bargaining by  the fairly well developed industrial 
and  national  bargaining  is  not  particularly 
great.  But  such  bargaining does  occur, though 
more  in  some  sectors  than  others.  It  should 
perhaps  also  be  observed  in  passing  that  the 
rights  of  recognized  union  delegates  are  them-
selves  based  not  on  law  but  on  a  collective 
bargain  concluded  in  1971  in  the  National 
Labour Council. 
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Representative institutions: 
Information, consultation and approval 
Present law and practices 
Three  institutions  must  be  considered  in  this 
context:  enterprise  councils,  safety  and  health 
committees and union delegations. 
Enterprise  councils  have  been  required  by  law 
since  1948  in  certain  private  sector  enterpri-
ses.  At  present,  all  such  enterprises employing 
one  hundred  and  fifty  persons or  more must set 
up  such a council.  An  enterprise  is  defined  for 
the  purposes of  this  law  as  the  'technical unit of 
production'  ('unite  technique  d'exploitation'). 
The  original  law  contemplated  an  extension  of 
the system to firms  with fifty employees.  This is 
not  proposed  at  the  present  time,  but  under a 
I  aw  and  decree  of  197  5, an enterprise is  obliged 
to  have  a  council  even  though  it  employs  on 
average only fifty  persons  provided that a coun-
cil was in existence at the time of the last election 
of members. 
The  councils  are  made  up,  on  one  side,  of 
representatives of the employees elected by secret 
ballot.  The  most  representative  trade  unions 
have  the  exclusive  right  to  nominate  lists  of 
candidates.  On  the  other side, the  head  of  the 
enterprise  ('chef  d'entreprise')  is  also  a member 
and  chairman of the council, and has the right to 
appoint  further  representatives  to  assist  him, 
though the  size  of  the  management's representa-
tion must not be greater than the employees'. 
The  head  of  the  enterprise  must  provide  the 
council  with  information  concerning  the  situa-
tion, development and prospects of the enterprise 
and  of any  legal, economic or financial  entity of 
which  the  enterprise  forms  a  part.  Under  a 
royal  decree  of  November  1973, the  nature and 
amount  of  this  information  was  considerably 
extended.  In  particular, information must now 
be  given  as  to  the  competitive  position  of  the 
enterprise  and  as  to  plans  for  the  raising  of 
finance and for investments. 
Further, the  enterprise couricil has the right to be 
consulted  on  any  measure  which  might  alter 
49 working conditions, the  structure of  the  organi-
zation  or output.  It examines  the  general  cri-
teria for  recruitment, and  determines the general 
criteria  to  be  followed  for lay-offs.  Finally, the 
council also has power of decision with regard to 
work  rules  ('reglement  du  travail')  and  welfare 
matters. 
Committees  for  safety,  health and  the  improve-
ment of work places have  been  required  by  law 
since  1952  in  all  enterprises  employing  more 
than fifty  people.  The committees are in princi-
ple  composed  in  the  same  way  as  enterprise 
councils.  Their role  is purely consultative. 
Union  delegations are  to  be  found  in  enterprises 
employing  more  than  twenty  persons  on  the 
basis of a nationally applicable, interprofessional 
collective  agreement  concluded  in  the  National 
Labour Council in  1971, and of collective agree-
ments particular to  certain industrial sectors and 
sub-sectors  concluded  in  national  joint commit-
tees.  Certain  of  these  collective  agreements 
have  been ratified by  royal decree.  They confer 
on union  delegations  certain  rights  to  represent 
union  members  individually  and  collectively. 
To this end, they  must be  informed of proposed 
changes  in  wages  and  labour  conditions,  and 
they must be  given  an opportunity to  make their 
representations. 
The  three  institutions  described  above  have  in 
part overlapping functions and often overlapping 
personnel.  The  resulting situations can  be com-
plex with a particular issue  being acted  upon by 
more  than  one  of  the  institutions  in  a  comple-
mentary fashion. 
Policy 
In  general, the trade unions are not satisfied with 
the  enterprise  councils  in  their  present  form, 
though  they  appear  to  value  the  right  of  the 
councils  to  receive  extensive  information  as  to 
financial  and  economic  matters.  However,  the 
joint composition of the councils is  regarded as a 
serious  limitation  on  their  potential  role.  The 
CSC  (Confederation  des  syndicats  chretiens) 
would  accordingly like  to  see  the  councils trans-
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formed  into  employee  councils  representing 
employees  exclusively  and  endowed  with 
enlarged powers, in  particular a power of veto  in 
relation  to  work  rules,  lay-offs,  closures,  and 
personnel  policy.
1  The  FGTB  ('Federation  gen-
erale  du  travail  de  Belgique')  is  at  the  present 
time  discussing  what reforms  of  the  enterprise 
councils  should  be  proposed  in  order  to  adapt 
the  councils  to  the  new  situation created  by  the 
recent  reform  concerning  the  councils' rights  to 
information.  The  federation  is  considering 
whether  the  councils  should  not become  instru-
ments of control as well as  channels for  consulta-
tion.2 
In  the  discussions  leading to the  reform  of 1973, 
the  employers  in  Belgium  took the  position that 
enterprise  councils  must  not encroach upon  the 
powers  of  management,  the  responsibility  for 
which had in their view  to remain with the head 
of the enterprise.  However they stated that they 
were  always  ready  to  ensure  that  as  much 
information  as  possible  be  provided  in  order to 
ensure  a  harmonious  climate  in  enterprises. 
The  FEB  is  also  reported  as  being  in  favour  of 
the simplification of  the  present situation so that 
there  would  be  one  representative  institution 
rather than three. l 
Participation in  decision making bodies 
Present law and  practices 
At  the  present  time,  there  is  no  proviSion  for 
representation on  the  boards of companies in  the 
private  sector  in  Belgium.  In  the  public sector, 
the  twenty-one  member  council  of  administra-
tion  of  the  railway company must include  three 
Du conseil d'entreprise au conseil des  travailleurs, 
CSC March 1974. 
2  La participation des  travailleurs aux decisions dans 
/'entreprise en Belgique; by j. Gayetot, national secre-
tary of the FGTB.  Paper delivered at the ILO Sympo-
sium  on  Workers'  Participation  in  Decisions  within 
Undertakings, August 1974. 
l  Worker  Participation and  Collective  Bargaining in 
Europe,  Commission  on  Industrial  Relations,  Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office 1974, p. 83. 
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minister  of  transport.  An  enterprise  in  which 
there  is  public  participation,  namely  the  inter-
communal transport company in  Brussels,  has a 
council  of  administration  some  members  of 
which  are  designated  by  the  company's 
employees. 
Policy 
The  FEB.  ts  m  principle  unfavourable  to  such 
forms  of  representation  in  the  private  sector 
believing  that it  would  have  undesirable  effects 
on the  liberty of decision  which  is  necessary for 
the  sound  administration of  an  enterprise.  The 
issue  is  however still  under discussion within the 
Federation at the present time. 
The  FGTB  is  opposed  on  the  ground  that such 
systems  entail  too  great a  risk  that unions  will 
become  integrated  in  the  mechanisms  of  a capi-
talist  society  to  which  they  are  fundamentally 
opposed.  They  prefer  policies  which  will  pro-
mote  'workers  control'  by  which  is  meant sys-
tems  whereby  the  unions  are  informed  in 
advance  of  proposed  measures,  and  can  on 
significant  matters  prevent their implementation 
and make proposals of their own. 
As  we  have seen, the  CSC  favours  at the  present 
time a change in the role of the enterprise council 
so  that  it  would  become  an  employees'  council 
with  significant  powers  to  veto  certain  major 
decisions.  However,  the  CSC  regards this  pro-
posal  as  requiring  a  complementary  reform  in 
company law to give  labour a real and preponde-
rant  voice  in  the  decisions  of  companies  in 
relation  to  economic  and  financial  policy, 
p  articul arl y  as  regards  large  enterprises.'  The 
precise manner in  which  it  is  proposed  that this 
preponderant  voice  should  be  ensured  is  still 
under consideration. 
Company structure 
Present law 
The  provisions of  the  Belgian  Commercial  Code 
applying  to  'societes  anonymes'  prescribe  a sys-
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tem  whereby the  company's  affairs  are adminis-
tered  by  a  council  of  administration  under  the 
supervision  of  commissioners.  The  council  of 
administration  ('conseil  d'administration')  con-
sists  of  at least three members who are  normally 
appointed and  can  be  removed without compen-
sation  by  the  shareholders  in  general  assemb-
ly.  The  members  need  not  be  shareholders  but 
must provide a guarantee of good administration 
in  the  form  of  shares in  the  company which can 
be  owned by someone else.  The commissioners 
('commissaires')  are  appointed  and  can  be  dis-
missed  at  any  time  by  the  general  meeting  of 
shareholders.  Companies making a public offer 
of  their shares  ('faisant ...  publiquement appel a 
l'epargne')  must  include  a  qualified  accountant 
('commissaire-reviseur')  among  their  commis-
SIOners. 
The  division  of  function  and responsibility pres-
cribed  by  the  law  is  that the  administration of 
the  company  is  entrusted entirely  to the  council 
of administration.  It  has  full  power to  manage 
and  represent  the  company  and  the  company 
statutes are  free  to  determine the precise powers 
of  the  council,  but  the  statutes cannot attribute 
to  the  council  powers  which  the  law  expressly 
gives  to  the  general  assembly  and  they  cannot 
take away from  the  council powers conferred on 
it  by  the  law,  such  as  drawing  up  the  annual 
accounts.  The  council  exercises  its  powers as  a 
body  and  can  delegate  only  the  management of 
day-to-day affairs to others. 
The commissioners are  responsible for  the super-
vision  of the company's affairs.  They can exer-
cise  no  other  function  in  the  company.  They 
have  an  unfettered  legal  right  to  supervise  and 
control  the  company's  affairs  and  to  that end, 
they  have  a  broad  power  to  scrutinize  the 
company's  books  and  records.  Furthermore, 
the  council  must  submit  a  balance  sheet  to  the 
commissioners at least every six months, and the 
commissioners must in  turn report to the general 
meeting on the results of their activities. 
Du  conseil  d'entreprise  au  conseil  des  travailleurs, 
op. cit.  Introduction, p. 4. 
51 Present practices 
The  limitations on  delegation  by  the council  are 
widely ignored, particularly in  larger enterprises, 
and  extensive powers are in fact delegated  to  an 
executive committee of the council.  The council 
itself meets only at intervals and  confines itself to 
exercising  a  form  of  control  over  the  manage-
ment  of  the  executive  committee.  Accordingly, 
there  is  a functional division of the  council  itself 
into  two  tiers  which  is  not  in  conformity with 
the  law,  but  which  enables  the  company  to 
operate  effectively  in  modern  conditions.  For 
this  reason, the  improper delegation  is  tolerated 
by the interested parties.
1 
As  for  the  commissioners,  they  confine  their 
supervision  to  financial  and  legal  control, ensur-
ing  that the accounts are properly kept and that 
there  have  been  no  infringements  of the  law  or 
the  company  statutes.  They  do  not  concern 
themselves  with  the  merits  of  the  executive 
committees'  decision  making.  There  is  thus  a 
similarity  between  the  actual  roles  of  the  com-
missioners in Belgium  and the 'collegio sindacale' 
in Italy. 
Policy 
In  1968, a  commtsston  of  experts  completed  a 
draft  law  for  the  Ministry  of  Justice  which 
contains  substantial  reforms  aimed  principally, 
as  regards  the  structure  of  'societes  anonymes', 
at  bringing  the  law  into  a  closer  relationship 
with commercial practice.  The draft law  is also 
consciously  derived  from  the  concepts  which 
have  been developed  in  Germany with regard to 
the  'Aktiengesellschaft',  or  public  company. 
The  administration  of  the  company  is  to  be 
divided  between two distinct organs:  a manage-
ment  board  or  a single  manager entrusted with 
the  effective  and  continuous management of  the 
company's  affairs,  and  a  supervisory  board 
charged  with  supervising  and  controlling  the 
management. 
The  managers  will  be  appointed  by  the  supervi-
sory board and will  have a measure of security of 
tenure;  though  of  course  the  supervisory  board 
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will  be  able  to  dismiss  a  manager  for  good 
cause.  An  improper  dismissal  will  give  rise  to 
an  action  for  damages.  Managers  will  not  be 
able  to  become  members  of  the  supervisory 
board, the  two  bodies being clearly distinguished 
from  each other.  The  mem hers of the supervis-
ory board will  normally be  chosen  by  the share-
holders  in  general  meeting.  There  will  be  at 
least three members, but no legal maximum. The 
Members will  be  removable  by  the  shareholders 
at  any  time  without  compensation.  They  will 
also  be  forbidden  to  perform any other function 
for  the  company  in  order  to  preserve  their 
independence. 
The  division  of  function  and  responsibility 
between  the  two  organs  is  drawn  with  some 
specificity.  Management  of  the  company's 
affairs  is  entrusted  to  the  managers  and  the 
supervisory board is expressly forbidden to inter-
fere  directly  except  in  the  case  of  an  action 
brought  by  the  company  against  a  manager. 
The managers will  have detailed obligations as to  . 
keeping  the  supervisory  board  informed.  They 
will  also have  to  obtain the consent of the board 
in  advance  to  transactions  and  decisions  which 
will  have  a  substantial  effect  on  the  life  of  the 
company.  The  statutes of the  company will  be 
able  to  specify  more concretely particular exam-
ples  of  such transactions and  decisions, and  also 
to  require  that other specified  measures  be  sub-
mitted  for  prior  approval.  The  supervisory 
board  will  also  be  able  to  specify  particular 
measures which require their prior approval. 
The  supervisory  board  members  will  be  able  to 
investigate  the  affairs,  books  and  other records 
of  the  company and, at any time, at least two of 
the  members of  the  board will  be  able to require 
a  report  from  the  managers  on  any  matter 
concerning  the  company's  affairs.  The  mana-
gers will  be  able to  participate in the meetings of 
the  supervisory board in  a consultative capacity, 
unless the  board decides otherwise. 
The  commissioners  are  to  be  retained  but  it  is 
proposed to  confine their role expressly to finan-
Proiet de  loi  modifiant les  lois  coordonm!es sur  les 
societes commerciales, p. 38. 
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sense.
1  It is  contemplated that they will perform 
an auditing function  in  the  broader sense of the 
term. 
In  1972, the  Council  of  State  ('Conseil  d'Etat') 
gave its opinion on the draft law which approved 
its main features.
2 
Projet  de  loi  modifiant les  lois  coordonnees sur les 
societes  commerciales~  p. 72. 
2  Avis du Conseil d'Etatof 22.11.1972. 
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Denmark 
Employee participation 
Collective bargaining 
In  Denmark, collective  agreements  are first and 
foremost concluded  at the  national level.  Both 
general  and  specific  questions  are  negotiat-
ed.  The  parties,  the  Danish  Employers  Con-
federation  ('Dansk  Arbejdsgiverforening')  and 
the  Danish Federation of Trade Unions ('Lands-
organisationen i Danmark') jointly choose at the 
beginning of the bargaining a number of general 
questions  relating  to  all  trade  unions  and  all 
sectors  of  industry.  These  questions  normally 
deal  with  such  matters  as,  for  example,  mini-
mum  rates  of  remuneration, holidays, and  cer-
tain social contributions.  Specific questions are 
those  which  are  related  to  a  single  sector ·of 
industry.  But these  agreements too are nation-
al.  They relate, for example, to such questions 
as training, welfare and safety. 
Collective  agreements  of  a  procedural  nature 
constitute a  fairly well developed framework for 
Danish  industrial  relations,  for  example  with 
regard to the  system for cooperation and consul-
tation. 
Special reference should be  made to the concilia-
tion  procedure  in  the  event  of  disagreement 
which  is  regulated  by  law.
1  The  Minister  of 
Labour appoints conciliators who have the task 
of  assisting  in  the  settlement  of  conflicts  be-
tween employers and employees.  The conciliat-
ors have a right to intervene when parties cannot 
agree,  to  help  them  to  reach  an  agree-
ment.  They also  have  power to  suspend indu-
strial action such as strikes for limited periods to 
enable negotiations to continue. 
1  'Lovbekendtgorelse nr. 559', of 21.12.1971 on the 
conciliation procedure in  the event of labour conflicts. 
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consultation and approval 
Present law and practices 
Consultation and cooperation, as  it  is  known in 
Denmark, has its  basis  not in  legislation, but in 
an 'Agreement on cooperation committees' con-
cluded by the Danish Employers' Confederation 
and  the  Danish  Federation  of Trade Unions  in 
October 1970. 
The agreement provides for cooperation commit-
tees  in  industrial  and  craft  enterprises.  These 
consist of an equal  number of representatives of 
management and  employees, with the  supervis-
ory staff being represented  on the  management 
side, and elected  shop stewards being ipso  facto 
employee  representatives.  In  establishments 
employing fifty  or more workers, a cooperation 
committee  must  be  set  up  when  recommended 
either  by  the  employer  or  by  a  majority  of 
workers.  In  smaller  establishments,  the  man-
agement  and  employees  are  recommended  to 
find  their own appropriate machinery for achiev-
ing the aims and objects set out in the agreement. 
The objects of the cooperation committees are to 
secure good  conditions of work and to increase 
the employees' job satisfaction, their security and 
their  interest  in  improving  the  efficiency  and 
competitiveness of their enterprises. 
The  committees are entitled  to  receive  informa-
tion  from  management relating to  the  enterpri-
ses'  economic  situation  and  future  pro-
spects.  They exercise  'co-influence' on general 
policy in  relation to  day-to-day production and 
wqrk  planning  and  on  the  implementation  of 
major alterations in the enterprises.  They exer-
cise  'co-determination' in formulating principles 
in relation to local  work and welfare conditions 
and in relation to staff policy. 
'Co-influence'  implies,  according  to  the  official 
comments made by the contracting partners, that 
the  management  shall  afford  the  cooperation 
committee  good  opportunities for  the  exchange 
of  ideas  and  suggestions  prior  to  taking  deci-
sions.  'Co-determination' implies an obligation 
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for  both parties to  strive  for  an agreement.  If 
one  party defaults on this obligation, an arbitra-
tion  procedure  is  provided.  A  cooperation 
board  set  up  by  the  Danish Employers'  Confe-
deration  and  the  Danish  Federation  of  Trade 
Unions  is  responsible  inter  alia  for  adjudicating 
in such cases. 
Policy 
Since  1969,  with  the  approval  of  the  Danish 
Employers' Confederation and the Danish Feder-
ation 'of  Trade  Unions,  experiments  in  cooper-
ation  have  been  taking place  in  several  Danish 
companies,  taking  the  existing  agreement  on 
cooperation as  their starting point.  The typical 
trend  has  been  in  the  direction  of  utilizing 
semi-autonomous work groups.
1  The results of 
these  experiments,  which  appear  generally  to 
have  had  favourable  effects/  will  probably  be 
reflected  in  time  in  the  agreement  on  cooper-
ation.  The  present agreement comes  to  an  end 
in  1976  if  either  party  gives  requisite  prior 
notict:. 
Participation in decision making 
Present law 
The  Danish Companies Act No 370 of 13  June 
1973  ('Lov  om  aktieselskaber')  for  joint stock 
companies  and  No  371  of  13  June  1973  for 
private  companies  ('Lov  om  anpartsselskaber') 
give  to  the  employees of all  companies employ-
ing at least fifty employees the right, but not the 
duty,  to  elect  to  the  board  of  directors  two 
members  in  addition  to  those  elected  by  the 
shareholders meeting. 
The  articles  of  association  may  provide  for  a 
larger  number  of  employees'  representatives  or 
for  one  or  more  representatives  appointed  by 
Industrial  Democracy in  Denmark, by  B.  Bordrup 
and P.  Roos.  Paper delivered at the ILO Symposium 
on Workers' Participation in  Decisions within Under-
takings, August 1974. 
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the members of the board of directors are always 
to  be  elected  by  the  shareholders  meet-
ing,  however.  The  employees'  representatives 
are elected for  a  term of two years from among 
the  employees who  have  been employed  by the 
company for one  year  prior to election.  Their 
rights  and obligations  are  the  same  as  those  of 
the other members of the board of directors. 
Th~se new  laws  were  conceived  as  the  starting 
pomt  for  employee  participation  which  would 
then  be  developed  by  employee  representatives 
joining  the  boards  of  directors  through  the 
operations of the Wage Earners' Investment and 
Profit  Fund  proposed  by  the  former  Danish 
Government in January 197  3.
1  The purposes of 
the  new  Companies Acts  were  to  give  the  wor-
kers.  proper  information  on  their  company's 
affatrs  and  to  enable  them  to  express  their 
viewpoint  within  the  decision  making  process 
prior to their representation through the machin-
ery  of the  Wage  Earners' Investment and Profit 
Fund.
2 
Parallel  to  these  developments,  action  has  also 
been taken recently with regard to representation 
of the public interest on the boards of companies 
with activities of  great importance for  the econ-
omy  of  the  State. · On  28  March  1974,  the 
Danish  Parliament adopted  a  law  requiring the 
boards of directors of Danish banks to include a 
representative appointed by the State. 
Practice and policy 
Since  these  new  laws  have  not  been  long  in 
operation,  it  is  too  soon  for  an  evaluation  of 
their  operation in  practice.  For  the  same reas-
on, fresh proposals have  not yet been made.  It 
does appear, however, that employees have been 
interested  in  exercising their right to elect repre-
sentatives to the board. 
Share and profit participation 
In  January  1973,  the  then  Social  Democratic 
Government of Denmark proposed legislation to 
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set  up  a  Wage  Earners'  Investment  and  Profit 
Fund. 
The  funds  were  to  be  provided by  contribution 
from  all  employers.  The  contributions were at 
the beginning to be 0.5% of the payroll, increas-
ing  by  0.5%  per year  until  the  contribution at 
the  end  would  be  equivalent  to  5%  of  the 
employer's payroll. 
In  joint  stock  companies  employing more  than 
fifty  persons, two thirds of the annual contribu-
tio~ was to remain in  the firm  by being convert-
ed  mto  share  capital  with  a  provision that the 
fund  could  not  own  more  than  half  of  the 
company's issued share capital.  For companies 
employing less than fifty persons, there was to be 
a  possibility for a similar conversion of contribu-
tions into share capital if  the company so chose. 
Furthermore,  companies  other  than  joint stock 
companies  employing at least te-n  persons were 
to  have  the  right to claim  that two thirds of the 
annual contributions were to remain in the firm 
as a loan. 
Employee capital not reinvested according to the 
provisions  mentioned  above was  to  be  invested 
according  to  directives  laid  down by  the  Com-
mittee  of  the  Wage  Earner's  Investment  and 
Profit Fund.  The  Committee, however, was to 
be  obliged  to  take  care  that the  funds  to  the 
highest  possible  degree,  were  invested' as  risk 
capital  in  enterprises:  in  shares, though always 
only half of a  company's issued share capital at 
most, as  capital in limited partnerships, or in any 
other way, as capital. 
Voting rights  attached to  share capital resulting 
from  conversion  were  to  be  exercised  by  the 
employees  in  the  enterprise  in  question  ..  The 
same  was  in  principle  the  case  for  the  voting 
rights  attached  to  the  shares  bought  by  the 
fund.  However, the  management board of the 
fund  could  under  special  circumstances  decide 
1  See  below. 
z  Statement  of  the  Danish  member  of  Parliament 
Christensen,  within  the  Committee on  Social  Affair; 
and Employment of the European Parliament, Doc. PE 
32.691. 
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fund administration. 
All  employees  were  to  receive the same amounts 
from  the  fund.  Certificates  would  be  credited 
with  the  employees'  share  of  the  profit once  a 
year.  The  certificates. could  be  redeemed  after 
the  passage  of  a number of  years  but, could  not 
be sold or pledged. 
The purpose of  the  proposed legislation was  'to 
bring about an important condition for  econom-
ic  democracy through a more  equitable division 
of  wealth,  income  and  influence'.
1  Employees 
were to  be  ensured of  participation in the  capital 
growth of  business enterprises and  greater voice 
in  their  affairs.  However,  no  broad  consensus 
could  be  reached  on the  proposal in the  form  in 
which it was proposed.  With the  resignation of 
the  Government  in  December  1973  and  the 
subsequent dissolution of Parliament, the  propo-
sal  has  to  be  re-submitted  to  Parliament.  This 
has  not yet occurred, though political discussion 
of this and other schemes continues. 
Company structure 
. Present law 
The  Danish  Law  on  Joint Stock  Companies
2  of 
1973 prescribes  a system  of administration with 
two decision  making bodies  for  all  such compa-
nies  having  a  share  capital  of  more  than  DKr 
400 000  and  permits  such  a  system  for  other 
joint stock companies. 
The  company  normally  must  have  a  board  of 
directors ('bestyrelse') consisting of at least three 
members  elected  by  shareholders  in  a  general 
meeting.
3  The  board  of  directors  appoints  a 
board of  management consisting of one or more 
members,  each of  whom  the  board of directors 
can remove from  office.  In  companies having a 
share  capital  of  more  than  DKr  400000  the 
majority of  the  members  of  the  board of direc-
tors must consist of persons who are not manag-
ers.4  A manager cannot be  elected  chairman of 
the board of directors. 
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The  board  of  directors  is  responsible  for  the 
proper  management  of  the  company  and  takes 
. part in  the  management together with members 
of the  management board.  The members of the 
board of  management take care of current man-
agement according to the  guidelines and  instruc-
tions  laid  down  by  the  board  of  direc-
tors.  Transactions  which,  in  relation  to  the 
general circumstances of the company, are of an 
unusual  class  or importance  cannot  be  effected 
by  the  management unless  the  board of directors 
has issued a special authorization, except in cases 
where  the  decision  of  the  board  of  directors 
cannot  be  awaited  without  causing  essential 
inconvenience to the  company's activities. 
Either  a  member  of  the  board of  directors or a 
manager may request that a meeting of the board 
of  directors  be  convened  and  a  manager, 
notwithstanding that he  may not be a member of 
the  board  of  directors,  shall  be  entitled  to  be 
present and  to  state  his  opinion at board meet-
ings, unless the  board of directors resolves to  the 
contrary in individual cases. 
The  articles  of  association  may  contain  provi-
sions  to  the  effect  that in  addition to  the  board 
of directors there shall  be  a committee of share-
holders  consisting of  at  least  five  members,  the 
majority of  whom  shall  be  elected  by  sharehol-
ders in general meeting.  This committee may be 
given  the  power  to  appoint  and  remove  the 
Documents  issued  by  the  Joint Committee of  the 
Social Democratic party and the Danish Federation of 
Labour on 'Economic Democracy', 9 .11.1972. 
2  These  companies are  the Danish companies which 
come  closest  to  the  French  'societes  anonymes'.  A 
separate  law  applies  to  companies  which  can  be 
compared to 'societe a responsabilite limitee' based on 
similar principles, discussed below. 
3  Sections  49  and  50.  Companies  with  a  share 
capital of less than DKr 400000 in certain circumstan-
ces  need  only  have  one director, and  a  management 
board  is  not  obligatory  in  joint  stock  companies 
having a share capital of less than DKr 400 000. 
4  The  Act  contains  transitional  provisions  which 
permit persons  who, at the  time  when  the  Act came 
into  operation,  occupied  seats on  both  the  board  of 
directors and on the board of management to continue 
doing so and the same applies to persons who are both 
membe'rs  of the  management board and  chairman of 
the company. 
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cannot be members of the shareholders' commit-
tee.  The function of the shareholders' commit-
tee  is  to  supervise  the  administration  of  the 
directors  and  managers.  To  this  end,  the 
articles  may  provide  that  specified  important 
measures  be  notified  in advance to  the commit-
tee.  No  other  powers  may  be  vested  in  the 
committee. 
A management system consisting only of a board 
of  directors  or  a  single  director,  having  total 
responsibility and power with regard to a  com-
pany's  affairs  may  be  chosen  for  small  compa-
nies  having  a  share  capital  of  less  than  DKr 
400 000,  unless  the  company  is  subject  to  the 
provisions  on election of employees' representa-
tives to the board. 
As  a  part  of  the  recent  company  law  reform, 
there  is  now  also  a  possibility  of  forming 
private  companies:  'anpartsselskaber'
1  (GmbH/ 
SARL).  These  companies  are  envisaged  for 
situations in which the number of capital holders 
is  much  smaller  than  in  a  large  joint  stock 
company.  A  management  b•)ard  consisting  of 
one or more managers is  compulsory for all such 
companies, whereas they need  not have  a board 
of  directors  unless  the  capital  is  at  least  DKr 
400000, or the company is  subject to the provi-
sions  on  the  employees'  right to  representation 
on the  board.  If this  is  the case, the provisions 
for  private  companies are  the  same  as  for  joint 
stock companies. 
Present practices 
An  analysis  of  the  structure  of  joint  stock 
companies shows that the  smaller the  company, 
the  greater  the  identity  in  practice  between  the 
board  of  directors  and  the  board  of  manage-
ment.  In  fact,  for  the  smallest companies, it  is 
often the  case that the board of directors consists 
of the businessman in question, who is  normally 
the  company's  sole  manager,  his  wife  or some 
other relative, and his  lawyer.  The company is 
effectively a  'one-man' company.  For this reas-
on  the  'one  tier  with  one  director'  system  for 
companies  having  a  share  capital  of  less  than 
DKr 400000 was introduced as  an alternative in 
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Table  1  - Companies  with  less  than  10 share-
holders 
Share Capital 
DKr 
Under 300000 
300000 
to 1000000 
1 000000 
to 2000000 
Over 2000000 
Number of Com.panies 
Number  having general 
of Companies  manager on the 
board of directors 
1 642  1 088 
421  317 
477  357 
352  229 
Table  2  - Companies  with more  than  10 sha-
reholders 
Share Capital 
DKr 
300000 
to 1000000 
1000000 
to 2000000 
More than 
2 000000 
Number of Companies 
Number  having general 
of Companies  manager on the 
board of directors 
143  84 
64  37 
147  52 
1973.  It  is  hoped that gradually the 'one man' 
companies  will  adopt  this  form  or  the  private 
company form,  thereby achieving a  coincidence 
of  law  and  fact  which  has  long  been 
absent.  Since  these  options  have  only  been 
available from  1 January 1974, it is  too early to 
say  whether  the  hope  shows  signs  of  being 
justified. 
As  companies  grow  larger  the  influence  of  the 
managers  on  the  board  gradually  declines.  A 
study<  published in 1973 of companies registered 
in Copenhagen produced the figures in  Tables 1 
and 2. 
1  'Lov om anpartsselskaber' No 371 of 13.6.1973. 
2  'De  fleste  direktorer sidder  ogsa  i  bestyrelsen', by 
B.  Posner, in:  Management 1.11.1973. 
57 It  can  be  seen  that among companies  having a 
share  capital  of  more  than  DKr  2000000 or 
with more widely distributed shareholdings, the-
re  is  a  noticeably smaller proportion having the 
general  manager  on  the  board  than  among 
companies with a  smaller or more concentrated 
share  capital.  The  trend  continues  as  compa-
nies grow larger though it remains true that the 
general  manager is  normally on the  board of a 
company  except for  the  very  largest companies 
of all.  Thus, although the system has two tiers, 
there  is  an  element  of  considerable  overlap 
between them. 
The  other  directors  on  the  board  of  larger 
companies will  normally include  representatives 
of the  larger shareholders in  the  company, and 
often  a  lawyer  who  will  not  necessarily  be  a 
shareholder. 
The  shareholders'  committee  is  extremely  rare. 
Some  banks have a  committee.  Otherwise they 
are  very  unusual  and  make  their  appearance in 
the law largely as a  result of its attempt to adopt 
structures  in  common  with  other  Scandinavian 
countries.  In  Norway, such  committees  play a 
much larger role. 
Policy 
No substantial  proposals  are  being made at the 
present time as to company structure. 
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Employee participation 
Collective bargaining 
The Constitution guarantees both the right of the 
individual  to  belong to  a  trade  union  and  the 
right of the trade union to develop freely.  One 
of the  most important tasks of the trade unions 
is  to shape the working and economic conditions 
of  employees  by  means  of  collective  agree-
ments.  Actual  working conditions  are  in  large 
part  established  not  by  law,  but  by  collective 
agreements.  The  form,  content  and  effects  of 
these  collective  agreements  are however defined 
more  closely  by  legislation.  Collective  agree-
ments  are  binding  on  the  employees  and 
employers  who  accede  to  them.  In  practice 
about 8 000 collective agreements are concluded 
each  year  between  trade  unions and employers' 
associations.  The trade unions are mostly orga-
nized  according to  sectors of  industry; therefore 
a  collective  agreement applies without exception 
to  all  employees in  the sector concerned.  Geo-
graphically  speaking,  regional  collective  agree-
ments are the rule, whereas collective agreements 
valid for  more than one region or for the Federal 
Republic as a whole are the exception. 
The responsibility and tasks of  the  trade unions 
in  the  field  of  collective  agreements  are  not 
affected  by  employee  participation  under  the 
Works  Constitution  Law  ('Betriebsverfassungs-
gesetz').  Under  this  Law  collective  agreements 
take precedence, as  regards basic working condi-
tions,  over  agreements  concluded  at  works 
level.  The Works Constitution Law strengthens 
the  presence of the trade unions in the establish-
ments  and  regulates  cooperation  between trade 
unions and works councils. 
Representative institutions: Information, 
consultation and approval 
Present law and practices 
The  Works  Constitution Law  of  1972 regulates 
in  particular the rights of employees' representa-
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('Betriebsrat')  must  be  set  up  in  every  private 
industrial  establishment  with  five  or  more 
employees.  Its  members  are  elected  by  secret 
ballot by all employees of the establishment.  In 
establishments  with  more  than  20  employees, 
voting  usually  takes  place  on  a  proportional 
basis,  and  separately  for  workers  and  staff, 
unless  it  is  decided  to  hold  a  joint  ballot.  Al-
though the  right to vote and to  be  elected to  the 
works  council  is  not dependent on  trade  union 
membership, well  over  80%  of  the  members of 
works councils elected  at the  last election belong 
to  trade  unions.  In  undertakings  with  several 
establishments, a central  works  council  must be 
set  up,  to  which  the  works  councils  of  the 
individual  establishments  normally  send  two 
representatives.  The  central  works  council  has 
responsibility  for  matters  concerning the  under-
taking as a whole or several of its establishments. 
In  a group of companies, a group works council 
can  be  set  up  by  qualified  majority  decision  of 
the  central  works  councils  of  the  individual 
companies in the group. 
Every  quarter  the  works  council  must  call  a 
works  meeting,  that  is  a  meeting  of  the 
employees  of  the  establishment.  This  takes 
place during working hours.  The works council 
must  present  it  with  a  progress  report.  The 
works  meeting  can  neither  dissolve  the  works 
council  nor  remove  individual  members  there-
of.  This  is  possible  only  by  a  decision  of  the 
labour court, which  must be  applied  for  by  one 
quarter  of  the  employees  of  the  establishment 
who  are  eligible  to  vote,  or  by  a  trade  union 
represented  in  the  establishment,  in  cases  in 
which the  works council, or individual members 
thereof, have infringed statutory obligations. 
The members of  the  works council enjoy special 
protection  and  numerous  facilities.  aimed  at 
making  them  independent and  efficient  in  their 
tasks.  Normally, a member of  a works council 
cannot be  dismissed  from  his  employment while 
holding  office  or  for  one  year  thereafter.  By 
way of  exception, he  may  be  dismissed with the 
approval  of the works council or on the  basis of 
a decision of the labour court.  The costs arising 
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from  the  activity of  the  works council are  borne 
by  the  employer.  He  must  make  premises, 
materials  and  office  staff  available.  The  mem-
bers  of  the  works council must be  released from 
their employment obligations without any reduc-
tion in  remuneration whatever and to  the  extent 
necessary  in  order  for  them  to  perform  their 
tasks.  In  larger  establishments  with  300 
employees  or  more,  individual  members  of  the 
works council  must be  released completely from 
their  employment  obligations.  The  number  of 
members thus released depends on the size of the 
establishment. 
The  employer and  the  works council  must work 
together in an atmosphere of trust, in compliance 
with  the  collective  agreements  in  force  and  in 
collaboration  with  the  trade  unions  and 
employers'  associations  represented  in  the  esta-
blishment for the benefit of the employees and of 
the  establishment.  Where  matters  are  in  dis-
pute, negotiations  must be  held  with  the  aim  of 
reaching an  agreement.  Industrial disputes bet-
ween  the  employer  and  the  works  council  are 
prohibited.  Differences  of  opinion  are  to  be 
settled  sometimes  by  decision  of  the  labour 
court, but more often  by  decision of  an  arbitra-
tion  board.  This  is  composed  of  members 
appointed in  equal numbers by the employer and 
by  the  works  council  and  a chairman on whom 
the  employer  and  the  works  council  must 
agree.  If no  agreement is  reached regarding the 
appointment of  a  chairman, he  is  appointed  by 
the  labour court.  Where  the works council has 
the  right of  co-determination, the decision of the 
arbitration board is  binding on the employer and 
the  works  council.  In  other cases,  the  decision 
of  the  arbitration  board  is  binding only if  both 
parties have agreed to abide by it. 
The  works  council  has  far-reaching  rights  of 
participation  in  social,  staff  and  economic mat-
ters.  To  enable  it  to  carry  out  its  tasks,  it  is 
entitled  to  receive  from  the  employer,  informa-
tion  and  the  necessary  documents.  The  works 
council has the  right of co-determination regard-
ing  the  following social matters: organization of 
the  establishment  and  of  the  conduct  of  the 
employees  within  the  establishment,  working 
hours,  holiday  arrangements,  technical  installa-
59 tions  to  supervise  the  conduct  or  output  of 
employees,  social  facilities  within the establish-
ment, company-owned dwellings, questions rela-
ting to the wages structure within the establish-
ment,  the  fixing  of piecework and  bonus  rates, 
and  rules  to  prevent  industrial  accidents  and 
illnesses and to safeguard industrial hygiene. 
The works council has rights to information and 
consultation regarding the layout of the place of 
work, the  work flow  and  the working environ-
ment.  If employees are  particularly affected  by 
changes  in  these  areas,  the  works  council  can 
request  that  appropriate  measures  be 
taken.  Where  there are differences  of opinion, 
the decision of the arbitration board is  binding. 
In  all  matters relating to vocational training the 
works  council  has  the  right  to  consultation, 
while  as  regards  the implementation of training 
measures in  the establishment it has the right of 
to-determination. 
In  principle  the  employer  may  take  individual 
measures  affecting  staff,  such  as  appointments, 
groupings  and  re-grouping  and  transfers,  only 
with  the  approval  of  the  works  council.  The 
latter is  entitled to oppose such a measure within 
one week on the grounds set out in  the law.  If 
the employer wishes to implement the measure in 
spite  of the  opposition of the  works council  he 
must normally appeal to the labour court.  The 
employer must consult the  works council  before 
any  dismissal.  Dismissals  made  without  such 
consultation  are  void.  Normally,  the  works 
council can oppose dismissals on certain grounds 
set out in  the  law.  [f  the employer carries out 
the  dismissal  in  spite  of  such  opposition,  the 
employee can  appeal to the  labour court on the 
grounds  alleged  by  the works council.  If these 
are upheld, the dismissal is  void. 
Provision is  made for an economic committee at 
enterprise  level  to  deal  with  economic  mat-
ters.  Such committees must be  set up in  enter-
prises  with  more  than  100  employees;  their 
members are appointed by the works council or 
the  central works council.  The economic com-
mittee  discusses  economic  matters  with  the 
employer and reports to the works council.  Ac-
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cordingly, the  employer must inform the works 
council  of any planned changes in  the establish-
ment which could have fundamental disadvanta-
ges  for  the  employees,  and  must  consult  it 
regarding  the  proposed  changes.  Changes  in 
the  establishment include, for  instance, the  con-
traction,  closure  or  transfer  of  the  whole esta-
blishment or of considerable parts thereof, amal-
gamation with other establishments, fundamen-
tal  changes  in  the  organization of the establish-
ment, its objectives or premises and the introduc-
tion  of new  working and  manufacturing proce-
dures.  The  employer  and  the  works  council 
should  strive  in  their  consultations  to  reach  a 
compromise  regarding  the  proposed  change  as 
well  as  an agreement to  offset or to reduce the 
economic  disadvantages  suffered  by  employees 
as a  result of changes (social plan).  The works 
council  has  no  right  of  co-determination  with 
regard to  the employer's decision on the change 
as  such.  The  arbitration  board  can  make  a 
proposal in this case also, but it is  not binding on 
the  employer.  The  works  council,  however, 
does  have  the  right  of  co-determination  when 
dealing with the social effects of changes on the 
employees.  If  the  employer  and  the  works 
council  cannot  agree  on  the  drawing  up  of  a 
social plan or on its contents, the decision of the 
arbitration board is  binding. 
Policy 
Generally, the system of employee representation 
through  works  councils,  operating  normally at 
'establishment  level,  is  regarded  as  a  form  of 
employee participation which has been successful 
within  its  proper  field  of  action.  The  law 
having  been  revised  and modernized as  recently 
as  1972, there  are no  proposals current!  y being 
made for  its  modification.  It is  regarded by the 
government  parties  as  being  essentially  distinct 
from  and complementary to employee participa-
tion  through  representation  on  an  enterprise's 
decision making body.  In defending the propo-
sed  law  in  the  Bundestag  in  1971,  the  then 
Minister of Labour was careful to stress that the 
two  forms  of  participation  are  not  equivalent 
S.  8/75 institutions  but  fulfil  different  functions  in  a 
complementary way.
1 
On the  other hand,  it has  been pointed out that 
the  developed  form  of  employee  representation 
at  plant  level  necessarily  has  an  effect  on  the 
proper scope which ought to  be  given  to  partici-
pation through representation on an enterprise's 
decision making body.
2 
Employee participation 
in  decision making bodies 
Present law and practices 
Employee  representation on the decision making 
bodies  of  German  companies  is  governed  by 
three  laws:  the  Co-determination  Law  ('Mitbe-
stimmungsgesetz')  of  1951,  the  Co-determina-
tion  Amendment  Law  ('Mitbestimmungsergan-
zungsgesetz')  of  1956, and  the  Works  Constitu-
tion Act ('Betriebsverfassungsgesetz') of  1952. 
The  Co-determination  Law  of  1951  applies  to 
companies  with  their  main  activities  in  the  coal 
and  steel  industry  employing  more  than  one 
thousand  workers.  The  supervisory councils of 
these companies normally consist of eleven mem-
bers.  All  of the  members are  appointed  by  the 
general  meeting  of  shareholders  but  there  are  a 
number  of  restrictions  as  to  whom  they  may 
appoint,  the  objective  of  which  is  to  guarantee 
employee  representation.  Four  shareholders 
representatives  can  be  appointed  by  the  general 
meeting  without  restriction,  and  one  further 
member  ('weiteres  Mitglied')  can  be  appointed 
provided he  is  independent of both shareholders' 
and  employees  and  their  respective  organiza-
tions.  · In  practice,  these  five  members  are 
known  as  the  shareholders'  representa rives. 
Two employees' representatives must be  appoin-
ted  on  the  nomination of the works council, and 
two  others  on  the  nomination  of  the· trade 
unions.  One  further  member  is  appointed  on 
trade  union  nomination  who  must  be  indepen-
dent  in  the  same  way  as  the  further  member 
appointed  by  the  shareholders.  These  five 
members,  whom  the  general  meetin-g  is  obliged 
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to  appomt,  are  m  practice  known  as  the 
employees'  representatives.  Both  the  sharehol-
ders'  representatives  and  the  employees'  repre-
sentatives  may  together  nominate  a  neutral, 
independent  eleventh  member  for  appointment 
by  the  general  meeting.  When  no  agreement 
can  be  reached, the  law  provides for  a concilia-
tion  procedure  with  an  appeal  to  the  ordinary 
appeal  courts  if  the  general  meeting  refuses  to 
make  an  appointment  in  accordance  with  the 
recommendations  of  a  conciliation  committee 
composed of shareholders' and employees' repre-
sentatives  in  equal  numbers.  If  the  refusal  is 
held  to  be  unjustified,  the  general  meeting  is 
obliged  to  make  an  appointment in  accordance 
with  the  committee's  recommendations.  If the 
refusal  is  finally  held  to  be  )ustified, the  general 
meeting  is  free  to  appoint  the  independent 
eleventh man itself. 
The management board of these companies must 
include  an  Employees'  Director  ('Arbeitsdirek-
tor')  who  may  not  be  appointed  against  the 
wishes  of  the  employees'  representatives  on  the 
supervisory  council  and  who  is  charged  with 
industrial relations and personnel affairs. 
The Co-determination Law  of 1951 has its origin 
in the fact that the former owners of the coal and 
steel  indus try were severely  limited  in  exercising 
their rights after the second world war.  In 1947 
the  British military authorities in agreement with 
the  trade unions introduced a regime which gave 
shareholders  and  employees  an  equal  say  in  the 
1  Deutscher  Bundestag,  6.  Wahlperiode,  150. 
Sitzung, Protokoll S.  8666 A, B. 
~  Professor  Biedenkopf,  in:  Der  Betriebsberater 
1972,  1517.  Since  197  3  Professor  Biedenkopf  has 
been  Secretary-General  of  the  Christian  Democratic 
Party, and was formerly chairman of the 'Commission 
of Experts to Evaluate the Experiences with Co-deter-
mination'  which  made  an  extensive  study  and  held 
hearings  on  employee  participation  in  Germany  for 
the government.  The study together with recommen-
dations  for  legislative  action  was  published  in  1970 
under  the  title  'Mitbestimmung  in  Unternehmen', 
Deutscher  Bundestag,  6.  Wahlperiode,  Drucksache 
Vl/334, referred to herein as the Biedenkopf Report. 
61 administration  of  the  industries.  The  owners, 
anxious  to  regain  even  a  part  of  their  former 
status  did  not  oppose  the  regime.
1  When  the 
time  came  for  the  Federal  Republic  to  legislate 
for  these  industries  the  trade  unions  insisted  on 
preserving their existing status. 
The Co-determination Amendment Law  of 1956 
deals  with  coal  and  steel  companies  which  are 
integrated  in  groups  of  companies.  It provides 
for  parity of shareholders' and employees' repre-
sentatives  with  an  eleventh  neutral  member  on 
the  supervisory  council  of  the  holding company 
if  more  than  half  the  turnover  of  the  group 
results  from  activities  in  the  coal  and  steel 
industry.  Employee  representatives  at  group 
level  are  to  be  elected  through  an  'electors 
assembly'  representing  all  the  companies  be-
longing  to  the  group.  This  election  machinery 
has  provided the model for subsequent proposals 
to extend employee participation in Germany. 
The  Works Constitution Act  of  1952 applies  to 
all  sectors of  the  economy not falling within the 
reach of the laws of 1951 and 1956.  It provides 
for  one  third  of the representatives of the super-
visory  councils  of  German  public  stock  compa-
nies  ('Aktiengesellschaften')  to  be  elected  by  the 
employees  unless  the  company  is  owned  by  a 
family  and  employs  less  than  five  hundred per-
sons.  It  also  provides  for  a  similar  form  of 
employee participation for  private  limited liabil-
ity  companies  ('Gesellschaften  mit  beschrankter 
Haftung')  which  have  five  hundred  or  more 
employees.  The  employee  representatives  are 
elected  by  all  the  employees  of  the  company 
concerned  and  of  subsidiaries  integrated  in  a 
group.  Employees  and  the  works  councils  are 
entitled  to  nominate  candidates,  but  not  trade 
unions  as  such,  though  in  practice  there  are 
'union' lists of candidates. 
In  all  cases, employee representatives or directors 
have  the  same  general  rights  and  duties  as  the 
other members of the board in question. 
Policy 
All  the  major  political  parties  appear  to  be 
agreed  that  there  should  be  an  extension  of 
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employee  representation on supervisory councils 
outside the coal and steel sector.  Discussion has 
been  going  on  for  some  time  as  to  the  precise 
manner in which this reform should be effected. 
This  general  consensus  and  the  debate which  is 
now  going on  owe  much  to  the  findings  of  the 
Commission  of  Experts  under the  chairmanship 
of Professor Biedenkopf charged by the Christian 
and Social  Democratic government in  1968 with 
a  study of  co-determination.  The  Commission 
reported  in  1970  and  concluded  among  other 
things  that the  supervisory  council  was  indeed 
the appropriate body on which employees should 
be  represented since  such representation enabled 
a  company  to  combine  the  representation  of  a 
plurality  of  interests  with  a homogeneous  man-
agement.2  The  Commission  proposed  that the 
employees'  representation  on  the  supervisory 
council  should  be  increased  from  the  present 
minimum  proportion of  one  third, but that the 
shareholders' representatives should still  retain a 
numerical  majority.  The  mechanism  proposed 
was  that  in  the  case  of  a  council  of  twelve 
members for  example, six representatives elected 
by  the  shareholders  and  four  representatives 
elected  by th employees  should  together co-opt 
two final  members on the  proposal either of one 
of  the  elected  representatives or of  the  manage-
ment board:' 
In  the  last few  years,  the  different parties repre-
sented  in  the  German  Federal  Parliament,  the 
trade  unions,  the  Protestant  church  and  the 
Catholic  employee  and  employer  organizations 
have  all  presented  particular  proposals  for 
~eform as  to  employee  representation  on  com-
pany councils. 
The  Social  Democratic  Party,  has  since  1968 
proposed  a  straightforward  extension  of  the 
Co-determination  Law  of  1951.  Its  proposal 
1  A  statement  of  Dr  Reusch  (Gutehoffnungshiitte 
AG)  quoted in 'Mitbestimmung-eine Forderung unse-
rer Zeit', DGB 1971, 8. 
2  Biedenkopf Report, op. cit., pp. 31-32, paragraphs 
7  and  8; pp. 71  to  74, paragraphs 38  to 45; and pp. 
99 to 100. 
_l  Biedenkopf  Report,  op.  cit.,  p.  96,  paragraph  1, 
and pp. 103 to 104, paragraph 18. 
S.  8/75 corresponds generally  to the  claims  of the  Ger-
man Trade Union Federation (DGB), except that 
the  Social  Democrats  do  not propose  that  the 
unions  should  appoint  a  proportion  of  the 
employee representatives. 
The  Free  Democratic  (Liberal)  Party  at  their 
congress  in  1971  backed,  after  a  controversial 
discussion,  a  model  with six shareholder repre-
sentatives,  four  employee  representatives  and 
two  representatives  of  the  'leitende Angestellte' 
(the supervisory staff). 
Within the Christian Democratic Party, different 
models  have  been  elaborated since  1970. Most 
of them aim at assuring the employees of a larger 
representation  without  affecting  the  predomi-
nance of the shareholders' representatives on the 
supervisory  council.  The  Social  Groups  of the 
party  (CDU-Sozialausschiisse)  have  however 
come out in favour of parity of shareholders' and 
workers'  representatives  on  a  'council  of  the 
enterprise'.'  But in  November 1973, the Chris-
tian  Democratic  Party  adopted  a  resolution 
which also proposes parity of representation on 
the  supervisory  council.  However,  the  chair-
man of the council is  to have a casting vote as  to 
the appointment of the management board.  He 
is  elected  by the  other members of the  council, 
but  cannot  be  elected  without the  approval  of 
the shareholders' representatives or the sharehol-
ders themselves. 
In February 1974, the  German government pro-
posed  a  bill  aiming  at  realizing  equal  rights 
('Gieichberechtigung') and equal weight ('Gieich-
gewichtigkeit') of both production factors, work 
and  capital, within the  decision making process 
of big enterprises.
1  The draft law will  apply to 
all  companies  and  groups  of  companies 
employing  more  than  two  thousand  workers 
which  do  not  fall  within  the  reach  of  the 
Co-determination  Law of  1951  and  the  Co-de-
termination Amendment Law of 1956. 
According to the  proposal, the supervisory coun-
cils  of these  companies will  consist of an equal 
number of shareholder representatives elected by 
the  shareholders'  meeting,  and  employee  repre-
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senta  tives  elected  by  an  assembly  of  delegates 
from  all  the  plants of the company or the group 
of  companies. directed  by  the  company.  Em-
ployee  representatives  will  include  at least  one 
member of the supervisory staff. 
The Bill  does  not provide for a  neutral eleventh 
man as  provided in  the Co-determination Law of 
19 51.  If the supervisory council does not reach 
agreement  on  the  appointment of  the  manage-
ment board even after a  conciliation procedure, 
the  final  decision  on  the  proposed  candidates 
will lie with the shareholders' meeting.  It is  also 
worthy  of note  that  the  trade  unions  have  not 
been  given  the  right to  make binding proposals 
as  under  the  19  51  Law,  but  they  have  the 
exclusive right to nominate candidates as regards 
a minority of the representatives to be elected by 
the assembly of delegates. 
The German employers' organizations ('Bundes-
vereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbande' 
and  the  'Bundesverband  der  Deutschen  Indus-
trie') have rejected the government's proposal on 
the ground that its  implementation would upset 
the social balance necessary for a free society and 
produce  a  situation  in  which  the  trade  unions 
became  too  dominant  a  group.
3  The  German 
Trade Union Federation has rejected the propo-
sal  as  well  on  the  principal  ground  that  the 
proposal differs  in  significant respects  from  the 
regime  currently prevailing in the  coal  and steel 
sector.
4  The  Federation  wishes  to  see  this  re-
gime given general application. 
At the present time the proposal has not made a 
great  deal  of  progress  in  the  legislature.  The 
Federal  Government has announced that before 
the  end  of the present Parliamentary session, an 
amended proposal will  be  presented to the legis-
lature. 
1  Vorschlag  der  15.  Bundestagung  der  Sozialauss-
chiisse, Bochum 20.5.1973. 
2  Entwurf  eines  Gesetzes  iiber  die  Mitbestimmung 
der Arbeitnehmer, Bundesrat-Drucksache 200/74. 
3  See  press declaration of 22.2.1974. 
4  See press declaration of 3.3.1974. 
63 Share  and  profit participation 
Present law and practices 
A  German  law  permits  em~loyees  to  acquire 
shares  in  the  company  whiCh  employs  them 
under  advantageous  conditions.
1  The  law 
allows employees to receive a premium_  fr~m the 
State  if  they  choose  to  make  certam  mvest-
ments.  The premium varies from 30% to 40% 
of the amount invested which is  limited to DM 
624  each  year.  Most employees  choose  to in-
vest  their  amount  in  life  insurance  or a  house, 
but  about  10%  of  the  total  is  used  for  the 
purchase  on  favourable  terms  of  shares  in  the 
company by which the employee is  employed. 
Moreover, if  a  company allots its own share~ to 
employees at a price lower than the marketynce, 
the  resulting  benefit  to  the  employees  ts  not 
taxed provided that the benefit does not amount 
to more than half the true market value and also 
provided that the employee agrees not to re-sell 
the shares for a period of five  years. 
These  provisions  have  given  companies  the 
opportunity  of  encouraging  shareholding  ~y 
employees in  different ways.  Several  compam~s 
have  issued  or  purchased shares  to  sell  to thetr 
employees  on favourable  terms, and  the  matter 
has  frequently  been made the  subject of  collec-
tive  agreements.  However,  these  schemes  are 
essentially  savings  and  incentive  schemes  and 
have not had a  fundamental effect on the distri-
bution  of  capital  in  society  or  the  influence 
which  employees  have  on  the  enterprises  for 
which  they  work.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  one 
leading  industrial  enterprise,  employees'  shares 
amount to only 6% of the total. 
Policy 
In February 1974, the government proposed new 
legislation  to  ensure  that  employees  generally 
will  participate in  the  increased wealth of ente~­
prises.  According to  the  proposal, all  enterprt-
ses  making  an  annual  profit  after  tax of  DM 
400 000  will  have to contribute a  proportion of 
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that  profit  to  a  fund  for  the  benefit  of 
employees.  The proportion will be on a sliding 
scale reaching 10% on profits of DM 1000000 
or  more.  A  further  payment  of  15%  of  the 
basic contribution will  be  payable if  a  company 
contributes  in  a  form  other than its  own shares 
or shares in companies controlled by the contri-
buting  company.  All  employees  and  self 
employed persons will  benefit annually from  t~e 
fund  provided  they  earn  less  than  certam 
amounts,  namely  DM  36000  per  annum  for 
single  persons  and  DM  54 000  for  married 
persons.  Annual allotments will  be redeemable 
only after seven years. 
There are divergent conceptions as to the admin-
istration  of  the  fund,  some  favouring  central 
administration,  others  administration  through 
local  financial  institutions.  No draft legislation 
has been  prepared at present, and in  view of the 
current  economic  situation,  it  is  impossible  to 
forecast when such draft legislation will appear. 
The  Confederation  of  German  Industry  ('Bun-
desverband der Deutschen Industrie') has  reject-
ed  the proposed legislation on the ground that it 
is  an  unrealistic evaluation of how  much enter-
prises  can  afford  to  divert  from  their  pro-
fits.  Contributions  of  the  kind  contemplated 
would result, it is  feared, in a continual watering 
of capital  to  the  prejudice of  sharehold~rs, yar-
ticularly small  shareholders, the  enterprise Itself 
and  the  economy  as  a  whole.  Raising  new 
capital would become more difficult and accord-
ingly  there  would  be  a  restraint on new  invest-
ments.1 
Company structure 
Present law 
The  German  Stock  Companies  Act  ('Aktienge-
setz') of 1965 prescribes a formal two tier system 
of ad ministration for  the  'Aktiengesellschaft' or 
AG,  which  corresponds  approximately  to  the 
1  Law  for  the  encouragement  of  the  formation  of 
savings by employees of 27.6.1970. 
2  Press declaration No 9/7  4 of 11.2.197  4. 
S.  8/75 French  societe  anonyme.  This two tier system 
was first made mandatory for AGs in  1870. 
The supervisory council  ('Aufsichtsrat')  consists 
of  a  minimum  of  three  members.  The  maxi-
mum  permissible  is  twenty-one  members  in  an 
AG  with  a  share  capital  of  more  than  DM 
20 000 000.  Except  for  special  provisions  for 
the participation of workers, the members of the 
supervisory council  are elected  by the  sharehol-
ders' meeting or appointed  by certain sharehol-
ders or holders of -a  certain class of shares.  The 
members who have been elected by the sharehol-
ders can be  removed from office by a three-quar-
ters  majority of the votes cast at a shareholders' 
meeting,  unless  the  articles  require  a  greater 
majority · or  the  fulfilment  of  other  condi-
tions.  Members of the supervisory council need 
not be shareholders. 
The board of  management ('Vorstand')  consists 
of one or more persons appointed by the super-
visory  council  for  a  maximum  of  five 
years.  The  supervisory  council  may  also 
appoint a  member of the board of management 
to  be  chairman.  These  appointmc~nts  may  be 
revoked  by  the  supervisory  council  for  a  good 
reason.  A  member  of  the  supervisory  council 
may  not  be  simultaneously  a  member  of  the 
board of management. 
The  division  of  function  and  responsibility 
established  by  the  law  is  clear  and  establishes 
that  the  board  of  management  directs  and  is 
responsible for the management of the company, 
while  the  supervisory  council  supervises  the 
management.  Thus,  while  the  board  of 
management is  responsible  for  the  management 
of the company and normally represents it in and 
out of court, it has specific and detailed obliga-
tions  as  regards  reporting  on  the  company's 
affairs  to  the  supervisory  council.  The  law 
requires a  continuous flow  of  information to be 
transmitted .  by the management to  the  supervis-
ory council  on the state of the enterprise and on 
envisaged management policy. 
Moreover, the  supervisory  council has the  right 
.·to· investigate  the  company's  affairs  and  in  so 
doing,  it  may  inspect the  company's books and 
records,  and  require  the  management board  to 
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make  specific  reports and  answer specific ques-
tions.  If the welfare of the company requires it, 
the  supervisory council  may call  a  shareholders' 
meeting. 
The supervisory council  cannot be  charged with 
management  functions,  but  the  company's 
articles  or  the  supervisory  council  itself  may 
require  that specified  measures  of  the  manage-
ment  board  receive  the  prior  consent  of  the 
supervisory  council.  If consent  is  refused,· the 
management  board  can  then  only proceed  if  it 
can secure a three-quarters majority of the votes 
cast at a shareholders' meeting. 
Present practice 
Though  the  relationship  between  the  board  of 
management  and  the  supervisory council  varies 
considerably  from  one  enterprise  to  another, 
certain generalizations can be made. 
In  practice, in  many companies  the  supervisory 
council's  decisions  are  prepared  by  committees 
of the council which then play a very important 
role.  Use  of  such committees provides flexibi-
lity.  Thus, the full  council normally meets only 
every three  months, unless special circumstances 
require  more  frequent  meetings.  Members  of 
the  management  board  normally  attend  the 
meetings  of  the  supervisory  council  and  its 
committees.  It  is  also  normal  practice  for  the 
supervisory  council  to  approve  the  company's 
annual accounts. 
The variation in the roles played by the supervis-
ory councils and management boards from com-
pany  to  company was  established  by  the  study 
made  by  a  panel  of  experts  under  Professor 
Biedenkopf for  the  German ·government.  If the 
company was in  the hands of one or a few  large 
shareholders,  the  supervisory  council  had  in 
many cases  not confined its  role to  supervision, 
but had played an active part in determining the 
general  strategy  of  the  enterprise.  The  legal 
power used  to enable the  council to play such a 
role  was  the  power  already  noted  which  the 
supervisory  council  has  to  require·  certain 
management decisions  to  have  its  prior appro-
65 val.  On the other hand, if the company's shares 
w~re widely distributed, the  management board 
mtght have a decisive influence on the election of 
the. supervisory council.  In such cases, the sup-
ervisory council often confined its  role to advice 
and  did  not  interfere  with  management  deci-
~i~ns.'  Much may also depend on the personal-
Ities  of  the  persons  involved, and  the  extent of 
e~ployee participation.  In  practice,  it  can  be 
satd  that  for  most  companies,  the  board  of 
management's  central  position  means  that  it  is 
normally better informed and more able to take 
action than the supervisory council. 
Policy 
In  1972, the  German government established  a 
com.mittee  of  experts  within  the  Ministry  of 
Justice  to  examine  the  question  of  whether 
company law required amendment in the context 
of  a  general  law  for  commercial  undertakings 
~'Unterneh~ensrecht').  It has not yet published 
Its  conclusiOns,  but  it  seems  that  it  will  not 
propose that the  established  two  tier  system  be 
abolished. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  proposal  of  the  Social 
Gr.o~ps  of  the  CDU  has  suggested  that  the 
exi~ti.ng system .be  amended so that all important 
declSlons affectmg the enterprise would be decid-
ed  by  an 'Unternehmensrat' or company council 
composed of delegates representing the sharehol-
ders,  the  workers  and  the  management.
2  This 
pr.op?sal has  receiy~d favourable comment from 
wtthm  other  pohtKal  parties,  but  is  not  in 
conformity with the official policy of any politi-
cal party in Germany at the moment. 
It  is  notable  th~t  all  the  programmes  being 
proposed by parues represented in the Bundestag 
to promote employee participation are based on 
the  existing  two  tier  structure  and  aim  at 
improving employee  participation on the  super-
visory council. 
1  Biedenkopf  Report,  op.  cit.,  pp.  32  to  33,  para-
graphs 7 to 10. 
2  Der Spiegel, 26.2.1973, p. 36.  Interview with Mr 
Katzer, the leader of the group. 
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France 
Employee participation 
Collective bargaining 
Present law and practices 
The  Collective  Agreement  Acts  of  1950  and 
1971 constitute a  legal  framework for collective 
agreements  which are  legally binding if  in  writ-
ten  fo~m.  The 1950 Act distinguished  between 
collective  agreements  ('conventions  collectives') 
a?,d  est.ablishment or salary agreements ('accords 
d etabhssement  ou  de  salaires').  The  contents 
of  ~he latter  w~re limited  to  the  adaptation of 
regiOnal  or  national  agreements  to  a  particular 
enterprise,  or  to  fixing  remuneration  in  the 
absence  o.f  .re~io~al  or  national  agree-
ments.  Thts  hmttatton  appeared  to  constitute 
an  obstacle  to  the  conclusion of agreements  at 
enterprise  level  and  the  1971  Act  removed the 
restriction. 
The  l~gisla  tion  in  force  distinguishes  between 
c?llecttve  agreem~nts which  apply  only  to  the 
stgnatory  enterpnses  and  those  which  can  be 
extended by order of the  Ministry of Labour to 
other enterprises.  The latter kind of agreement 
can only be concluded by the most representative 
employers' organizations and  trade  unions, and 
through a special negotiating procedure in which 
a.  government  official  participates.  The  exten-
Sion  ~rocedure has been the subject of improve-
ment m recent years. 
A:  collec~ive agreement accordingly applies to all 
stgnatones, to all enterprises .which are members 
of  a  signatory  organization  or  to  which  the 
agreement has been extended, and to all workers 
in these firms whether union members or not. 
In the 1950's and early 1960's, wage agreements 
at  national  or  regional  levels  were  the  most 
s~gnificant  form  of  collective  agreement,  but 
smce  then,  far  reaching  developments  have 
occurred  particularly  after the  social  disruption 
S.  8/75 of 1968.  There has been a substantial widening 
in  the  contents of  agreements, combined with a 
trend towards 'multi-industrial' bargaining at the 
national  level.  This  has  produced  some  major 
agreements  of  great  importance  for  a  large 
number  of  enterprises,  organizations  and 
employees.  These have included the agreements 
of 1969 on job security, of  1970 on training and 
of  1972  on  guaranteed  income  for  employees 
over  60  years  of  age  without employment.  At 
the  present time, negotiations are proceeding for 
a  national  multi-industrial  agreement  on  con-
ditions of work. 
Moreover,  within  particular  industries  and  sec-
tors the range of collective bargaining has greatly 
increased  also,  dealing  for  example  with  the 
introduction of salaried status for  all employees, 
lay-offs, and retirement.
1 
On  the  other  hand,  plant  and  enterprise  level 
collective  bargaining, though more frequent than 
in  the  past  is  still  not  very  common  or  very 
broad  in  scope.  It  has  not  yet  become  dear 
whether  the  change  of  law  in  1971  has  had  a 
substantial effect on this kind of bargaining. 
Policy 
All  current statements are  linked with the  publi-
cation of  the  report made  by  the  Sudreau Com-
mission.2  This  Commission  had  undertaken 
extensive  consultation  of  all  trade  union  and 
employer  organizations  after  Mr  Giscard 
d'Estaing charged it with the examination of  the 
problem  of  the  reform  of  the  enterprise  as  a 
whole.  According  to  this  report, a  larger  field 
of  application  should  be  left  to  collective  bar-
gaining,  since  it  is  desirable  that the  representa-
tive  organizations  of employers  and  employees 
exercise  their  right  to  innovate  by  agree-
ment.  The trade union must be  recognized as  a 
real  partner  to  whom  the  material  means  for 
action  must  be  given.  This  is,  however,  not to 
mean  that the  authority of  management ('auto-
rite de Ia direction') should be  adversely affected. 
Mr  Roccard  of  the  Socialist  Party  has  already 
indicated that the  emphasis placed on the  impor-
-;_  8/75 
tance  of  contractual  relations  in  enterprises 
seemed  to  him  to  be  a good  thing.  Moreover, 
the  reactions  of  trade  unions  and  employers  to 
these proposals were generally favourable. 
Representative institutions: 
Information, consultation and approval 
Present law and practices 
At  the  present  time,  French  law  provides  for 
three  forms  of  representative  institutions,  all  of 
which can  and  sometimes do  co-exist in a given 
establishment.  First  there  are  the  personnel 
delegates ('delegues du personnel') created by the 
Matigt•on Agreement of 1936 and now regulated 
by  a law  of  1946 subsequently amended in some 
respects.  Then there are the enterprise commit-
tees  ('comites  d'entreprise')  created  by  an  ordi-
nance  of  1945 which has also been the subject of 
amendment.  Finally,  there  are  the  union  dele-
gates  ('delegues  syndicaux')  operating  under  a 
law of 1968. 
The employees having representative functions  in 
the  enterprise  (personnel  delegates,  members  of 
the  enterprise  committee,  union  delegates) 
receive  the  benefit  of  a  protective  statute,  in 
particular  as  regards  dismissals.  The  evolution 
of  the  relevant  case  law  continues  to  reinforce 
this protection. 
The personnel delegates are to be elected annual-
ly  in  all  industrial,  commercial  and  agricultural 
enterprises  with  more  than  ten  employees  by  a 
secret  ballot  of  all  employees  divided  into  two 
electoral  colleges:  one  for  managerial,  supervis-
ory  and  technical  staff,  and  the  other  for  the 
remainder  of  the  employees.  The  election  is 
1  See  generally 'La  Participation des  travailleurs aux 
decisions  dans  l'entreprise  en  France',  by  J.  Chazal. 
Paper  delivered  at  the  ILO Symposium  on Workers' 
Participation  in  Decisions  within  Undertakings, 
August  1974.  Also  Workers  Participation  and  Col-
lective  Bargaining  in  Europe,  Chapter  5.  Commis-
sion on Industrial Relations, HMSO 1974. 
2  Rapport  du  Comite  d'etude  pour  Ia  reforme  de 
/'e_ntreprise,  February  1975,  La  documentation  fran-
\=aise. 
67 organized according to  a system of proportional 
representation.  Candidates  are  initially  nomi-
nated  by  the  most  representative  trade  unions, 
but if  less· than half the  electorate  votes  in  this 
election,  a  second  election  must  be  held  for 
which lists  of candidates can be  presented other 
than  those  of  the  unions.  The  number  and 
composition  of  the  electoral  colleges  and  the 
allocation  of  seats  between  them  can  be  made 
the  subject of collective agreements.  The num-
ber of delegates is  fixed according to the number 
of employees. 
The  personnel  delegates  are  by  law  given  the 
function  of  representing  the  employees  on  all 
claims relating to the application of agreed wage 
rates  and  job  classifications  and  of  the  labour 
laws.  However, an employee  is  always entitled 
to  present  his  own  claim,  if  he  wishes.  The 
delegates  must also iriform the labour inspector-
ate  of all  infractions of the labour laws.  When 
an enterprise  committee exists, they are entitled 
to  communicate  to  it  the  comments  of  the 
employees on all  matters for which the commit-
tee  is  competent.  When  no  committee  exists, 
they may communicate suggestions for improve-
ments in  the organization of the enterprise to the 
employer.  The delegates have a legal right to be 
received and heard by management. 
Enterprise  committees  must  be  set  up  in  all 
enterprises  employing  more  than  fifty  work-
ers.  The  committee  is  composed  of  delegates 
elected  by  the  employees  and  of  the  chief exe-
cutive  ('chef d'entreprise') who presides at meet-
ings.  The number of employee delegates  varies 
according  to  the  number  of  employees  from 
three  to  eleven,  though  the  number  can  be 
increased  by  collective  agreement.  The  dele-
gates  are  elected  by  secret  ballot  through  a 
system  of  proportional  repre"sentation,  the 
employees being divided in  up  to three colleges: 
one  for  the  'maitrise',  one  for  the  supervisory 
and technical staff, and one for the  remainder of 
the  employees.  The  distribution  of  seats 
between the  colleges and the composition of the 
colleges  themselves  is  regulated  by  collective 
agreement  between  the  chief  executive  and  the 
trade unions concerned.  If no agreement can be 
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reached, the Director of Labour from the appro-
priate  Department  decides.  The  system  of 
nomination  by  lists  of  candidates  is  similar  to 
that for the election of the personnel delegates. 
Each trade union recognized as  representative in 
the  enterprise  can designate a  non-voting repre-
sentative from among eligible employees to parti-
cipate in the meetings of the committee. 
The  committee's functions are entirely consulta-
tive  except for the administration or supervision 
of the social welfare programmes in the firm.  It 
must be  informed and consulted on the progress 
of  the  enterprise  and  in  particular  about  mea-
sures  likely  to  affect the size  or structure of the 
labour force  or conditions of work.  . It must be 
consulted  in  good  time  about  staff  reductions 
and allowed to give  its opinions on the proposed 
measures.  The Act 75-5 of 3 January 1975 on 
redundancies for economic reasons provides that 
personnel  delegates  and  enterprise  committees 
must be  consulted  by  the  employer if  the latter 
envisages making employees redundant for econ-
omic reasons,  whether  conjunctural  or structu-
ral,  when  the  redundancies  affect  a  number of 
employees of at least ninety in a  given period of 
thirty days. 
The enterprise committee also has specific rights 
to information, including for example an annual 
report  from  the  chief  executive and, if  desired, 
explanations  from  a  company's  commissioners 
of accounts ('commissaires aux comptes'). 
Finally,  under  an  Act  of  27  December  1968, 
trade  unions  have  the  right,  in  enterprises 
employing  more than fifty  persons, to  set  up  a 
union section  ('section syndicate').  The section 
is  composed  of  delegates  nominated  by  the 
union,  and  its  function  is  to  ensure  that  the 
interests of the union mem hers are represented in 
the enterprise. 
In  practice,  the  personnel . delegates  do  not 
appear  to. have  played  as  significant  a  role  in 
recent  years as  the  enterprise  committees  and 
union delegates.  It appears that the number of 
enterprise  committees  and  union  delegates  has 
been  increasing  substantially,  and  furthermore, 
recent legislative  texts and collective  agreements 
S.  8/75 have  added  to  the  functions  of  enterprise  com-
mittees.1  Moreover, it seems clear that in prac-
tice  there is  an overlap between the operations of 
the  enterprise  committees  and  the  union  sec-
tions.  In  1972,  for  example,  the  major union 
confederations between them controlled 54% of 
the  seats on enterprise committees.
2  The result-
ing situations  are  complex and generalization is 
difficult.  However,  many  trade  unions  claim 
that the  law  as  to enterprise  committees  is  not 
properly  observed  by  many  managements, par-
ticularly in  relation to the disclosure of informa-
tion. 
Policy 
According  to  the  Sudreau  Commission,  it  is 
necessary  to  strengthen  the  consultation  which 
·occurs  within  the  enterprise  committee  for  it 
expresses a  true though imperfect recognition of 
the  community  of  employees  as  a  constituent 
part of the  enterprise.  The representative char-
acter of the  committee has  to  be  improved and 
its competences reinforced by way of full  consul-
tation, but not by way of co-decision which the 
social  partners do not want.  It is  necessary to 
provide also for a personnel representation with-
in  groups  of  companies  and  in  relation  to 
holding companies, since,  within such extensive 
structure:;,  I  ocal  enterprise  committees  could 
form  the  impression  that  they were  not talking 
with  the  real  holder  of  management  pow-
er.  Therefore,  foreign  m ul tina  tiona!  groups 
should be  obliged to  appoint a representative for 
each  of  their  French subsidiaries  to  be  answer-
able for the group's overall policy. 
The CGT ('Confederation Generate du Travail') 
asked  in  its  paper  presented  to  the  Sudreau 
Commission
1  for  a  true right to information on 
the economic situation of the enterprise, as well 
as  on  the  group  to  which  it  may  belong  and, 
more  generally,  for  strengthening  the  role  of 
enterprise  committees to  the  exclusion of  every 
element of class  collaboration.  After the publi-
cation of the Sudreau report, the CGT remained 
sceptical  about  the  capacity  of  the  capitalist 
system to proceed to the reform of the enterprise, 
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which in its  opinion only the joint programme of 
the  left  ('programme  commun  de  Ia  gauche') 
would be able to achieve. 
The  CFDT ('Confederation  Fran~aise Democra-
tique  du Travail') expressed  similar views  prior 
to/ and after, the publication of the report. 
On 2 July 1975,  the  assembly of the  Economic 
and  Social  Council  gave  an  opinion
5  which 
rejected  the  proposal,  made  by  certain 
employers' organizations but not adopted in the 
Sudreau report, to open nominations for the first 
ballot in elections to enterprise committees to all 
employees,  and  not  only  to  the  representative 
trade  unions.  In  putting in  question the  union 
monopoly  once  again,  the  employers  hoped  'to 
achieve  a  distinction  between  the  roles  of  con-
frontation  ('contestation')  and  participa-
tion'.  This thesis was deemed to be too tainted 
with anti-unionism to be retained.  The demand 
of the CGT and CFDT for the granting of a right 
of veto to enterprise committees as regards plans 
for  continual  training  ('formation  permanente') 
was also rejected. 
The report on the preliminary orientation of the 
seventh  national  plan,  published  on  12  July 
1975,
6  reads as  follows: 'Three approaches must 
be  developed  to  enlarge  the  possibility  of 
employees  expressing their collective  aspirations 
and  influencing  the  decisions  of  the  manage-
ments  of  enterprises:  the  first· is  to  study  and 
bring  about  the  conditions  for  a  more  fruitful 
dialogue  between trade unions on the  one hand 
and responsible enterprises and their professional 
organizations  on  the  other;  the  second  is  to 
develop full  consultation taking fuller advantage 
of  the  possibilities  offered  by  the  existence  of 
enterprise committees ... '. · 
1  'La  participation  des  travailleurs  aux  decisions 
dans l'entreprise en France', J.  Chazal, op. cit. 
2  Worker Participation and Collective  Bargaining in 
Europe, op. cit., p. 50. 
3  'Non a l'austerite  - La  CGT et  !a  reforme  de 
l'entreprise' (Le Peuple of 15 to 31.10.1974). 
4  Hearing  of  the  CFDT  by  the  Study  group  on 
enterprise reform.  Paris, 10.10.1974. 
1  Official Journal of the French Republic, 5.8.1975. 
6  Official Journal of the French Republic, 12.7.1975. 
69 Participation in  decision making bodies 
Present law and  practices 
The  preamble  to  the  French  Constitutio~ con-
templates  the  participation of  employees  m the 
administration of enterprises. 
Moreover, the  law  makes concrete provision for 
employee  representation on  the  decision  makin~ 
bodies  of  certain  enterprises.  Thus  an  ordi-
nance  of 1945
1  as  amended provides that public 
companies  ('societes  anonymes') employing fifty 
or more persons  must admit two delegates from 
the  enterprise committee  in  a consultative  capa-
city  to  all  meetings of  the  council of  administra-
tion  ('conseil  d'administration')  or  supervisory 
council  ('conseil de  surveillance') as the case may 
be.  Since  1972,  in  enterprises  in  which  the 
number  of  supervisory  and  technical  staff  is  at 
least twenty five,  then these employees constitute 
a  special  college,  and  the  number  of  employee 
representatives is  increased to four, one of whom 
represents the  'maitrise', one the supervisory and 
technical  staff  and  two  the  remainder  of  the 
employees. 
In State-owned enterprises, representatives of the 
employees  occupy  one  third  of  the  seats  on  the 
council  of  administration  and  have  the  same 
rights  and  obligations  as  the  other  members  of 
the  council. 
Policy 
According  to  the  Sudreau  Commission,  a  new 
road  for  participation  has  to  be  opened  up: 
co-supervision  ('co-surveillance~),  aime~ at  fur-
ther  satisfying  the  need  for  mformation  and 
supervision felt  by  employees, through repr_esen-
tation  with  a  full  right  to  vote  on  counetls  of 
administration or supervision.  Such representa-
tion would  however, consist only of one third of 
the  seats  'so  that  the  autonomy  of  decision 
('autono~ie de  decision')  of  the  chief  executive 
remains  unaffected.  This  co-supervision  could 
only  be  established  step  by  step, but con:panies 
wishing  to  establish  it  should  be  authonzed  by 
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the  law  to  do  so.  Such  co-supervision  could 
only  be  optional  for  enterprises  with  less  than 
one  or two  thousand employees.  The Commit-
tee  was  divided  as  to  whether  co-supervision 
should  become  compulsory for  large  companies, 
either immediately or in the future  after a period 
of five  years. 
On  2  July  1975,  the  Economic  and  Social 
Council,  issued  the  following  statement:  'consi-
dering  that the  majority  of organizations repre-
sentative  of  employers  and  employees  reject,  in 
the  clearest  manner,  any  obligation  to  ensure  a 
representation of  employees, even as  a minority, 
in the  decision making of councils of administra-
tion or supervision, the  Council does not accept 
the  idea that such a reform could  be  imposed by 
law  ...  Accordingly, the  law  must confine itself 
to  imposing  structures  and  procedures  as  to 
information and full  consultation, and to provid-
ing  a  statute  for  those  bodies  endowed  with 
powers of negotiation'. 
2 
Published  on  12  July  197 5,  the  report  on  the 
preliminary  orientation  of  the  seventh  national 
plan/ under the headin(T,o consecrate  th~ place 
of  man  in  the  enterpnse ,  stated  that  It  was 
necessary 'to inquire into the  methods of permit-
ting  the  representatives  of  employees  to  partici-
pate in the  bodies directing enterprises'. 
On  18  July  1975,  the  first  inter-ministerial 
council  defined  certain priorities and established 
a time-table  which  will  lead  to  the  presentation 
of  a series  of  draft laws.  The  Sudreau  Report 
will  probably  serve  as  no  more  than  a  back-
ground  to  the  work  on  the  reform  of  the 
enterprise, because its text has been overtaken by 
the  proposals  and  reactions  which  it  has  pro-
voked.  The government will take into consider-
ation  the  problem  of  the  distinction  between 
functions  of  confrontation  ('contestation')  and 
participation  in  the  enterprise, and will examine 
the  proposal  for  'co-surveillance'  made  in  the 
Sudreau  Report,  and  the  observations  made  by 
such 
1  Ordinance 45-280. 
Official Journal of the French Republic, 5.8.197  5. 
Official Journal of the French Republic, 12.7 .,197 5. 
S.  8/75 groups  as  Enterprise and  Progress ('Entreprise et 
Progres')  or  the  Association  for  Participation 
('l' Association pour Ia participation'). 
Mr Giscard  d'Estaing has written recently to  his 
Prime  Minister  'I  hope  that  a  first  round  of 
reforms  could  be  proposed  to  Parliament in  the 
next session'.  The  social  partners will  be  con-
sulted  between  October  and  December  1975 
concerning  the  draft laws,  which  will  probably 
not be  debated  in  Parliament until  the  spring of 
1976. 
Share and  profit participation 
Present law and  practices 
In  France,  share  and  profit  parttetpation  has 
been  made the subject of  a number of legislative 
instruments in the fairly recent past. 
An  ordinance  of  1959'  instituted  an  optional 
system  for  permitting the  employees of enterpri-
ses  to  participate  in  the  profits of  an  enterprise, 
or  in  increases  in  productivity  or  capital,  or 
operations of  a self-financing nature ('operations 
d'auto-financement').  The  schemes  are  imple-
mented  through  the  negotiation  of  collective 
agreements  either  with  the  most  representative 
unions  in  the  enterprise  or  with  the  enterprise 
committee.  Tax  incentives  are  granted  for  the 
schemes,  whether payments  are  made  in  cash or 
otherwise.  At  the  present time,  232 companies 
have  concluded  agreements,  and  135 000 
employees  are  benefiting from  them.
2  The  limi-
ted· number  of  agreements  is  partly due  to  the 
fact  that an ordinance of  1967' instituted a new, 
obligatory form  of participation in the growth of 
enterprises  employing  more  than  one  hundred 
persons. 
Enterprises covered  by  the  1967 ordinance must 
create  a  special  reserve  for  participation  by 
employees,  the  amount of  which depends.on the 
enterprise's profits.  The  amounts paid in to the 
reserve  cannot be  paid  out for  a  period  of  five 
years.  During this period, the  employees' rights 
in  the  reserve and  the  methods of its  administra-
tion  are  determined  by  collective  agreement  as 
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under  the  1959  ordinance.  These  agreements 
can  contemplate either the  assignment of shares, 
or  the  deposit  of  funds  constituting the  reserve 
with  bodies  external  to  the  enterprise,  or  the 
deposit  of  funds  in  blocked  current accounts  of 
the  enterprise.  At  the  end  of  the  period, 
employees  receive  amounts which are calculated 
according to their relative salary levels during the 
relevant period, though in  the  interests of equity 
certain  ceilings  are  imposed  on  the  amounts  by 
which  individuals  can  benefit.  As  with  the 
1959 ordinance, the  State  grants  substantial tax 
incentives for schemes of this kind. 
By  1  March  1974,  8 971  collective  agreements 
had  been  concluded  implementing  the  ordi-
nance.  They  benefited  four  million  employees
4 
and  covered  a  total  of  10 051  enterprises.  Of 
this  total,  15%  of  the  enterprises  had  less  than 
one  hundred employees  and therefore submitted 
voluntarily  to  a  law  which  was  not  obligatory 
for  them.  More  than  80%  of  the  agreements 
were concluded by enterprise committees. 
An  attempt to achieve  a measure  of  harmoniza-
tion  between  the  two  systems  just  described, 
particularly  as  regards  the  application  of  the 
schemes  through  collective  agreements,  was 
made in 1973.
1 
In  addition,  in  that  year,  legislative  provision 
was  made
6  to  further  promote  share  participa-
tion  in  the  private  sector.  The  law  applies  to 
companies  the  shares  of  which are  quoted  on  a 
stock exchange or admitted  to  the  market with-
out  a  quotation  where  they  are  the  object  of 
transactions  of  sufficient  importance  and  fre-
quency.  The law  does not impose an obligatory 
1  Ordinance  59-126,  amended  m  1973  (Act 
73-1197). 
2  'La  participation  des  travailleurs  aux  decisions 
dans l'entreprise en France', by ].  Chazal, op. cit., pp. 
11 and 12. 
3  Ordinance 67-693. 
4  'La  participation  des  travailleurs  aux  decisions 
dans  l'entreprise en France', by ].  Chazal, op. cit., p. 
15. 
1  Act 73-1197. 
6  Act  73-1196  of  27.12.1973  as  supplemented  in 
1974 (Decree 74-319 of 23.4.1974). 
71 regime  but  grants  certain  advantages  in  the 
expectation  that such  advantages  will  stimulate 
the growth of share participation. 
Finally,  it  should  be  observed that in  the  public 
sector,  share  distribution  schemes  have  been 
implemented  for  the  employees  of  the  Renault 
concern and  the  national banking and  insurance 
enterprises.  The  schemes  are  not identical, but 
in  general terms they provide for distributions of 
shares  to  employees,  based  on  a  minimum 
seniority  in  the  enterprise, of  up  to  one  quarter· 
of the enterprise's total capital. 
Policy 
The Sudreau committee considers that the finan-
cial  participation  of  employees  should  be 
improved,  in  particular  by  the  immediate  pay-
ment  of  amounts  acquired  under the  obligatory 
form  of  participation.  It should also  be extend-
ed  progressively  in  various ways  to  all  enterpri-
ses,  because  'the  progress  of  the  enterprise,  the 
work of  all,  must  be  a source  of enrichment for 
all'. 
The  employers  and  the  Christian  unions  have 
insisted  upon  the  necessity  of  this  form  of 
participation.  On  the  other hand, the  political 
parties  and  unions  of  the left call  these  forms of 
association  between  capital  and  labour  'legal 
gadgets'  ('gadgets  juridiques') when they  do  not 
lead  to  the  supplanting,  or  at  least  to  the 
questioning  of  the  established  power structures 
('lorsqu'elles  ne  tendent  pas a  supplanter ou  au 
mains a  contester Ia legitimite du pouvoir'). 
Company structure 
Present law 
The  French  Law  of  Commercial  Companies  of 
1966  permits  a  'societe  anonyme'  to  adopt one 
of two  possible structures, namely a system  with 
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a council of  directors ('conseil d'administration') 
as  the  sole  decision  making  body,  or  a system 
with  a  supervisory  council  ('conseil  de  surveil-
lance')  and  a  management  committee  ('direc-
toire').  Prior  to  1966, only the  former  system 
was known in France. 
The first system, often referred to  as the 'classical 
system',  specifies  that  the  shareholders  at  a 
general  meeting,  whether  constitutive  or  ordi-
nary,  appoint  a  council  of  directors  of  at  least 
three  and  not more  than twelve members.  The 
directors can be removed by a general meeting at 
any  time  and  must  be  shareholders  in  the  com-
pany.  An  employee  of  the  company  can  only 
become  a director  if  his  contract of employment 
began  more  than  two  years  prior to  his  nomin-
ation  and  relates  to  a  genuine  employment 
('emploi effectif'). 
The  council  of  directors  has  full  powers  to 
conduct  business  on  behalf  of  the  company 
within  the  scope  of  the  company's  objects  and 
subject  to  the  powers  given  by  the  law  to  the 
general meeting of shareholders. 
The  council elects, and can at any time remove, a 
chairman  who  is  responsible  for  the  general 
management of the company and who represents 
it  in  relationships  with  third  parties.  On  a 
proposal from  the chairman, the council can also 
appoint a  general  manager  ('directeur general'), 
or two  in  the  case of a company with more than 
FF  500000 capital,  to assist the  chairman in  the 
performance  of  his  functions.  Such  managers 
can  be  removed  at any time by the  board acting 
on  a  proposal  from  the  chairman.  The  extent 
and  duration  of  the  powers  delegated  to  a 
general  manager  are  determined  by  the  council 
of directors in agreement with the  chairman. 
Apart  from  attendance  allowances  and  fees 
received  in  their  capacity  as  members  of  the 
council  of  administration, the  chairman and  the 
general  manager  receive  a lump  sum  determined 
by  the  council.  Other  members  of  the  council 
may  receive,  in  addition  to  their  attendance 
allowances  and  fees,  only  exceptional  rem une-
ration for specific missions and tasks. 
S.  817 5 The  second,  'dualist',  system  specifies  that  the 
shareholders in  general meeting, whether consti-
tutive or ordinary, appoint a supervisory council 
which  will  normally  consist  of  from  three  to 
twelve  members.  All  of  the  members  of  the 
supervisory council  must be  shareholders of the. 
company and no member can also be  a member 
of  the  management  committee.  Furthermore, 
restrictions on the manner in which members of 
the  supervisory  council  are  remunerated  mean 
that in practice no employee of the company can 
be a  member.  The  members of the supervisory 
council can be  removed by the general meeting at 
any time. 
The supervisory council appoints a management 
committee  of  not more than five  members and 
appoints one of these  members chairman of the 
committee.  If the  company has  a share capital 
of less than FF 250000, a single director-general 
can be appointed.  The members of the manage-
ment  committee  or  the  director-general  can  be 
dismissed  by  a  general  meeting of shareholders 
on a proposal from the supervisory council. 
The  management  committee  has  full  power  to 
conduct  business  on  behalf  of  the  company 
within  the  scope  of  the  company's objects  and 
subject  to  the  powers  given  by  law  to  the 
supervisory board and to  the general meeting of 
shareholders.  The company is  represented in its 
relations  with  third  parties  by  the  chairman of 
the  management  committee or the  single  direc-
tor-general. 
But  the  management  committee  exercises  its 
functions  under  the  continuous  control  of  the 
supervisory  council,  to  which  it  must  report 
regularly.  Furthermore, the supervisory council 
can  impose  such  supervisory  mechanisms  as  it 
thinks fit.  In turn, the supervisory council must 
make observations  on the  reports  and accounts 
submitted  by the  management committee to the 
annual  general  meeting of shareholders.  Final-
ly,  the  articles of the company may require that 
certain  transactions  receive  prior  authorization 
from  the  supervisory council, while  certain con-
tracts in  the nature of guarantees are required by 
law to be authorized in advance. 
S.  8175 
Present practices 
In  practice under the  classical system, there is  a 
clear differentiation between the chairman on the 
one  hand,  and  the  remaining  members  of  the 
board  of  directors  on  the  other.  The  former, 
assisted as the case may be by one or two general 
managers,  normally have  active  executive roles, 
the  latter  normally  do  not.  Accordingly,  even 
within the  classical  system, there  is  a separation 
of  the  executive  and  supervisory  functions  in 
practice.  However,  it  must be  recognized  that 
the  two  functions  overlap  to  some  extent and 
that the  system  has a  certain flexibility  in prac-
tice  because  of  the  absence  of  an  institutional 
barrier. 
As  for  the  acceptance  of  the  dualist  system,  it 
should  be  noted  that since  1966  the  form  has 
been adopted by  companies of various sizes and 
kinds,  but  it  does  not  appear  that  the  dualist 
system  has  been so  attractive  that it will  in  the 
foreseeable future rival in popularity the classical 
form.  The statististics show that after a period 
of growth from  about 6.6% to 15% of registra-
tions  and  re-registrations in  the  first  three years 
after  1966,  there  was  a  decline  back to  6%  in 
1972.  Furthermore in  1970, the year following 
the  most successful  year  for  the  dualist system, 
there  was  a  notable  leap  in  the  number  of 
companies reverting to the classical form. 
The reason for these developments appears to be 
that  friction  and  conflict  have  occurred  in  a 
significant proportion of dualist companies as  a 
result of the supervisory councils having difficul-
ty  in  confining themselves  to  control, and  tres-
passing on management territory.  It has  often 
been  difficult  to  resolve  these  conflicts  because 
only the general assembly of shareholders has the 
power  to  remove  the  management  committee 
which  deprives  the  supervisory  council  of  an 
important means of coercion. 
Policy 
According to the Sudreau rt?port,  co-supervision 
requires that the  classical  system  of a council of 
administration  be  adjusted  by separating clearly 
73 the administrative and supervisory functions as  is 
the  case  in  the  dualist  system,  which  it  is  also 
necessary  to  render  more  attractive  because  its 
extension  is  desirable.  To  that  end,  it  is  pro-
posed  that  the  members  of  the  management 
committee  be  removable  by  the  supervisory 
council and not by the general meeting. 
The  CNJC ('Centre national des  jeunes cadres'), 
the  Democratic Centre  ('Centre democrate'), the 
Radical Party ('Parti radical') and 'Socialism and 
Enterprise'  ('Socialisme  et entreprise')  call  for  a 
generalization of the dualist system. 
The employers' organization Enterprise and  Pro-
gress  thinks  that  it  is  indispensable  that  the 
function  of  management  and  supervision  are 
separated.' 
'Les  sept  propositions  d' Entreprise  et  Progres',  in 
Le  Monde of 8.1.1975. 
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Ireland 
Employee participation 
General 
The  legal  background  to  employee  participation 
in  Ireland  is  similar in  many ways  to that of  the 
United  Kingdom.  Company law  as such makes 
virtually  no  provision  for  the  employees  of 
companies,  but  does  not  prevent special  provi-
sion being made by those constituting a company 
to  take  into  account their  interests.  Moreover, 
there  is  a  body  of  industrial  relations  and 
employment  law  which  regulates  the  relation-
ships  of  employees  to  employers,  companies 
included.  The  Trade  Union  Acts  enable  trade 
unions  to pursue  their  activities.  Great empha-
sis  is  placed  on  the  concept of  voluntary agree-
ment,  be  that  agreement  in  the  form  of  a 
coltective  bargain,  an  employment  contract,  or 
the statutes of a company. 
Collective  bargaining 
Present law and  practices 
Collective  bargaining  forms  the  most  obvious 
mode  of  employee  participation.  The  right  of 
workers  to  form  unions  is  guaranteed  by  the 
constitution  and  while  there  is  no  legal  obliga-
tion on employers to  recognize and  bargain with 
a union,  in  practice, employers usually negotiate 
with  unions  which  are  representative  of  a sub-
stantial  proportion  of  their  employees,  or  a 
section of their employees. 
In  recent years, however, Irish collective bargain-
ing  has  in  one  respect  been  different  from  the 
collective bargaining in the United Kingdom, and 
this  is  with  respect  to  the  concept of  the  'wage 
round'.  The  'wage  round'  is  the  major  re-ne-
gotiation  of  wage  rates  which  has  taken  place 
since  1970 at  national  level  in  the  context of an 
Employer-Labour Conference, a voluntary orga-
nization  consisting  of  representatives  of 
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ment  being included  on the  employer side  in  its 
capacity  as  a  major  employer.  The  general 
position with regard to these national procedures 
and  agreements  is  reviewed  towards the  termin-
ation of  each agreement and  there  is  always the 
possibility  of  a return to  the  previous  system  of 
collective  bargaining  at  company  and  industry 
level  as regards all aspects of pay revisions. 
The  institution of  the  'wage  round' has  empha-
sized  the  national  aspects  of  collective  bargain-
ing,  whereas  in  the  United  Kingdom  greater 
emphasis  has  been on the  development of  plant 
and  industry  level  bargaining.  However,  the 
contrast  should  not  be  exaggerated.  The  Irish 
national  agreements  are only a framework with-
in  which  further  more  detailed  bargaining  can 
take place  at industry and plant level  in the same 
manner  as  in  the  United  Kingdom.  The  natio-
nal  agreements  provide  for  collective  bargaining 
at company and industry level on such matters as 
productivity  agreements,  pay  anomalies  and 
other terms of employment.  The  procedures to 
be  followed  in  dealing  with  such  matters  are 
prescribed  in  the  national  agreements,  which 
reduce the  scope for  management to act unilater-
ally.  Moreover,  plant  and  industry  bargaining 
occurs  independently  of  national  agreements  in 
relation  to  a  large  number  of  topics  such  as 
recruitment, redundancy, training, plant location 
and many other matters, so that it may in fact be 
difficult for  management to act unilaterally over 
quite a wide range of issues. 
Policy 
The  development  of  collective  bargaining  is 
endorsed  by  a wide  range  of  opinion in  Ireland, 
for  example  the  Federated Union  of  Employers, 
the  Irish  Congress  of  Trade  Unions,  and  the 
main political parties: Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and 
the  Labour  Party.  It  is  safe  to  say  that  the 
desirability of  free  collective bargaining is part of 
the  conventional  wisdom  concerning  industrial 
relations  in  Ireland  at present.  Discussion  con-
cerning the  development of  collective  bargaining 
is  concentrated  on  the  question  of  how  far 
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employers  should  be  required  to  disclose  infor-
mation  to  the  trade  unions  for  the  purpose  of 
facilitating  meaningful  negotiation,  and  on the 
problems resulting from  the  existence of a fairly 
large number of separate trade unions. 
Representative institutions: 
Information, consultation and approval 
Present law and practices 
Consultation  on  a  voluntary  basis  has  played  a 
part in  Ireland  and in  certain parts of the private 
sector,  works  councils  have  been  established 
usually  as  a  result  of  joint  action  between 
management  and  unions  concerned.  Where 
unions have  controlled the  works council, it has 
often  ceased  to  be  a  purely  consultative  organ 
and  has  combined the  processes  of  consultation 
and  collective  bargaining  quite  effectively. 
Where  the  unions  have  not  been  active  and 
consultation  through  works  councils  or  other-
wise  has  taken  place,  it  has  generally  been  less 
successful, and  has  often been  regarded  as  being 
of limited value as a result. 
The  only  form  of  consultation  required  by  the 
law  is  required  under  the  Factory  Act  1955 
which  gives  workers  in  factories  the  right  to  set 
up  safety  committees  and  employ  safety  dele-
gates  who  have  a  consultative  function  with 
regard to  safety matters.  the experiment is  not 
generally  regarded  as  a success  and  has  contri-
buted to the  view  that purely consultative bodies 
in general are of limited value. 
Policy 
As  for  the  future,  the  debate  on  consultation 
through  bodies  such  as  works  councils  has 
received  a  new  stimulus.  In  1973, a sub-com-
mittee  of  the  Employer-Labour  Conference 
recommended  a national  collective  bargain esta-
blishing works councils as  consultative organs in 
all  places  of work where  twenty-five  persons or 
more  are  employed.  The  election  of  worker 
representatives  would  be  through  trade  umon 
75 machinery.  Information  relating  to  an  enter-
prises's position should be  made available to  the 
councils  subject to  confidentiality, except where 
the  provision of -the  information would be detri-
mental to the interests of the organization.  Due 
regard  is  to  be  given  to  existing collective  bar-
gaining  machinery  and  agreements.
1  Whether 
or not the  recommendation is  adopted, the  fact 
that the sub-committee has made the proposal is 
likely  to  have  a stimulating effect, and  indicates 
that  both  management and  labour  are  to  some 
extent  agreed  on  the  desirability  of  promoting 
consultative machinery subject to  certain limita-
tions. 
In  this  connection, it  is  also  noteworthy that the 
Irish  Congress of Trade Unions has  accepted the 
proposals  as  to  works councils  in  the  European 
Companies  Statute  subject  to  the  significant 
proviso  that employee  representatives should  be 
elected  through  'the  appropriate  trade  union 
machinery in each establishment'. 
2 
The Minister for  Labour in the  coalition govern-
ment  (Fine  Gael  and  Labour  Party)  last  year 
announced that while  not proposing to legislate, 
he  will  encourage  the  development  of  works 
councils in State-mn enterprises.  These councils 
would  probably  be  based  on  trade  union  struc-
tures  and  would  meet  and  negotiate  with 
management and  receive  reports  from  employee 
representatives  on  the  boards  of  the  enterprises 
in  question.
1  Fianna Fail,  the  opposition party, 
has  in  the  past  expressed  the  view  that  new 
forms  of  employee  participation  should  evolve 
from  the working of normal processes of consul-
tation and bargaining without interference by the 
State. 
Participation in  decision making bodies 
Present law and  practices 
Irish  law  does  not  prevent  those  forming  a 
company  from  making  provision  for  employee 
representation,  but,  in  practice  employee  repre-
sentation on company boards  is  not found  in  the 
private sector.  In  the  public sector, a few  trade 
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unionists have  in  the  past been appointed to  the 
boards  of  some  State  enterprises.  While  not 
employees  of  the  enterprises,  these  members  do 
represent  the  interests  of  labour  in  a  general 
sense. 
Policy 
The Minister for  Labour in  the  coalition govern-
ment has also expressed approval  in  principle of 
the  idea  of  employee representation as  'an essen-
tial  component of  any  comprehensive  approach 
to  worker participation'.
1  He  intends  to  intro-
duce  legislation  to  provide  for  such  representa-
tion  for  certain  public  commercial  enterpri-
ses.  The  main  features  of  the  proposals
4  are 
that  one  third  of  the  members  of  the  boards 
concerned  will  be  elected  from  and  by  the 
workforce as a result of an election conducted by 
secret  ballot  under  the  proportional  representa-
tion system.  Only branches of trade unions and 
staff  associations  recognized  for  the  purpose  of 
collective bargaining within the enterprise will  be 
entitled to  nominate candidates.  Each employee 
elected will  have  the  same rights and responsibil-
ities as other directors on the board. 
As  already  noted,  Fianna  Fail  has  traditionally 
opposed legislation requiring employee participa-
tion  for  private  enterprises,  but  like  much  of 
Irish  industry  itself,  it  is  not  opposed  to  the 
development  of  participation  through collective 
bargaining and voluntary development of consul-
tative machinery. 
The  Irish  Congress  of  Trade  Unions  has 
approved the concept of employee representation 
Draft National Agreement on the  Establishment of 
Works Councils, Sub-Committee on Worker Participa-
tion of the Employer-Labour Conference, 1973. 
2  Submission  to  Minister  for  Labour on Statute  for 
the  European  Company  proposed  by  the  European 
Commission, Irish Congress of Trade Unions, 1973. 
>  Address  by  the  Minister  for  Labour  to  the  Irish 
Congress  of  Trade  Unions'  second  annual  summer 
course on 14 July 197  4. 
4  Election  of  Employees  to  the  Boards  of  State 
Enterprises.  Proposals  by  the  Minister  for  Labour. 
July 1975. 
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opean  Companies  though  it  wishes  to  see  half 
the  supervisory  boards appointed  through trade 
union  machinery.  However,  it  has  expressly 
stated  that similar  views  will  not necessarily  be 
taken of the proposal for a fifth directive.
1 
Share  and  profit participation 
These  programmes play a minor part in  Ireland 
at  the  moment  being  mostly  in  the  nature  of 
bonus and incentive schemes.  Irish trade unions 
tend  to  be  suspicious  of  thein.  However,  Fine 
Gael  has  a commitment, announced  in  1965, to 
pr?mote profit sharing schemes  in private enter-
pnse. 
Company structure 
Present law and practices 
In  general, Irish law  and practice  as  to  company 
structure are  similar  to  those  to  be  found  in the 
United  Kingdom.  For  this  reason,  a  detailed 
description  is  not  required.  It suffices  to  say 
that  while  no  formal  division  of  the  board  is 
required by law, in some companies there will be 
non-executive  directors,  though  their  indepen-
dence  and  ability  to  supervise  the  executive 
directors may be limited. 
Policy 
No  substantial  proposals  as  to  company  struc-
ture  are  being made  at the  present time.  How-
ever,  in  the  context  of  a  speech  on  industrial 
democracy,  the  Minister for  Labour in  the  coa-
lition  government  announced  that  he  envisaged 
employee  directors  being  elected  to  single  tier 
boards  as  they  are  presently  known  in  Ire-
land.  In  his  view,  it was  not possible  to  divide 
policy and  management decision  making,  which 
cast  some  doubt  on  the  desirability  of  the  two 
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tier  system.  Moreover,  effective  power  tended 
to  pass  to the  management board, the employees 
being  excluded  from  critical  decision  mak-
ing.  Accordingly,  it was  preferable to  rely on  a 
single  tier  structure,  unless  it  were  to  appear 
subsequently that it was deficient in some way.
2 
1  Submission  to  Minister  for  Labour on Statute  for 
the  European  Company  proposed  by  the  European 
Commission, op. cit. 
2  Address  by  the  Minister  for  Labour  to  the  Irish 
Congress  of  Trade  Unions'  second  annual  summer 
course on 14 July 1974. 
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Employee participation 
General 
The  grand  design of the  Italian Constitution on 
employee  participation  in  the  management  of 
undertakings, prepared in  a  particular political, 
economic and social context has not been imple-
mented to date.  This does not mean, as will  be 
shown within  the  limits  of  this  general descrip-
tion,  that Italian workers do not possess means 
to  exert  a  more  or  less  extensive  and  decisive 
influence  over  economic  decisions  taken  by 
industrialists.  Italian workers have been able to 
achieve  significant  results,  at  least  so  far  as 
substantial  influence  on  managerial  economic 
policy is  concerned, within the  main p'roduction 
sectors,  and  particularly  in  large  and  medium-
sized industrial undertakings. 
The  relevant  constitutional  provision  in  Article 
46 states that: 'in order to improve the economic 
and  social  conditions  of  employees, and in  har-
mony with production requirements, the Repub-
lic  recognizes  the  right of employees  to partici-
pate  in  the  management  of  undertakings,  in 
accordance with the procedures and to the extent 
laid down by  law'.  This statement of principle 
has remained such, since the social groups which 
might have  been concerned did not seek to have 
it  implemented; under present circumstances,  it 
does  not  seem  as  if  this  attitude  is  likely  to 
change. 
With regard to  industrial relations, the Constitu-
tion in  Article  39  affirmed the  principle of free 
trade  union  association,  and,  with  a  view  to 
recognizing  the  trade  unions, made registration 
compulsory  and  subject  to  the  existence  of 
internal rules with a democratic basis. 
Registration would have  included  the possibility 
of drawing up .collective agreements having 'erga 
omnes' effect  that is,  applying to  all  employees 
belonging  to  a  particular  industrial  category. 
The  unions  were  to  be  represented  at the  bar-
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gammg  table  in  proportion  to  their  member-
ship.  The  constitutional  design was not imple-
mented  because  trade  union organizations hold 
that  if  it  were  put  into  effect,  it  could  restrict 
their freedom and lead to the system of industrial 
relations  becoming inflexible.  At present, trade 
union organizations are  therefore de  facto  asso-
ciations. 
The  Statute  on  Workers'  Rights
1  provides  for 
certain rules  establishing a  legal  basis  for  indu-
strial  relations  in  enterprises.  The  aim  of  the 
law  is,  firstly,  the  protection of employees, and 
secondly, to legalize  union activity on the shop-
floor by trade union representatives in firms, and 
to  develop  their  role.  Trade  unions  have 
achieved  de  facto  recognition,  and  provisions 
have been laid down to enable them to act under 
procedures freely  chosen by them.  Recognition 
has  been  accorded  by  reference  to  trade  union 
organizations belonging to confederations which 
are most representative at national level, and to 
unions which sign  national or provincial agree-
ments which are applied in undertakings. 
Collective bargaining 
Present law and practices 
Collective  agreements  operate  at  two  levels  in 
Italy, at national level and at the level of firms. 
Until  the  begining  of  the  sixties,  collective 
negotiations were  mainly  conducted  at national 
level.  Besides  general  inter-union  agreements, 
collective  agreements  for  a  specific  sector  and 
specific occupational category were also  conclu-
ded.  The  agreements  fixed  the  level  of wages 
and  the  main  working  conditions.  Plant  and 
enterprise agreements were limited in application 
to  the  larger  undertakings,  and  in  content  to 
piece-work, production bonuses and similar mat-
ters.  Such  agreements  were  virtually  indepen-
dent of the national agreements.  · 
1  Law of 20 May 1970. 
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metal  and  engineering  industries  in  1962  and 
1963,  a  definite  turning  point  was  reached 
which,  as  a  result  of  a  radical  change  in  the 
collective  bargaining  system,  was  to  lead  to  a 
new phase of industrial relations in Italy.  Trade 
union  organizations  maintained  that the  policy 
pursued  up  to  that  time  no  longer  met  the 
requirements of labour. 
The  economic  conditions  for  industrial  recon-
struction and the situation on the job market had 
changed, and made it necessary to adjust collec-
tive  bargaining  machinery  to  the  different  pro-
duction  structures,  particularly  at  factory 
level.  This  led  to  the  drawing up  of so-called 
'contrattazione  articolata'  or  'local  agree-
ments'.  Specific  referral  clauses  contained  in 
national agreements laid down that, in respect of 
certain  matters  and  within  certain  limits,  final 
provisions should be  settled locally in  plant and 
enterprise level agreements. 
The decentralization thus effected came closer to 
meeting  basic  demards,  and  moved  the  focal 
point  of  negotiations  to  the  individual  firm, 
while retaining the main function of the national 
agreement,  which  is  to  ensure  and  protect  the 
production  structures  of  a  country still  charac-
terized  by  the  existence  of  many  small  and 
medium-sized undertakings. 
The  emergence  of  new  structures for  employee 
representation,  the  works'  delegates  and  coun-
cils,  had a  dynamic effect on industrial relations 
which  led  to  wider  and  more detailed  negotia-
tions within the undertaking, relating, for exam-
ple, to continuing changes in  technology and the 
organization of work.  As  a  result of the natio-
nal  agreements  drawn  up  at  the  end  of  the 
sixties; the  material  restrictions  on the  contents 
of plant and enterprise agreements have thus in 
practice been overcome. 
With  local  agreements  becoming  firmly  esta-
blished, new limits and conditions were set to the 
employer's  managerial  and  organizing  author-
ity.  Employees' representatives now make spec-
ific  demands  as  regards  work organization,  as 
the  time  has come in  their view  to  negotiate on 
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the  management's willingness to ensure conside-
rable improvement in working conditions gener-
ally,  and  more  particularly  in  those  relating to 
functions and the work place. 
These efforts to change the organization of work 
at plant and  enterprise  level  were subsequently 
applied  to  the  pursuit  of  other  objectives  at 
national level.  A profound change was request-
ed  and made for example in staff classifications, 
and  in  almost  all  sectors,  the  principle  that 
overtime should be  regarded as exceptional and 
be  the  subject  of  prior  agreements  concluded 
with  the  trade  union  representatives  of  the 
undertaking,  was  confirmed  and  made  more 
strict in application. 
More  recently,  on the  basis  of a  critical assess-
ment of current production structures both from 
the point of view of quality and location, and as 
a  result  of  the  urgent  need  to  improve  social 
structures,  the  employees'  organizations  main-
tained that it was time at last to start providing 
concrete  solutions  to  these  problems,  via  local 
agreements. 
Plant and enterprise level bargaining in 1973 was 
marked  by  substantial  demands  in  respect  of 
certain  points.  Specific  commitments  were 
obtained from  certain firms  to place new invest-
ments  in  the  Mezzogiorno;  firms  accepted 
requests to direct investments to socially impor-
tant  production  sectors;  in  a  number  of  cases 
employers  agreed  to  make  financial  contribu-
tions, related to the wages bill, to improve social 
structures outside of the undertaking. 
Policy 
Both  employer  and  labour  organizations  agree 
on the  basic importance of collective bargaining 
to  the  orderly  development  of  industrial  rela-
tions. 
Trade  union  organizations  have  always  been 
consistent in  emphasizing the paramount impor-
tance  which  they  attach  to  agreements,  as  the 
most appropriate means of settling, from time to 
time,  the  natural  conflict of interests  which, in 
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system.  Employer  organizations,  conscious  of 
the  need  to create  a  harmonious social  climate, 
also  display  readiness  to  engage  in  a  searching 
dialogue with their counterparts. 
Here it will be  recalled that the big trade unions 
believe  that given  present circumstances in  Italy, 
they  have  a  special  and  basic  responsibility for 
the  organization  of  the  economic  life  of  the 
nation.  In  order  to  promote  general  develop-
ment  in  line  with  their  conception  of  society, 
these  organizations  use  collective  agreements  in 
order to exercise  influence  over employers both 
to protect the  employees'  interests  in  undertak-
ings,  and  at  the  same  time  to  organize  the 
economy  according  to  the  principles  they  pro-
fess.  Italian  trade  unions  consider  that  their 
position  under  the  agreements  is  sufficiently 
strong for their planned objectives to be attained, 
and  that  the  results  obtained  to  date  are  not 
unsatisfactory. 
Representative institutions: 
Information, consultation and approval 
Present laws and practices 
Three bodies should be  taken into consideration, 
namely:  internal  commiSSions  ('commissioni 
interne'),  trade  union  delegations  ('rappresen-
tanze  sindacali  aziendali'), and  finally  the  dele-
gates and the works councils ('consigli di fabbri-
ca'). 
The internal committees, which reappeared after 
the war under agreements drawn up for the first 
time  in  1943,  are  at  present  governed  by  the 
Inter-Trade  Union  Agreement of 1966.  Under 
this  agreement,  the  internal  committee,  or· in 
firms  employing between five  and forty persons, 
the  plant  representative,  constitutes  the 
employees'  representative  body  before  manage-
ment.  Their main task  is  to  promote or main-
tain·  normal  relations  between  workers  and 
management,  for  the  purpose  of  achieving  the 
regular development of production in  a spirit of 
cooperation and mutual understanding. 
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Their  duties  are  thus  to  ensure  that  works 
agreements  are  applied,  and  that the social  and 
legal  provisions  on  occupational  hygiene  and 
safety are complied with.  They can also formu-
late  proposals to improve company social servi-
ces  and  working  methods,  and  they  enjoy  in 
substance powers of representation and consulta-
tion,  except  as  regards  interna1  social  institu-
tions, which they help to supervise. 
The internal committees, whose activities became 
rather  limited  in  the  recent  past,  entered  on  a 
decidedly critical  period, when, as stated above, 
the  focal  point of collective agreements switched 
to enterprise level.  As a result, they have largely 
disappeared  from  most industrial undertakings, 
even although the  inter-union agreement is  still 
in force. 
In  1970,  the  Statute  on  Workers'  Rights  gave 
workers  the  possibility  of  forming  trade  union 
delegations  in  each production unit.  The wor-
kers'  right of association, for  the  representation 
of their collective  interests, was thus confirmed, 
and  the  members  of  the  representative  bodies 
afforded the .guarantees and protection necessary 
for carrying out the tasks involved. 
The  law  speaks  quite  generally  of  'trade union 
representation',  leaving  the  trade  union  free  to 
select  the  most  appropriate  form  of  internal 
organization:  trade  union branches, departmen-
tal  committees,  or  works  councils.  In  many 
ways, particularly with regard to the appearance 
of  new  forms  of  representation, the legal  provi-
sions  in  question  accepted  what  had  been 
achieved  in  practice  under  the  renewed  agree-
ments drawn up after the autumn of 1969. 
During the industrial disputes of 1968 and 1969, 
new  forms  of  worker  representation  emerged 
and  spread,  rapidly  supplanting  those  in  exis-
tence,  because  the  latter had proved inadequate 
in  advancing  the  new  types  of  claim  which 
placed  most emphasis  on  the  enterprise  as  the 
site  and  subject  of  collective  bargaining.  The 
new  forms  are  the  delegates  and  the  works 
councils.  The  delegate  is  elected  by a  homog-
eneous group, i.e. by all the workers carrying out 
their  activities  in  one  production unit, working 
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problems.  All workers in a homogeneous group 
take part in  the  election of their representative, 
whether  or  not  they  belong  to  a  trade 
union.  Voting  is  by  ballot,  which  emphasizes 
the  unitary nature of  the  representation.  Since 
the  delegates  precisely reflect the organizational 
structure  of  the  undertaking,  they  are  able  to 
represent the interests of employees at all stages 
and with regard to all  aspects of the production 
process. 
All  the  delegates  together  constitute  the  works 
council, where decisions concerning the claims to 
be  made  at  plant  and  enterprise  level,  and  the 
various forms of action, are taken. 
In  spite  of  the  spontaneous  and  fragmentary 
nature of  these  representative  bodies, they esta-
blished  themselves  during the so-called  hot aut-
umn,  and  were  accepted  as  the  backbone  of 
trade  union  organizations  in  the  undertak-
ing.  The Trade Union Agreement establishing a 
single federation between the CGIL ('Confedera-
zione  Generate  Italiana  del  Lavoro'),  the  CISL 
('Confederazione  Italiana  Sindacati Lavoratori') 
and the UIL ('Unione Italiana del  Lavoro') states 
that  works  councils  are  'the  basic  units  of  the 
trade  unions',  and  that  it  is  their  duty  to 
negotiate industrial agreements. 
In  other  words,  the  function  and  the  duty  of 
these  representative  bodies  is  to  represent  and 
defend the workers' interests, especially through 
agreements  drawn  up  with  the  undertak-
ings.  Given  that,  as  was  stated  above,  local 
agreements,  worked  out  in  conjunction  with 
trade  union  bodies,  may  henceforth  relate  to 
managerial  decisions  in  almost  all  areas,  for 
example, how to  produce, what to produce and 
where,  the  role  which  the  works  council  has 
assumed  in  the  industrial  economy is  obviously 
important. 
Policy 
Given  the  attitude of the  trade  union organiza-
tions  to  collective  agreements,  both at national 
and factory level,  it seems reasonable to assume 
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that  agreements  will  continue  to  develop,  and 
extend  still  further.  The  relationship  which 
labour has  seen  and  sees  between the problems 
of industrial democracy peculiar to the undertak-
ings,  and  the  general  problems  of  the  national 
economy,  is  a  basic  feature  of  this  approach. 
Greater weight will  therefore attach to the role 
of  the  new  forms  of  representative  institution 
which have emerged in recent years. 
Participation in decision making bodies 
Employee  representation  ~m  the  management 
board  of  firms  is  unknown  in  the  private  sec-
tor.  Only  in  the  public  sector  is  it sometimes 
provided  that  employees'  delegates  may  be 
included  on  the  management  boards  of  public 
institutions.  Under present circumstances neith-
er  trade  union  nor  employer  organizations,  as 
such,  have  shown  any  interest  in  this  form  of 
employee participation. 
Generally speaking, employees are perplexed  by 
this type of participation and in a way consider it 
divorced  from  the  realities  of  Italian  industrial 
relations.  They  think  that  the  natural  conflict 
of  interests  inherent  in  any  undertaking makes 
every form of cooperation within the structure of 
the  enterprise  unreal  and  hazardous.  It would 
be better to accept the conflict and settle matters 
by  collective  agreements  which,  as  previously 
stated, have  been greatly improved and become 
much  more  common  in  Italy.  This  machinery 
enables  the  workers  to  curb  managerial  power 
and to  influence  the  choices  made  in  undertak-
mgs. 
Although  the  trade  unions  state  that  they  are 
fully  prepared to discuss any policy which could 
improve  industrial  relations,  they  naturally 
intend  to  retain  any  advantage  gained.  They 
consider that every new measure which may even 
unwittingly  restrict  their  freedom  of  action 
should be examined with the utmost caution. 
Employer  organizations  seem  to  hold  that  in 
present circumstances, in any case, the social and 
trade union prerequisites for employee participa-
tion  in  company  bodies  do  not  exist.  They 
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agreements  has  been  gradually  extended  to 
include  production  targets,  investment  commit-
ments  and  organizational  methods,  employees 
have  had  a  considerable  say  in  fundamental 
decisions  concerning  the  life  of  undertak-
ings.  Given  the  special  nature of  Italian  indus-
trial  relations, employer  organizations  maintain 
that the  introduction of formal  institutionalized 
participation would  not be  likely  to bring about 
the  effects  and  obtain the  objectives claimed for 
such structures elsewhere. 
Company structure 
Present law and practices 
The  administrative structure of a limited liability 
company  ('Societa  per  azioni')  consists  of  three 
separate  bodies.  Two of  these  are  compulsory 
and one optional, but the optional body exists in 
practice  in  most  large  undertakings  and  in  the 
majority of medium-sized businesses. 
The  first  body  is  the  Council  of  administration 
('Consiglio  d'amministrazione')  which  is 
extremely  important from  both the  institutional 
and  the  practical points of view .
1  The function 
of the  council  is  of  a general nature and, in  fact, 
is  identified by the law as the management of the 
company.  The  powers  and  duties  of  the  mem-
bers of  the  council  are derived  by inference from 
Article  2364  of  the  Civil  Code  which  specifies 
the  matters  to  be  dealt  with exclusively  by  the 
company  in  general  meeting, such  as  the  appro-
val  of  the  accounts, the appointment of members 
of  the  council,  and  matters  concerning  the 
management of  the  company which according to 
the  memorandum  and  articles  of  association 
must be dealt with in this way. 
The  law  itself thus places few  restrictions on the 
council's  power  of  managing  a  company,  but 
provides  that  the  articles  of  association  may 
restrict  the  council's  powers  by  specifying  that 
particular  questions  shall  be  dealt  with  by  the 
company in general meeting. 
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The  management  of  a  company,  being  a cont-
inuous  and  demanding  business,  is  regarded  as 
being possibly inappropriate for a relatively large 
body  such  as  a council  of  administration.  Ar-
ticle  2381  of  the  Civil  Code  accordingly  lays 
down  that  where  the  articles  of  association  or 
the  company  in  general  meeting so  provide, the 
council  may  delegate  their  powers  to  an  'exec-
utive  committee'  consisting  of  certain  of  their 
members  or  to  one  or  more  'delegated  admin-
istrators'  ('amministratori  delegati'),  and  shall 
specify the extent of the delegated powers. 
This  provision  prohibits  only  the  delegation  of 
powers  relating  to  the  preparation of  accounts, 
to  the  right  to  increase  the  share  capital  when 
such  a  right  is  vested  in  the  council, and  to  the 
taking of  measures  in  the  event of a reduction in 
capital owing to  a loss. 
Consequently, there are  two legal  restrictions on 
the  possibility  of  delegation:  one  is  procedural 
and  is  based  on  the  requirement  that provision 
must  be  made  officially for  the  delegation in  the 
articles  of  association  or  by  a resolution of  the 
members of the company in general meeting, and 
the  second  is  a matter of  substance and consists 
of  certain  matters  being  excluded  from  the 
power of delegation.  It must be  emphasized, as 
has  already  been  stated,  that the  delegation  of 
powers  must  be  decided  on  by  the  council  of 
administration and  granted  only  to  people who 
are already members of the council. 
Delegation  then gives  rise  to  the  setting up  of  a 
second  body, known as  the executive committee, 
which  exists  side-by-side  with  the  council  of 
administration. 
The latter is  thus empowered to form  an entirely 
separate body in the company.  The legal validi-
ty  of  this  power  of  organization is  based on the 
memorandum  and  articles  of  association  and  a 
resolution  of  the  members  of  the  company  in 
general  meeting,  but the  new  body is  completely 
separate  and  different from  the  body delegating 
the  powers  and  exercises  powers  of  its  own  on 
1  The administration of a company may be entrusted 
to one person only, a sole director. 
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Article  2392).  The  result  is  both  a  change  in 
the  structure  of  the  company  and  a  certain 
change in  the position, formally and substantial-
ly,  of  the  delegating  body,  as  well  as  in  the 
powers  and  duties  of  the  latter  towards  the 
company.  The  delegation  of  powers  may  be 
revoked or amended at any time; nevertheless it 
is  a  normal, permanent handing over of general 
administrative power in  that the delegated body 
is  authorized to perform not simply specific acts, 
but  also  all  the  acts  which  it  considers  appro-
priate within the limits of the delegation. 
The setting up  of the new  body does not imply 
the removal of powers from the delegating body 
which  maintains  'concurrent  and  cumulative' 
powers  with  the  delegated  body.  The  delegat-
ing body retains the right therefore to exercise all 
the  powers  conferred  on  it  by  law  and  by  the 
memorandum  and articles of association and to 
decide directly, even on matters delegated to the 
executive committee. 
Accordingly,  a  further  advantage  of the  Italian 
system can be seen to be its flexibility which does 
not require the complete removal of  the  council 
from  active  administration,  there by  facilitating 
the  adjustment  of  organizational  structures  to 
the  varying  requirements  of different  undertak-
ings.  The same flexibility also allows any coun-
cil  to intervene directly in the affairs entrusted to 
the delegated body whenever it considers it to be 
appropriate. 
Nearly all  commentators think that it should be 
possible to include a clause in the memorandum 
and  articles  of  association  providing  for  the 
compulsory  setting  up  of  delegated  bodies  and 
under which the council of administration would 
not be  able to  refuse  to delegate to an executive 
committee.  It is  clear  in  such  a  case  that  the 
council  would  lose  the  power  to  revoke  the 
delegation as a whole unless the revocation were 
accompanied by an identical delegation of pow-
ers to other persons, that is  to say other members 
of the same council of administration. 
The duties and consequently the potential liabil-
ities of the council of administration change once 
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the delegated  body has been set up.  As  regards 
the  functions  of  the  executive  committee,  the 
other  directors  retain  only  a  general  duty  to 
supervise  the  management  and  to  intervene  to 
prevent acts of which they are aware and which 
would  be  prejudicial  to  the  company,  or  to 
prevent  or  minimize  harmful  consequen-
ces.  The  explanatory  note  981  to  the  Civil 
Code  shows  that in  this  connection  account is 
thus  taken  both  of  the  requirement  that  the 
office  of  a  member  of  the  council  shall  not 
become  an  easy  sinecure,  and  of  the  need  to 
avoid  the  situation  where  fear  of  assuming 
responsibility far in excess of their powers would 
discourage  men  from  taking  up  an  office  in 
which  their  knowledge  and  honesty  would  be 
particularly valuable. 
As  has already been said, the above Article 23 81 
also  provides  that  powers  of  the  council  of 
administration may be  delegated to one or more 
delegated  administrators  instead  of to  the exec-
utive  committee.  In  such a  case  the  delegated 
administrator  is  in  practice  entrusted  with  the 
entire running of the undertaking and the delega-
tion  is  usually  decided  on  the  basis  of  the 
aptitude and professional ability of those select-
ed.  For this reason the delegated administrator 
is  also  usually  permitted  to  represent  the  com-
pany towards third  parties.  Where powers are 
delegated to two or more administrators it is  the 
prevailing opinion that in  this type of case, each 
administrator is  in general individually entrusted 
with full  powers, even  when provision  is  made 
that  for  certain  acts  all  the  delegate  must  act 
together. 
It will  be  noted, finally, that the  existence of an 
executive  committee  and,  at  the  same  time, 
delegated directors does not seem to comply with 
the law.  Nevertheless, this sometimes occurs in 
fact,  and some commentators have  thought that 
it might be  possible to justify it. 
The  above  short  description  shows  how  the 
Italian  legislator  has  enabled  the  company,  by 
creating a  new  body, the executive committee or 
one or more delegated administrators, to assume 
an administrative structure which separates to  a 
certain  extent  management  from  control  and 
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by  a free  organizational  choice  of  the  company 
and  is  dependent both essentially and functional-
ly  on  the  will  of  the  main  governing  body,  the 
council  of  administration  which  is  entitled  to 
intervene  in  management  affairs  whenever  it  so 
wishes.  Moreover,  as  has  rightly  been  pointed 
out,  in  reality,  the  delegated  body  consists  of 
those who are the most highly qualified represen-
. tatives  of  the  controlling shareholders' group in 
the  company,  so  that  there  is  a  tendency  in 
practice  for  the  council  of  administration  to 
cease  being  the  source  of  effective  management 
and power. 
The  other  compulsory  body  completing  the 
administrative  organization  of  the  company  is 
the  shareholders' committee ('collegio sindacale') 
which  is  essentially an  internal supervisory body 
empowered  to  act  in  the  interests  of  members 
and  third  parties.  The  main  function  of  this 
body  is  to  supervise  the  administration  of  the 
company.  The  law  has  been  drafted  in  such a 
way  that the  committee's powers  are  unlimited, 
so  that  the  activities  o~ the  other bodies  of  the 
company  come  under  ;ts  supervision.  In  parti-
cular, it should  be  noted that, in this context, the 
law  emphasizes,  as  the  primary  aspect  of  the 
institutional role  of the shareholders' committee, 
its auditing function. 
Attention should also  be  drawn in the  context of 
the  committee's  general  supervisory  function  to 
cases  in  which  the  committee  may  be  requested 
to  intervene  where  one  or  more  shareholders 
have  reported  irregular  acts.  Where  such  a 
request  is  made  by  a  number  of  shareholders 
representing  not  less  than  5%  of  the  share 
capital,  the  committee  is  obliged  not  only  to 
investigate  the  matters reported, but also  to  call 
immediately  a  general  meeting  if  the  report 
seems  well  founded  and  urgent  action  needs  to 
be taken. 
For  a complete account of this  body, it should be 
pointed  out  that  it  has  two  further  functions, 
though  of  minor  importance:  an  active  admin-
istrative  one  such  as  calling  a  general  meeting 
where the  council of administration has  failed to 
do  so,  and  the  performance  of  ordinary 
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administrative  duties  in  the  event  of  all  the 
members  of  the  council  ceasing  to  hold  their 
office.  Furthermore it  has  an advisory role, for 
example  when  it  must  advise  on  the  remuner-
ation  of  members  of  the  council  entrusted with 
special duties. 
The  many  important duties  of  the  shareholders' 
committees  are  not  accompanied  by  sufficient 
powers  to  enable  them  to  take  the  measures 
which  may  be  shown  to  be  necessary  by  their 
investigations.  In  fact,  the  shareholders'  com-
mittee  has  practically  no  decision  making pow-
ers.  Virtually its  only  power is  to  refer matters 
to  the  company in  general  meeting which  alone 
may  take  decisions.  It must  be  acknowledged 
that  the  committee  has  had  a  controversial 
existence  as  regards  its  composition  and  the 
functions  assigned  to  it.  Wherever  company 
law  reform  is  mentioned,  the  radical  reform  or 
even  abolition of  the  shareholders' committee  is 
generally called for. 
The  recent Law  No 216 of 7 June 1974 retained 
the shareholders' committee but delegated to  the 
government a power to  issue  rules  in  relation to 
companies  quoted on  the  stock exchange which 
will  have  the  effect of  removing the  committees 
from  the  auditing of  their  annual  accounts  and 
entrusting this  task to appropriate auditing com-
panies  for  certification.
1  A  new  public  body, 
called  the  National  Commission for  Companies 
and  the  Stock Exchange has also been set up and 
has  been  given  the  task  of  supervising  quoted 
companies  even  as  regards  the  interests of  third 
parties. 
Policy 
It  has  already  been  stressed  that  the  common 
view  seems  to  be  that the shareholders' commit-
tee  has not come up  to expectations, and referen-
ces  to  its  inefficiency are  often made when  calls 
are  made  for  the  introduction of  a genuine  and 
1  This delegation has since been used, see the Decree 
of the President of the Republic of 31.3.1975, No 136, 
published in  the Gazzetta Ufficiale of 7.5.1975. 
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report of an Interministerial Commission which 
recently  drew  up  a  draft law  on the  reform  of 
limited  liability  companies,  which  was  used  as 
the basis  of the said  law, it is  stated that where 
companies  which  are  quoted  on  the  Stock 
Exchange remove from  their shareholders' com-
mittee the  power to audit the  accounts, the said 
body retains  'a function  which  may  be  broadly 
defined  as  being  control  of  management'.  It 
was  not 'considered  appropriate in  view  of  the 
limits  placed  on this  reform  to  study in greater 
detail  the  complex problem of the internal orga-
nizational structure of companies, the  reform of 
which  is  less  urgent  and which  in  any event is 
still  being  studied  by the  Community.'  Given 
the almost total lack of effective internal supervi-
sion in the present administrative organization of 
companies, and the  fact that the general duty of 
supervision and intervention, which all  membe~s 
of  the  council  of  administration  have  conti-
nuously  to  discharge,  does  not  seem  to  have 
provided the necessary protection, there ~as been 
no  lack  of  authorities  suggesting,  despite  some 
doubt  as  to  whether  the  dualist  system  is  the 
ideal  solution, that it should  be  introduced into 
Italy,  as  the most suitable means of ensuring the 
attainment of satisfactory internal control. 
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Luxembourg 
Employee participation 
Collective bargaining 
The  liberties  of  trade  unions  to  organize  are 
gu'aranteed explicitly by the Luxembourg Consti-
tution, and  by  several international labour con-
ventions which have been ratified by law. 
Collective  bargaining  was  first  regulated  by  a 
law  of  1965, though of course collective  agree-
ments had  been concluded before that date, but 
without a particular legislative basis.  Collective 
agreements  can  be  concluded  between  one  or 
several  trade  unions  ('organisations syndicates') 
on the one hand, and on the other hand, one or 
several  employers'  organizations,  enterprises, 
groups  of  enterprises  engaged  in  similar  acti-
vities, or an ensemble of enterprises of  the same 
profession.  However, only  those  organizations 
which are the most representative at the national 
level  may  conclude  such  collective  agreements, 
and  thus  craft  and  enterprise  labour  organiza-
tions are excluded. 
A  legal  obligation  to  bargain  is  imposed  on 
employers though they can of course bargain as 
members of an employers' organization.  When 
an employer refuses  to  negotiate, or when nego-
tiations have failed  to  result in an agreement, the 
issue  comes  before  the  National  Conciliation 
Office. 
A  collective  bargain  is  defined  by  law  as  a 
contract relating to labour relations and general 
conditions of work.  In particular, it deals with 
such  matters  as  engagements,  dismissals,  hours 
of  work,  overtime,  holidays  and  of  course,  the 
remuneration  of  employees.  Salaries  must  by 
law be indexed. 
Both parties  to  a  collective  bargain are under a 
legal  obligation  to  observe  its  terms  for  its 
duration, which must be at least six months, and 
to do nothing which may compromise  it~ faithful 
execution. 
85 Collective  bargains  may  also  be  extended  by 
decree  to  cover  all  employees  in  a  particular 
sector. 
Representative  institutions: 
Information,  consultation  and  approval 
Present law and practices 
Two institutions must be considered: the person-
nel  delegates  ('delegues du personnel') who have 
been required by  law in certain enterprises since 
the  end  of  the  first  world  war, and  the  mixed 
committees ('comites mixtes') first required by a 
law passed in May 1974. 
As for the former, the law was last brought up to 
date in  1962 and requires a delegation represent-
ing  manual  workers  ('delegation  ouvriere')  in 
every enterprise in the private sector and in every 
establishment in the public sector which normal-
ly  employ  at least  fifteen  manual  workers.  A 
delegation  representing  white  collar  workers 
('delegation  d'employes')  is  required  in  every 
enterprise  normally  employing  at  least  twelve 
such workers.  The size  of the delegation varies 
with  the  number  of  employees,  the  delegates 
being  elected  by  the  employees  from  among 
themselves.  The law confers on the delegations 
the general function of safeguarding and defend-
ing the  rights  and  interests  of  employees  in  the 
social  field.  The  delegates' proposals are to be 
made directly to management.  They can receive 
and  take  up  individual  grievances  but  in  such 
cases  they  must  above  all  attempt  to  effect  a 
conciliation.  The delegates must also give  their 
advice  on  the  development and  amendment of 
the  work  regulations  and  supervise  their  exe-
cution.  They participate  in  the  administration 
of  the  welfare  programmes  instituted  by  the 
employer  and  finally,  they  contribute  to  the 
prevention of industrial accidents and sickness. 
Alongside  these  personnel  delegates,  in  the  pri-
vate sector the law of 1974 has instituted mixed 
committees  composed  equally  of employer and 
employee  representatives.  Such  committees are 
required  in  all private sector enterprises employ-
ing at least one hundred and fifty  persons.  The 
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size  of  the  committees  varies  between  six  and 
sixteen  members  depending  on  the  number of 
employees.  The  employee  representatives  are 
elected  by  the  personnel  delegates  by  secret 
ballot  according  to  the  rules  of  proportional 
representation from  among the employees them-
selves. 
The  law attributes to  the  committee a  consulta-
tive  function,  some  powers  of  decision,  and  a 
supervisory function. 
The law obliges the chief executive ('chef d'entre-
prise') to  inform and consult the mixed commit-
tee  at  least  twice  a  year  on  the  economic  and 
financial  development  of  the  enterprise.  The 
mixed  committee  must  also  receive  all  doc-
uments  which are  to  be  submitted  to  a  general 
assembly of shareholders.  Moreover, the  com-
mittee must normally be  consulted in advance of 
any  decision  of  an  economic or financial  kind 
which  might have  an  effect on the  structure  of 
the  enterprise  or  the  level  of  employment,  for 
example, decisions  concerning investment or vo-
lume  of  production.  In  the  social· field,  the 
committee  must  be  consulted  in  advance  as  to 
important decisions  concerning such matters  as 
changes  in  production  methods,  in  machinery 
and  workshop  rules.  In  the  personnel  field, 
there  must  be  consultation  as  to  manpower 
projections and training schemes. 
As  for powers of decision, the mixed committee 
has  power  to  decide  on  measures  concerning 
surveillance of employees' behaviour, health and 
safety.  A  similar  power  extends  to  the  settle-
ment of the general  criteria to be  followed as  to 
the  hiring, .promotion, transfer and dismissal  of 
personnel.  In  the  event  of  disagreement 
between  the  two  groups  in  relation  to  these 
matters, the law provides for the commencement 
of  a  conciliation  procedure,  and  if  necessary, 
arbitration before the National Conciliation Off-
ice  in accordance with the provisions of a decree 
of 1945. 
Finally  the  committee  has  a  power to supervise 
the  administration of any welfare schemes esta-
blished  in  the  enterprise,  and  to  this  end,  it 
receives  a  report on the  administration at least 
once a year from the chief executive. 
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The  law  of  1974  has  not  been  operating  for 
sufficient  time  for  evaluations  to  be  made.  It 
follows  quite  closely  the  advice  of the  Economic 
and  Social  Council of  Luxembourg as  to  mixed 
committees given  in 1972, a fact which indicates 
that on  its  entry  into  force,  the  law  met with a 
large  measure  of  general  approval  from  the 
major interest groups. 
Participation in  decision making bodies 
Present law and practices 
The  same  law  of  1974 which  instituted  mixed 
committees  for  private  sector  enterprises  also 
provides for representation of employees  in  pub-
lic  companies  ('societes  anonymes').  The  law 
applies  to  all  such companies having more  than 
one  thousand  employees  or  in  which  there  is 
state financial participation amounting to at least 
25%, or  which  benefit  from  a concession  from 
the  state  relating  to  the  company's  principal 
activities.  The  law  requires  all  companies 
caught by  the  first  criterion to  have  a council of 
administration  ('conseil  d'administration')  on 
which  one  third  of  the  members  represent  the 
employees.  Companies  caught  by  the  second 
and  third  criteria  must have  a council  on which 
there  is  an  employee representative for every one 
hundred  employees,  provided  that  there  cannot 
be  less  than three such representatives  and  they 
cannot  constitute  more  than  one  third  of  the 
council.  All  companies within  the  scope of  the 
law  must  have  a  council  composed  of  at  least 
nine members in total. 
The  employee  representatives  must  normally  be 
designated  by  the  personnel  delegates  already 
described  by  secret  ballot according  to  rules  of 
proportional  representation.  They  must  be 
chosen  from  among  the  company's 
·employees.  The  representatives  are  divided 
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between  manual  workers  and  other  employees 
on  a proportional  basis.  Special  provision  has 
been made for  the  coal and steel sector however, 
in  view  of  the  traditionally close  relationship  in 
that  sector  between  enterprises  and  the  trade 
unions.
1  The  law  permits  the  most representa-
tive  trade  unions  on the  national level  to  desig-
nate  three  representatives  directly who  need  not 
be  employees  of  the  company  in  question.  All 
employee  representatiyes _can  be _remove?  from 
office  by  the  orgamzat10n  whiCh  designated 
them. 
The  legal  responsibility  of  the  employee  repre-
sentatives  is  the  same  as  that of  other members 
of  the  council  and  they  are  responsible with the 
others according to  the  provisions of  the  law  of 
1915 concerning commercial companies. 
Policy 
The  new  law  has  not  been  operating for  suffi-
cient  time  for  evaluations  to  be  made,  but  it 
should  perhaps  be  observed  that the  Council  of 
State  and  a  majority in  the  Social  Affairs  Com-
mission  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  were 
opposed to parity of  representation on the coun-
cil  of  administration  being  permissible  and 
amended the draft law accordingly. 
Company structure 
Present law and practice 
For  the  most  part, the  law  as  to  the  administra-
tion  and  supervision  of  'societes  anonymes' 
which  is  currently in  force  in  Luxembourg, and 
the situation to  be found in practice are the same 
as  the  law and practice existing in Belgium.  For · 
this reason, the material is not repeated here. 
Projet  de  loi  instituant  les  comites  mixtes,  etc., 
1973.  (No 1689, Chambre des Deputes), p. 21. 
87 Policy 
Division  of  the  administration of  'societes  ano-
nymes' between a management and a supervisory 
board has been contemplated for the near future 
as  an  optional form  alongside  the  classical  sys-
tem  of  administrators  subjected  to  legal  and 
financial  control  by  commissioners.  This  pro-
posal  was  consciously  related  to  the  proposals 
made  by  the  Commission  in  the  draft  Fifth 
Directive on the structure of 'societes anonymes' 
and  the  European  Companies  Statute.'  A  Bill 
was laid  before Parliament to effect this change/ 
but it has not yet been adopted. 
1  Projet de  loi instituant des  comites mixtes, etc., p. 
14. 
2  Projet  de  loi  completant  la  loi  du  10 aout  1915 
concernant les  societes  commerciales,  etc.,  1974 (No 
1781, Chambre des Deputes). 
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Netherlands 
. Employee participation 
Collective bargaining 
Present. law and practices 
According  to  Netherlands  law,  collective  bar-
gains are legally binding and can be concluded at 
national, industrial, enterprise and establishment 
level.'  However,  the  law  does  not  oblige  an 
employer  to  negotiate  with  a  trade  union  nor 
does  it require facilities  to be  made available to 
union  delegates.  Such  matters  are  themselves 
often the  subject of collective agreements.  Col-
lective  agreements can, however, be  extended by 
law to cover firms which were not represented in 
the negotiations.
2 
In  practice,  there  is  a  tradition  of  centralized 
bargaining,  and  this tradition, reinforced by the 
ex(ension  by law  of  concluded  agreements, res-
ults  in  a  .large  number  of  employees  being 
CO'Jered  by  a  small  number  of  agreements.
3 
However, bargaining for  particular branches of 
an industry and  even for  single large enterprises 
has  been  increasingly common in  some sectors, 
for example in  the metal, chemical and construc-
tion industries.  The contents of agreements are 
normally  confined  to  such  issues  as  remuner-
ation, hours, holidays and similar matters. 
Policy 
The Social-Economic Council of the Netherlands 
is  at  the  present  time  studying  the  question of 
under which circumstances trade unions may be 
considered  'representative'  and  of  what conse-
quences a recognition of 'representa  tivity' should 
1  Act of 24.12.1927. 
2  Actof25.5.1937. 
3  Worker Participation and  Collective  Bargaining in 
Europe, Commission on Industrial  Relations, HMSO 
1974, p. 62. 
S.  8/75 have  as  regards  partiCipation  in  negotia-
tions.  The  Council is  composed of trade union, 
employer  and  independent  members  in  equal 
numbers.  It has  an  important advisory  role  on 
all  social  and economic matters as  well as  other 
more  specific  functions,  some  of  which  are 
referred to  subsequently. 
Representative institutions: 
Information, consultation and approval 
Present law and practices 
Enterprise  councils  ('ondernemingsraden')  were 
established  by  law  in  the  Netherlands  in 
1950.  That law was  amended by a law of 1971 
which considerably extended the functions of the 
councils. 
An  enterprise  council  must  be  set  up  in  each 
establishment  having  at  least  one  hundred 
employees.  If there  are  several  councils  in  an 
enterprise  or  in  several  enterprises  belonging to 
the same  group, a central enterprise council  may 
be  formed.  The  central council must be formed 
if  required  by  a  majority  of  the  enterprise 
councils.  By  virtue  of  a  recent  amendment, 
group-level  enterprise  councils  may  be  set  up  in 
addition to  central and ordinary enterprise coun-
cils,  which  are  competent  with  regard  to  a 
specific  activity  (division)  of  the  group.  The 
members  of  the  councils  are  elected  by  the 
employees,  but  a  member  of  the  management 
board  is  required  by  law  to  be  the  chair-
man.  Candidates  for  the  election  can  be 
nominated  by  the  unions  in  consultation  with 
their  members  in  the  establishment, and  subject 
to  certain  conditions,  by  non-union 
employees.  The  number  of  representatives 
varies  according to  the size of the  enterprise, the 
maximum  being  twenty-five  for  establishments 
with six thousand or more employees. 
The  councils  have  a right to  information on the 
progress of  the  enterprise.  The  same applies to 
central  councils  in  relation  to  questions  which 
concern  all  establishments, or all  the  enterprises 
in  a group.  Further, in  a number of  cases,  the 
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councils must be  allowed to  give  a prior opinion 
in  relation to  a decision to  be  taken by  manage-
ment,  unless  there  are  major  interests  of  the 
enterprise or of persons interested which prevent 
it.  This  right  of  prior consultations  applies  to 
all  measures  which  will  have  an  effect  on  the 
structure of the enterprise such as, for example, a 
transfer of  control of  the  whole or a part of  the 
enterprise  to  another employer, or a closure  of 
the  whole  or a part of  the  enterprise.  In  other 
situations,  when  the  employer  wishes  to  take 
measures  of  a 'social'  nature, for example, with 
regard to  training schemes or recruitment policy, 
then he  must in every case co.nsult the  councils in 
advance. 
Finally,  the  law  of  1971  provides  that  the 
councils  should  have  the  right  to  participate  in 
decision  making on a small  number of  matters, 
also  of  a 'social'  nature, for  example,  on  regu-
lations  as  to  pensions,  working  time,  holidays, 
participation in profits, and measures as to safety 
and  health.  If  an  agreement  between  the 
employer and the  council cannot be reached, the 
matter  may  be  decided  by  the  competent Trade 
Commission ('Bedrijfscommissie') which is set up 
by  the  Social-Economic Council and has a mem-
bership  drawn  from  both  sides  of  the  indu-
stry.  These  rights  of  co-decision  and  consulta-
tion  do  not  apply  when  the  matter  is  already 
regulated by a collective agreement. 
It should also  be  observed  that the Merger Code 
of  the  Social-Economic  Council  requires  trade 
unions  to  be  informed  in  advance and  consulted 
concerning  any  measure  constituting  a  transfer 
of control of an enterprise.
1 
Policy 
At  the  present  time,  the  proper  role  of  the 
enterprise  councils  is  under  active  review,  not 
least  in  the  Social-Economic  Council,  as  the 
1  SER-besluit  Fusiegedragsregels  (Merger  Code  of 
the Social Economic Council), 1971. 
89 result of a reference  of  the  issue  to  them  by  the 
government in October 1973. 
The trade unions are  in some disagreement as  to 
what  should  be  done.  The  Christian  National 
Trade Union  Federation (CNV)  believes  that the 
powers of co-determination of the  councils as  to 
social  policy  should  be  increased,  but that their 
structure should not be  changed.  However, the 
Netherlands Federation of  Trade Unions  (NVV) 
and  the  Netherlands  Catholic  Trade  Union 
Federation (NKV)  do not agree with the present 
structure and wish  to delete the  provision that a 
mem her  of  the  management  board  should  pre-
side  over  the  enterprise  council,  so  that  the 
council  becomes  exclusively  composed  of  the 
employees'  representatives,  who  may  however 
invite  a  manager  to  a  meeting  to  inform 
them.  In  their  opinion,  the  function  of  the 
enterprise  council  should  be  clearly  defined  as 
the  representation  and  defence  of  employees' 
interests.  As  yet, the unions have  not been  able 
to resolve their differences. 
Surveys  of  employers  and  employers'  associa-
tions  show  that  they  are  virtually  unanimous 
that  employees  should  have  a  voice  in  the 
enterprise  through  the  enterprise  council,  and 
almost equally  unanimous  in  their opposition to 
co-determination  through  trade  union  machin-
ery.1 
A substantial body of opinion holds that insuffi-
cient time has elapsed since the law  of 1971 for a 
proper evaluation of  the  improved  system  to  be 
possible. 
Nevertheless,  the  government,  besides  recent! y 
legislating  on  group  enterprise  councils,  has 
introduced  a Bill  ac.cording  to  which  enterprise 
councils  may  lodge  an  appeal  before  the  courts 
against  certain  management  decisions  on  the 
ground  that the  employer, considering the  inter-
ests  involved,  could  not  reasonably  have  taken 
the  decision.  The decisions concerned are those 
upon  which enterprise  councils  must  always  be 
consulted  under  the  present  law,  and  perhaps 
those  decisions  upon which they  must  normally 
be consulted. 
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Participation in  decision making bodies 
Present law and practices 
The  Netherlands law of 1971 on the structure of 
public and  closed  companies  ('Wet op de  struc-
tuur  van  naamloze  en  besloten  vennootschap-
pen')  introduced  employee  participation  with 
regard to  the  appointment of the members of the 
supervisory councils  ('raad van commissarissen') 
of  large  Dutch  companies.  The  law  applies  to 
all  such  companies  with  a  capital  including 
reserves  of  at  least  ten  million  guilders,  and 
having an  enterprise council  by  virtue of  a legal 
obligation  or  employing  at  least  one  hundred 
workers  in  the  Netherlands  either  alone  or 
together with their subsidiaries.  These subsidia-
ries  are  exempted  from  the  law  if their  parent 
company  is  itself subject to it.  A special excep-
tion  is  also  made  for  the  holding  companies of 
international  groups  having  a  majority of  their 
employees abroad. 
The  supervisory  council  of  companies  falling 
within  the  reach  of  the  law  is  composed in  the 
following  manner.  New  members  are  to. be 
appointed by way of 'co-optation' by the existing 
members  of  the  council.  The  shareholders' 
meeting,  any enterprise council  or central enter-
prise  council  and  also  the  management  board 
may  advance recommendations for  nominations. 
A person  may qualify for  appointment with two 
limitations only:  no  person can be recommended 
who  is  in  the  service  of  the  company  or  its 
subsidiary,  or  of  a  trade  union  involved  in 
determining working conditions for the company 
concerned.  The  final  choice  of  a  prospective 
new  member remains with the  supervisory coun-
cil  itself.  Before  appointing a new  mem her, the 
supervisory  council  informs  the  shareholders' 
meeting and the enterprise council of its choice.  · 
Both  the  enterprise  councils  and  the  sharehol-
ders' meeting may  object to  the  appointment of 
the  candidate envisaged  for  one  of two reasons: 
on the  ground that the  person is  not qualified to 
Worker  Participation and Collective  Bargaining  in 
Europe, op. cit., p. 76. 
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ground  that  the  composition  of  the  council 
'would  not. be  appropriate'  if  this  person  were 
nominated. 
Notwithstanding  this  objection,  the  person  in 
question can still be nominated if the supervisory 
council puts the issue before the Social-Economic 
Council  of  the  Netherlands and  a committee of 
the  Council  overrides  the  opposition  after  con-
sultation  of  all  parties  involved.  However,  if 
the  committee deems the opposition justified, the 
whole  procedure  starts  again.  Up  to  the  pre-
sent,  no  appeal  to  a  committee  of  the  Council 
has been made. 
The  system  was  proposed  by  the  Social-Econo-
mic  Council  in  1969  in  a  unanimous 
report.  The  Council  considered  that  in  large 
enterprises  it  was  desirable  that  employees  as 
well  as  shareholders  have  confidence  in  the 
members of the supervisory council.  Employees 
should  therefore  have  the  same  influence  as 
shareholders  on  the  composition of  the  council, 
but direct  representation was  rejected  because it 
was  felt  that  there  was  too  great  a  risk  of 
polarization and  faction.  The  system  of  co-op-
tation  was  accordingly  propos·.::d  in  order  to 
preserve  a  greater  degree  of  homogeneity  while 
at  the  same  time  giving  both  employees  and 
shareholders  an  equal  opportunity  to  influence 
the  council's composition.
11 
Policy 
The new  system  has  been in operation only since 
July  1973 and  accordingly experience of  how  it 
works  in  practice  is  somewhat  limited.  How-
ever, several unions are already discussing differ-
ent  models.  The  NKV  has  recently  taken  a 
position  in  favour  of  a  model  similar  to  that 
proposed  by  the  Commission  in  the  amended 
proposal for  a regulation on a European Compa-
nies Statute. 
Share and  profit participation 
The  Netherlands  government has  announced  its 
intention  to  introduce  a bill  setting up  a system 
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of  profit  sharing.  If  is  intended  to  give 
employees  a  share  in  the  'surplus  profits'  of 
companies,  a  notion  further  to  be  defined.  A 
share  of  10%  has  been  mentioned.  Not more 
than  half  the  amounts  paid  into  the  fund  will 
benefit  the  employees  of  the  companies  which 
made  the  profit,  by  the  allocation  to  them  of 
shares  of  profit-sharing  debentures,  which  will 
only be redeemable after a certain period of time, 
for example, seven or ten years. 
Company structure 
Present law 
The  Netherlands  law  of  1971  applying  to  the 
larger  public  and  dosed companies  prescribes a 
formal  two  tier  system · with  a  management 
board and a supervisory council. 
The supervisory council consists of at least three 
members  who  are  appointed  according  to  the 
procedure already described in which both share-
holders ·and  employees  can  normally  partici-
pate.  Members  of  the  management  board  are 
appointed  and  may  be  removed  by  the  supervi-
sory  council.  Before  a  manager  is  appointed, 
the  general  meeting  of  shareholders  and  the 
enterprise  council  are  informed.  In  case  of 
dismissal,  the  general  meeting  must  be  heard 
beforehand,  and  the  enterprise  council  must  be 
informed. 
The division of function and responsibility is that 
the management board carries out and  is  respon-
sible  for  the  management  of  the  company's 
business under the supervision of the supervisory 
council.  To  this  end,  the  management  board 
must keep  the supervisory council informed as to 
the  state of the  company's business.  The super-
visory  councils  must  also  settle  the  annual 
accounts, subject to the approval of the sharehol-
ders'  general  meeting.  Furthermore,  decisions 
of  the  management  board  closely  affecting  the 
1  See  generally  Advies  van  de  Sociaal-Economische 
Raad inzake de  herziening van het ondernemingsrecht 
(Opinion  of  the  Social-Economic  Council  of  the 
Netherlands on the reform of the law on enterprises), 
1969. 
91 life  of the enterprise cannot be  taken without the 
prior  consent  of  the  supervisory  council,  for 
example,  decisions  as  to large  new  investments 
or  financial  participation  in  other  enterprises, 
issues  of new capital and closures, among other 
things. 
Companies  which  are  members  of  a  group  of 
which a  majority of the  employees are working 
outside the Netherlands have to have a modified 
dualist  structure.  The  company  must  have  a 
supervisory council subject to the normal co-op-
tation procedures and this council must approve 
.  the  same  categories  of  management decision  as 
the ordinary supervisory· council.  But the mem-
hers of the management board are not appointed 
and dismissable  by  the  supervisory council, but 
by  the  shareholders'  general  meeting,  i.e.,  the 
dominant  company.  Similarly,  the  annual 
accounts are settled by the shareholders' meeting 
and  not  the  supervisory  council.  This  special 
provision  was  included  to  ensure  the  uniform 
direction of groups of this kind, and is called 'the 
mitigated regime'. 
Companies  not  falling  under  the  mandatory 
provisions of  the  law  of  1971  may  also  have  a 
supervisory council  if  the  articles of association 
so  provide.  Here  the  system  of  the  company 
law of 1928 still applies.  The supervisory coun-
cil  is  appointed by the general meeting of share-
holders,  its  powers  are  more limited in  that the 
general meeting, and not the supervisory council, 
appoints  and  dismisses  the  management  board 
and  settles  the  annual  accounts.  However, 
these companies may voluntarily adopt the man-
datory  system  applicable  to  larger  compa-
nies.  Similarly  a  company  fatting  under  the 
mitigated  regime  may voluntarily adopt the  full 
system applied to larger companies. 
Present practices 
Under  the  company  law  of  1928,  two  tier 
structures have been adopted for quite some time 
by  most medium-sized  and  large  Dutch compa-
nies.  The  use  of 'commissarissen'  to  supervise 
the  'bestuurders'  has  been  a  long standing fea-
ture of  Dutch company law  and practice.  Nor-
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mally,  both  would  be  appointed  and  could  be 
dismissed  by  the  general  assembly  of sharehol-
ders.  Thus,  at  the  present  time,  most  Dutch 
companies  of  any  size  have  a  formal  two  tier 
system  under the terms of their statutes, even if 
they are outside the scope of  the  recent manda-
tory provisions. 
The  mandatory  system  came  into  full  effect  in 
July  1973.  It  applies  to  325  companies  and 
appears to have  produced in practice  no serious 
objection.  This  is  perhaps not surprising when 
one remembers  the Dutch tradition of voluntary 
two  tier  systems  which had been pragmatically 
evolved, and also that the mandatory system had 
the  unanimous  approval  in  1969 of  the  Social-
Economic  Council  which  included  representa-
tives of the major interest groups.
1 
Policy 
As  for  the  future,  some  interested  parties  and 
groups  are  at  present  waiting  to  see  how  the 
changes  effected  by  the  1971  law work out in 
practice  before  they  commit themselves  to  new 
proposals.  They  express  the  view  that insuffi-
cient time has elapsed for  a proper evaluation of 
the new law.  As  we have seen, the trade unions 
are discussing  new  systems of employee partici-
pation though no general agreement has yet been 
reached. 
1  Opinion, op. cit. 
S.  S/75 United  Kingdom 
Employee participation 
General 
Company  law  in  the  United  Kingdom  makes 
virtually  no  provision  concerning  a  company's 
employees.  However,  this  does  not  mean  that 
employees  have  no  legal  rights  in  relation to  the 
company which employs them, nor does it imply 
that  the  law  prevents  the  implementation  of 
schemes  for  employee  participation even  within 
the  structure of  the  company itself.  In  the first 
place,  there  is  a body of  industrial relations law 
which  regulates  the  relationships  between 
employees  and  employers,  companies  included. 
By  way  of  parenthesis  it  should  be  noted  that 
this  body  of  law  still  places  great emphasis  on 
the  concept of agreement, whether the agreement 
is  a  collective  bargain  which  may  well  not  be 
legally enforceable or an  individual employment 
contract..  In  the  second  place,  company  law 
itself  relies  fundamentally  on  the  concept  of 
agreement, so  that it is  open to  those who form 
or own a company to  agree,  if  they so  desire, on 
a  company  constitution  and  structure  which 
entail  a  high  degree  of  employee  participa-
tion.1  For both industrial and  company law are 
still  fundamentally facultative  rather than regul-
atory,  though  the  amount of  regulation  grows 
continuously.  But if  those  forming or owning a 
company  do  not  express  in  the  constitution  a 
desire  for  the  protection of  the  employees' spe-
cial  interests,  then  company law  does  not inter-
vene,  and  will  moreover  enforce  the  logical 
implications  of  what  has  been  agreed  to  the 
possible  detriment of employees.
2  Accordingly, 
in  the  absence  of  special  provision  by  those 
forming  a  company, employees  are  in  no  sense 
members  of  the  company.  Such  special  provi-
sion is extremely rare. 
S.  8/75 
Collective bargaining 
Present law and practices 
The  most  obvious  mode  in  which  employees 
'participate'  in  the  conduct  of  a  company's 
affairs  is  by  collective  bargaining  through  the 
trade union movement.  Traditionally, collective 
bargaining  has  been  an  essentially  voluntary 
process  with  little  reliance  being  placed  on  the 
law except for  a few  statutes which facilitated or 
supported  voluntary  collective  bargaining  such 
as  legislation  for  extending  widely  applicable 
collective  agreements  to  recalcitrant  em-
ployers.1  The  Industrial  Relations  Act  1971 
attempted  to  give  collective  bargaining  a  more 
legal  character, but the  Trade Union and Labour 
Relations  Act  197  4  has  restored  the  traditional 
position so  that, for  example, collective bargains 
~re at  present presumed  not  to  be  legally  bind-
mg. 
Collective  bargaining  in  the  United  Kingdom  is 
in  practice  a very  flexible  institution.  Both the 
procedures  for  bargaining  and  the  scope  of 
collective  bargaining are  capable of almost limit-
less  variety.  It can mean very little participation 
at  all,  for  example  a  three  yearly  national 
agreement  on  basic  minimum  wage  rates  and 
other remuneration which  is  the subject of much 
supplementation locally.  On the  other hand, it 
can  mean  c:  great  deal  of  participation,  for 
example,  the  agreement  between  the  Glacier 
Metal  Company  Limited  and  four  important 
unions  which in  fact  forms  a constitution under 
which inter alia the principles and policies within 
which  management  operates  are  settled  by 
unanimous  vote  in  a works council  consisting of 
14 representatives of  all grades of employees and 
1  e.g.  The Scoft Bader Commonwealth.  See  Partici-
pation in Industry, by Gordon Brown, 1972. 
2  See  e.g.  Parke  v  Daily  News  Ltd.  (1962)  Ch. 
927.  Since  the  enactment  of  the  Redundancy  Pay-
ments  Act  1965,  a  company  will  now  often  have 
statutory  obligations  to  employees  in  closure  situa-
tions like that of the  Parke case. 
1  The  Terms  and  Conditions  of  Employment  Act 
1959. 
93 a  management  representative  representing  the 
board.  In  between these  extremes, a  large  and 
expanding number of forms is  to be found. 
Perhaps the most significant trend in  recent years 
has  been  the  shift  in  some  industries  from 
national . agreements  to  more  detailed  and 
broader  enterprise  and  plant  level  agreements, 
accompanied  necessarily  by the  development of 
local machinery and procedures such as the _shop 
steward  committee  or  joint  works  comrmttees 
involving  lay  members  of  the  union  who  are 
employed in  particular establishments.' 
When  collective  bargaining  has  become  very 
developed both in  terms of scope and procedure, 
it  is  often  given  the  name  'joint  regulation'. 
However,  the  institution  is  fundamentally  no 
different,  being  based  on  an  agreement  or  a 
series  of  agreements  between  management and 
labour  which  may  well  not  be  legally  enforce-
able.  Glacier  Metal's  scheme and the  activities 
of some shop stewards and joint works commit-
tees  fall  into  this  category.  The  existence  of 
'joint regulation' may sometimes be  indicate~ by 
the inclusion of a formal 'status quo' clause m a 
collective  bargaining  agreement  according  t? 
which the  management agrees  not to take decr-
sions  affecting  the  employees'  interests  until 
agreement  is  reached or  negoti~ting procedures 
have been exhausted.  The precrse scope of such 
'status  quo'  agreements  is  often  somewhat 
obscure. 
Even  when  collective  bargaining  is  very  deve-
loped, however, certain decisions, often o~ major 
importance,  are  not  normally  the. subject  of 
collective  bargaining, though exceptionally they 
may  have  been.  It is  still  the  ~x~eption rath~r 
than the rule for collective bargammg to occur m 
relation  to  major  decisions  on  investment, clo-
sures, mergers and the like. 
Policy 
The importance of collective bargaining is  recog-
nized  by  almost  all  major  interest groups.  As 
for  the  future,  the  Labour  Party  has  recently 
reaffirmed its  commitment to  collective bargain-
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ing,  and proposes to  pass  an  Employmen~  ~ro­
tection  Bill  which  will  include  provisions 
designed  to  strengthen  the  proce~s.
2  In  pa_r~ic­
ular  unions  would be  able to  brmg recogmtton 
disp~tes, which may relate to recognition  ei_t~er 
in  general  or in  respect of one or more specified 
matters  before  a  government  authority,  the 
Concili~tion  and  Arbitration  Service,  which 
could  recommend  recognition  by  the 
employer.  If  agreement  were  not  ultimately 
reached  the union would have the right to seek 
unilater~l arbitration before the authority on the 
terms  and  conditions  of  employment  of  the 
employees·  concerned.  Furthermore,  a  duty 
would  be  placed  on  employers  to  disclose  to 
unions  the  information needed for effective col-
lective  bargaining.  Failure  to  do so  might give 
rise to a form of legally binding arbitration. 
Reference  should  also  be  made to  the proposed 
Industry  BiiP  under  the  terms  of  which  trade 
union  representatives  from  the  firms  concerned 
would  be  closely  involved  in  the  negotiation of 
planning agreements between enterprises and the 
government.  In  addition,  important  manufac-
turing enterprises would be required to supply to 
the  government information on a  w~de range of 
matters, including,  for  example, estimates  as_ to 
the  enterprises' future  output, sales, and caprtal 
expenditure.  Subject to  certain  limitations and 
safeguards, these enterprises would have to sup-
ply the same information to trade unions recog-
nized by them. 
Collective  bargaining  also  forms  the  main  ele-
ment  in  the  Trades  Unions  Congress'  (TUC) 
programme for industrial democracy, which con-
templates  the  continued  development of collec-
tive  bargaining  at  many  levels  of  a  company's 
structure, and also  increased scope for collective 
1  See  for  an authoritative account the  Report of the 
Royal Commission on Trade  Unions and Employers' 
Associations  (Donovan  Commission)  1968,  Cmnd. 
3623. 
z  Employment  Protection  Bill.  House  of Commons 
Bill  119, 25.3.1975.  See  also  The  Community and 
the  Company,  Report  of  a  Working  Group  of  the 
Labour Party Industrial Policy Sub-Committee, 1974, 
p. 12. 
J  House of Commons Bill 73.  31.1.1975. 
S.  8/75 bargaining  agreements  themselves. 
1  Often,. the 
apparently  more  radical  demands  for  worker 
participation  from  the  labour  movement  are 
essentially demands  for  the  extension of collec-
tive  bargaining,  for  example,  to  permit  union 
participation  at  all  levels  of  a  company's 
management  structure.
2  Accordingly,  it  is  safe 
to  assert that the  labour  movement as  a  whole 
remains firmly committed to the principle of free 
and extensive collective bargaining. 
The Conservative  Party has also  been  a  consis-
tent  supporter  of  collective  bargaining,  though 
often qualified by the epithet 'orderly'.  Parts of 
the  Industrial Relations Act 1971 were designed 
to  promote  effective  collective  bargaining,  as 
well  as  to  impart  a  more  specifically  legal 
character to the process and the resulting agree-
ments.  For  example,  provision  was  made, 
though in  fact never implemented, for the disclo-
sure  of  certain  kinds  of  information  to  unions 
and  employees  to enable  them  to  bargain more 
effectively.  In  the  last  election  campaign,  the 
Conservative Party announced that it would not 
seek to re-introduce  the  Industrial Relations Act 
and that it accepted the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations Act in  the form  in  which it was finally 
enacted  as  'the  legal  framework  for  collective 
bargaining'.~  Accordingly,  it  appears  that  the 
voluntary nature of the process has been accept-
ed.·  However there are still  a number of issues, 
such as  the  closed shop, on which the two main 
political parties are not agreed. 
Most employers'  associations,  in  their evidence 
to the  Donovan Commission and  subsequently, 
have  indicated  their  support  for  collective  bar-
gaining, and indeed  on occasion their reluctance 
to see legal interference with the process.
4 
The  Liberal  Party  alone  has,  by  implication at 
least,  questioned  the  primacy of collective  bar-
gaining.  They stress that half the  United King-
dom's  work  force  is  not  unionized  and, as  we 
shall  see,  they  advocate  policies  of  'industrial 
partnership'  aimed  at  benefiting  all  employees 
whether union members or not.
1 
S.  8/7  5 
Representative institutions: 
Information, consultation and approval 
Present Law and  Practices 
Quite  a  common  form  in  which  employees 
participate  in  the running of their company has 
been  through  machinery  for  'consultation', 
defined  in  the  Industrial  Relations  Code  of 
Practice
6  as follows: 
'Consultation means  jointly examining and  dis-
cussing  problems  of  concern  to  both  manage-
ment  and  employees.  It  involves  seeking 
mutually acceptable solutions through a genuine 
exchange of views and information.' 
The most normal method of conducting consul-
tation was through works councils.  Large scale 
development dated from the first world war and 
the  impetus  given  by  the  Whitley  Committee 
reports in 1917 and 1918.  The councils are not 
required by law and have been founded normally 
as  a  result  of  a  management  initiative  but 
sometimes  as  a  result  of  a  trade  union  or 
employees'  initiative,  or  even  of  a  collective 
agreement.  In  the  past, an effort was made to 
draw  a  sharp  distinction  between  consultation 
through  the  works  council  or  some  other 
medium,  and  negotiation  through  trade  union 
machinery  leading  to  collective  agree-
ments.  This  was  largely  the  result  of  trade 
union suspicions that the works council could be 
used to undermine their position. 
Industrial  Democracy.  Report by  the TUC gener-
al  Council  to  the  1974 Trades Union Congress, July 
1974. 
2  'A  Plan  for  a  Break-Through  in  Production'  by 
Jack Jones (1966)  and  'A Workers Control  Bargain', 
by  Tony Topham (1968) in Workers Control, ed. Ken 
Coates and Tony Topham (1968}. 
3  Conservative Party Manifesto, September 1974, p. 
12. 
4  See  for  example The  Responsibilities of the British 
Public  Company,  Confederation  of  British  Industry 
1973,  p.  20 and  'CBI  Rethink  on Works  Councils' 
Daily Telegraph, 13.9.1974. 
1  Liberal Party  Manifestos, February and September 
1974. 
'  Department of Employment, 1972, p. 16. 
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and  consultation  was  always  somewhat  unreal 
and  after  a  period  of  decline  in  the  1950's, 
consultation has begun to revive with due regard 
to  union  suspicions  about formal  and  separate 
machinery.  Thus, where  unions  are· not active, 
works  councils  are  still  to  be  found  which  are 
representative  of  the  employees  as  a whole and 
are ·constituted  in  a  variety  of  ways.  On  the 
other hand, where  trade  unions are active, there 
is  a growing tendency for  the  joint consultation 
machinery to be  union based, and for there to be 
a  single  channel  for  consultation  and  negotia-
tion. 
1  Shop stewards, normally elected by union 
members  in  particular establishments  under sys-
tems of varying formality, have played an impor-
tant  part in  this  development.  The  merger  of 
the  machinery  of  consultation  and 
negotiation  is  often  a significant aspect of  'joint 
regulation'  which  was  discussed  in  connection 
with  collective  bargaining.  The  ability  of 
management to  take decisions unilaterally has  in 
some  sectors  been  substantially  reduced  by  this 
kind  of development. 
Policy 
As  for  the  future,  the  posttlon  of  the  Labour 
Government  is  somewhat  uncertain.  In  1973, 
Prime  Minister  Wilson  publicly  demanded  'a 
system  of  elected  works  committees  in  factories 
employing at least  100 people'/ but the  Labour 
Party  has  not  formally  committed  itself  to  any 
such  proposals  on  employee  participation.  In 
its  recent  election  manifesto,  it  simply  pledged 
itself  to  'introduce  legislation  to  help  forward 
our  plans  for  a  radical  extension  of  industrial 
democracy'.
3  The  TUC believes  that 'in general 
there  will  not  be  a  major  role  for  separate 
consultative  machinery'  but  that  'all  improve-
ments  in  industrial  democracy  should  be. based 
on  a single channel of communications',
4  that is, 
the  trade  unions.  However  the  'TUC  accepts 
that  there  may  be  important exceptions  to  this 
principle,  for  example  for  international  compa-
nies  in  general  and  European  Companies  in 
particular.' 
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The  Employment  Protection Bill,  when enacted, 
will  oblige  employers  not  only  to  disclose  to 
trade union  representatives  information  request-
ed  for collective bargaining purposes, but also to 
inform  and  consult  those  representatives  in 
redundancy situations. 
The  Conservative  Party  on  the  other  hand  is 
reported  to  favour  the  promotion  of  consulta-
tion,  but  to  have  had  some  difficulty  while  in 
office  of  formulating  concrete  proposals  which 
would  have  been effective without alienating the 
TUC.
6  The  most  recent  Conservative  Party 
Manifesto
7  undertook to lay  ;,1  formal duty on all 
large  and  medium-sized  firms  to  consult 
employee  representatives  on  a  wide  range  of 
subjects  ranging from  disciplinary and  dismissal 
procedures  and  redundancy  arrangements  to. 
methods  of  working  and  profit-sharing  and 
share-ownership schemes.  It  is  desired  to  leave 
the  precise  methods and procedures as flexible as 
possible. 
The  Confederation  of  British  Industry  (CBI)  has 
also  indicated  a preference  for  the  development 
of consultation but appears to  be  opposed to the 
introduction  of  any  mandatory  system  which 
might  interfere  with  established  collective  bar-
gaining  practices.s  Neither  the  Conservative 
Party  nor  the  CBI  up  to  the  present  have  seen 
works  or  company  councils  as  being  anything 
more than consultative  organs.  There has been 
no  suggestion  that  such  councils  should  have 
powers of co-decision. 
The  Liberal  Party  is  committed  to  the  idea  of 
compulsory  elected  works  councils  for  all  sub-
stantial  enterprises.  These  councils  would 
Participation in  Industry, by Gordon Brown, 1972, 
p.  22.  See  also  Industrial  Relations Code of Practice, 
op. cit., pp. 16 and 17. 
2  'Wilson's new recipe for  contented workers'.  The 
Observer, 18.3.1973. 
'  Labour Party Manifesto.  October 1974, p.  13. 
4  Industrial Democracy, op. cit., p. 29. 
5  Ibid., p. 3. 
6  'A  lack  of harmony  over  participation',  tn:  The 
Financial Times, 26.11.197  3. 
7  September 1974, p.  12. 
8  The  responsibilities of the  British public company. 
Op.  cit.,  pp.  19  to  22, and  'CBI  Rethink  on  Works 
Councils', op. cit. 
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consultation and negotiation with certain powers 
of  co-decision.'  In  1973,  five  leading  Liberals 
introduced  a  Private  Member's  Works  Council 
Bill  to  give  effect  to  their  proposals.
2  It made 
little progress. 
Participation in  decision making bodies 
Present law and  practices 
In  the  public sector, since the  second world war, 
it  has  been  common practice to provide that the 
boards  of  nationalized  industrial  undertakings 
might include someone with a trade union back-
ground,  and  such  appointments  have  been 
made.  At  the  same  time,  it  has  normally  been 
provided that no-one should be appointed whose 
interests are likely to prejudice the exercise of his 
functions.  This  has  led  to  a  practice  whereby 
only trade  unionists who are no  longer active or 
who  are  at  least  not  active  in  the  industry  in 
question  have  been  appointed.  The  appointees 
are  in  no  sense  representatives  of  the  employees 
in  the  undertaking, but represent the  interests of 
labour in  a more general fashion. 
Recently  in  the  British  Steel  Corporation how-
ever,  a  more  far  reaching  scheme  has  been 
adopted for  the  appointment of worker directors 
to  Divisional  Boards  of  the  Corporation.  The 
scheme  does  not have  a legislative  basis, and  in 
its  present form  is  the  product of  refinement by 
agreement between  the  BSC  board and  the TUC 
Steel  Committee.  These  worker  directors  can 
be  active trade unionists in  the steel industry.  It 
is  to be  assumed that they normally will  be.  In 
this  form  the  scheme  has  not been running long 
enough for an estimate of its effects to  be  made. 
As  for  the  private  sector,  participation  in  the 
decision  making  bodies  of  a  company or enter-
prise  is  almost unknown, being confined to a few 
special  organizations  such  as  the  John  Lewis 
Partnership,  and  the  Scott  Bader  Common-
wealth. 
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Policy 
On the  left, the situation is  at present somewhat 
unclear.  During  the  last  election,  the  Labour 
Party  confined  itself  to  a  gener.al  pledge  to 
introduce  new  legislation  to  help  forward  their 
plans for  a radical extension of industrial demo-
cracy  in  both  the  private  and  public  sectors 
which would  involve  major changes in  company 
law  and  in  the  statutes  governing  nationalized 
industries and  public services.
1  Earlier in  1974, 
a working group of the Labour Party's sub-com-
mittee on industrial policy had proposed• legisla-
tion  which  would  require  among  other  things 
that  companies,  beginning  with  the  largest, 
should  be  required  to  have  a two  tier  structure 
with  half  of  the  members  of  the  supervisory 
board  being  appointed  through  trade  union 
machinery.  The  problem  of  deadlock could  be 
solved by means of a jointly co-opted or alternat-
ing chairman with a casting vote.  Such worker 
directors  would  have  a  duty  to  act  in  the 
interests  of the  enterprise while at the same time 
taking special  account of their constituency, with 
an equivalent duty being imposed on shareholder 
directors.  The  supervisory  board  would  have 
the  final  say  on  decisions  effecting  structural 
changes  in  the  enterprise  such  as  mergers  and 
closures. 
At the  same time, the TUC was  in  the process of 
formulating a somewhat similar policy contained 
in  an  interim  report by  the  TUC General Coun-
cil. 
1  It was proposed that companies employing 
more  than  two  hundred  persons  should  have  a 
two tier structure with one  half of  the  members 
of  the  supervisory  board  being  appointed 
through  trade  union  machinery.  No  provision 
was  suggested  to  deal  with  the  problem  of 
deadlock.  The supervisory board would  be  the 
supreme  body  of  the  company  able  to  overrule 
both  management  and  shareholders  on  major 
Liberal  Party  Manifestos, February and September 
1974. 
2  House of Commons Bi/1131,9.5.1973. 
1  Labour Party Manifesto, September 1974, p. 13. 
·•  The Community and the Company, op. cit., pp. 12 
to 17. 
Industrial Democracy, July 1973. 
97 decisions.  Specified  decisions  affecting  the 
structure  of  the  enterprise  and  appointments to 
the  management  board  would  require  the  con-
sent  of  the  employee  representatives.  More-
over,  these  representatives would  be  responsible 
to  trade  union  members  in  the  firm  rather than 
to  shareholders or even the company.  However 
at the  TUC Congress, a resolution  to  adopt the 
final  report  of  the  General  Council,  which  did 
not  differ  in  its  essentials  from  the  interim 
report,  was  passed  only  together  with  another 
resolution rejecting the mandatory imposition of 
supervisory boards with worker directors, recog-
nizing  the  primacy of  collective  bargaining  and 
calling  for  a  more  flexible  approach  giving 
statutory  backing  to  the  right  to  negotiate  on 
major  issues  such  as  forward  planning of man-
power  rationalization,  but  relating  the  control 
more  directly  to  collective  bargaining  machin-
ery.  The  passage  of  this  resolution  cast doubt 
upon  the  way  in  which  policy  in  the  labour 
movement as a whole would develop. 
In  early  August  197  5,  the  Labour  Government 
announced  that legislation  to  put worker direc-
tors on the boards of private-sector companies is 
to  be  introduced  during  the  Parliamentary ses-
sion  of  1976  to  1977.  In  the  meantime,  a 
committee  of  inquiry  has  been  set  up  to  advise 
on  how  best  to  achieve  this,  given  the  essential 
role  of  trade  union  organization  in  the  pro-
cess.  At  the  same  time,  the  Government  will 
examine  the  role  of  the  employees in  relation to 
decision making in the nationalized industries. 
The  Conservative  Party  while  in  office  never 
announced  its  attitude to employee directors but 
it  was  reported  that  while  not  opposed  to 
experiments,  it  was  not  in  favour  of  general 
legislation prescribing employee directors, prefer-
ring  in  general  the  concept  of  works  coun-
cils.1  As  we  have  seen,  in  the  last election  the 
party  opted  for  a  duty  to  consult  but  with 
methods  left open and  flexible.  The  preference 
for  consultation, as opposed to  representation on 
the  board, is  consistent with attitudes expressed 
generally on the right, with certain limited excep-
tions.2  Thus,  the  CBI  has  stated  that  worker 
directors  should  not  be  imposed  on  British 
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companies  though  it  does  not  oppose  their 
appointment under existing law .
1 
Similarly,  the  Stock  Exchange  has  indicated 
opposition  in  principle  to  the  election  of  direc-
tors  by  employees,
4  and  the  Engineering 
Employers  Federation  has  rejected  the  idea  as 
being 'premature' and 'unacceptable'.
5  The City 
Company Law  Committee has  also  indicated its 
opposition to  the  imposition at the  present time 
of  a  legal  requirement  that all  or  some  compa-
nies  should  have  employee  directors,  preferring 
that companies should  be  left free  to  experiment 
with  various  forms  of  employee  participation, 
and  indeed  should  be  encouraged  to  do 
so.
6  Similar  views  have  been  expressed  by  a 
British Institute of Management working party/ 
The  Liberal  Party on  the  other hand  is  firmly  in 
favour  of shared  control  through the  election of 
directors  and  works  councils.  For  companies 
employing  between  fifty  and  two  hundred  per-
sons  there would  be  a single  board of directors, 
elected  by  workers  and  shareholders  in  equal 
proportions.  For  companies  employing  more 
than two  hundred, there would be  a supervisory 
board,  directly  elected  by  shareholders  and 
employees  in  equal  proportions, to  appoint and 
supervise a management board.
8 
'A lack of harmony over participation, op. cit. 
1  e.g.  Those industrialists and directors who partici-
pated  in  an  informal  study  group  in  July  1973, 
reported  in  The  Sunday  Times,  15.7.1973:  'Top 
executives back shopfloor directors'. 
3  The responsibilities of the  British  public company, 
op. cit., pp. 20 and 22. 
4  Company  Law  Reform  - The  Stock  Exchange's 
View, 1973. 
5  'Worker-director  proposal  "premature",  The 
Financial  Times,  11.7.1973.  See  also  Policy  Paper: 
Employee Participation, November 1974. 
6  Employee Participation, First Report of City Com-
pany Law Committee, February 1975. 
7  Employee  Participation:  a  management view, Bri-
tish Institute of Management, April 197  5. 
8  The  Liberal  Party  Manifestos,  February  and  Sep-
tember  1974.  'What  the  Liberals  stand  for',  The 
Economist 29.9.197  3. 
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Present law and practices 
Profit  sharing  and  share  distribution  schemes 
have  been  adopted in  the  United Kingdom since 
the  nineteenth  century,  but  even  with  official 
encouragement they have  never achieved a major 
role  in  the  industrial  scene.  Official  surveys 
carried  out  in  1912, 1920 and  1956
1  indicated 
that  somewhat  more  than  half  of  the  schemes 
started had  been abandoned due to lack of profit 
or  to  dissatisfaction  and  apathy  among 
employees.
2  The  average  life  for  abandoned 
schemes  was  eight  years  and  for  continuing 
schemes  twelve  to  fourteen  years.  Most 
schemes  result  from  management  initiative  and 
are  more  in  the  nature  of  production  incentive 
schemes  than  true  programmes  for  participa-
tion.  The  schemes  remain  for  the  most  part 
firmly  in  the  control of  management and are for 
the  ultimate  benefit of the  non-employed  share-
holders. 
There  have  been  exceptions  to  this  gt:neral  pic-
ture.  Organizations  have  been  constituted  in  a 
way  which  gives  the  employees  the  benefits  of 
the  ownership  of  shares  both  as  regards  profits 
and  control.  The  Scott Bader  Commonwealth, 
Landsman's (Co-ownership) Limited, Kalamazoo 
Ltd.  and  the  John  Lewis  Partnership  are  all 
examples  of  this  kind  of  enterprise.
1  These 
exceptions  have  been  in  the  nature of  voluntary 
experiments  and  are  not  generally  regarded  as 
particularly instructive  precedents for  legislation 
in  relation  to  limited  liability  companies  in 
general. 
Policy 
As  for  the  future,  the  traditional  type  of  profit 
and  asset  sharing scheme does  not form  part of 
the  Labour  Government's  plans.  It  should  be 
noted  that  in  the  opinion  of  the  TUC,  'com-
pany-based  schemes  of  co-ownership  and  profit 
sharing  are  discredited'.
4  In  their  view,  most 
such  schemes  provide  no  real  control;  would 
have  to  provide  for  share  distribution  on  a 
massive  scale  to  provide  real  control;  entail  a 
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substantial  risk  for  workpeople  if  the  result  is 
that an employee's  total savings  are  invested  in 
one  company;  will  do  little  to  reduce  real  in-
equality of  wealth; and cannot be  applied to  the 
public sector.  However, both the TUC and the 
Labour Party are investigating the possibility of a 
form  of capital sharing at national level based on 
a  national  fund,  possibly  to  be  administered 
through the union movement.
5 
The  Conservative  Party  has  not adopted  profit 
and  share  participation  as  a  part  of  its  pro-
gramme though it can  be assumed that it is  in no 
way  opposed  to  schemes  of  a  voluntary 
kind.  Similarly,  neither  the  CBI,  nor the  Stock 
Exchange  nor  employers'  associations  have 
either proposed  any substantial developments or 
expressed  opposition to existing practices.  The 
CBI  regards  such  schemes  as  desirable  options 
which  should  not  be  made  mandatory.  They 
also  add  a word of  warning against the  promo-
tion  of situations  in  which an employee  has  the 
bulk of his savings tied up in the company which 
employs him.
6 
The  Liberal  Party  is  committed  to  a  proposal 
that all  employees  should  by  law  be  entitled to 
share  in  company  profits  and  capital.
7  Similar 
ideas  have  been put forward by several commen-
tators  for  some  years.  Some  have  envisaged  a 
scheme  whereby  the  shareholders  would  be 
bought out gradually,  leaving  those  working  in 
the  enterprise  whether  as  managers  or  in  some 
other  capacity  as  joint  owners.
8  Others  envi-
1  Ministry of Labour  Reports  on Co-partnership of 
1912 (Cd. 6496), 1920 (Cmd 544) and 1956. 
2  Company  Law  and  Capitalism,  by  T.  Hadden, 
1972, pp. 423 to 427. 
1  For detailed accounts see  Participation in Industry, 
by Gordon Brown, 1972. 
4  Industrial Democracy, op. cit., p. 36. 
·
1  Industrial Democracy, op. cit., p. 35.  Capital and 
Equality,  Report  of  a  Labour  Party  Study  Group, 
1973. 
6  The  responsibilities  of the  British  public company, 
op. cit., p. 20. 
7  The  Liberal  Party  Manifestos, February and  Sep-
tember 1974. 
8  The  Future  of Private  Enterprise  (  19 51)  and  The 
Responsible Company (1961), by G. Goyder. 
99 sage  the  shareholders  becoming  in  effect  fixed 
interest  creditors,  and  again  being  gradually 
dominated by employee shareholders.
1 
Employees  as  members of  the  company 
In  English  company  law,  as  we  have  already 
seen, employees are  not normally members of the 
company.  However,  in  recent  years,  proposals 
have  come  from  several  quarters  to  make  them 
members in  some sense or other. 
The  Liberal  Party  has  stated  that  'employees 
must become members of their companies just as 
shareholders  are,  with  the  same  clearly  defined 
rights'/  The  TUC  has  demanded  'a statutory 
obligation  on  companies  to  have  regard  to  the 
interests  of  its  workpeople  as  well  as  its  share-
holders.1  The  most  sophisticated  development 
of the  concept has  been  by  a working party led 
by  Professor Gower and  sponsored by the Indus-
trial  Society.  Their  proposal
4  is  that  the  law 
should  declare  that  employees  of  a  company 
should  be  members  of  the  company.  As  mem-
bers,  employees  would  enjoy  as  individuals  the 
right  to  information on  matters of  consequence 
to  them.  As  a group, they would have the right 
to  endorse  the  appointments  of  at  least  two 
directors  and  of  liquidators  in  members'  volun-
tary  liquidations,  and  also  to  be  represented  at 
shareholders' meetings. 
The  Conservative  Party  rejected  the  idea  of 
making the  board of  directors legally responsible 
for the  interests of employees as  well  as sharehol-
ders,'  though  in  1973  the  Conservative govern-
ment had  proposed to  include a provision in  the 
Companies  Bill  of  that year  which  would  have 
entitled  directors  of a company to take  account 
of employees'  interests  as  well  as  the  interests of 
the  company's members in  exercising their pow-
ers."  A  working  group  of  the  Labour  Party 
industrial  policy  sub-committee  has  commented 
unfavourably  on  the  idea  of  making employees 
members of the companies which employ them.' 
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Company structure 
Present Law 
The  general  law  in  force  in  the United Kingdom 
at the  present time  neither requires nor prohibits 
the setting up  of  a two tier system of administra-
tion  for  limited  liability  companies.  The  main 
requirements  of  the  law  are  simply  that  all 
companies must have one director, that all  public 
companies  registered  after  1929  must  have  at 
least two directors/ and that any director (other 
than  directors  holding  office  for  life  in  private 
companies  on  1  July  1945)  can  always  be 
removed  from  office  by  ordinary resolution  on 
special  notice  at  a general  meeting of  the  share-
holders.9  For the  rest,  matters are largely left to 
be settled by the articles of association. 
In  most  cases,  companies  adopt the  articles  set 
out  in  Table  A  in  the  First  Schedule  of  the 
Companies  Act  1948,  modified  according  to 
their particular requirements.  Table A provides 
that directors are  initially to be  appointed by the 
subscribers  to  the  memorandum  of  association, 
and  thereafter by  the  annual  general  meeting of 
shareholders, except in  the case of casual vacan-
cies  which  are  to  be  filled  by  the  remaining 
directors until the next annual general meeting.
10 
Table A also provides that one or more directors 
may  be  appointed  managing  director  by  the 
directors  as  a whole.  These  appointments  can 
be  revoked  at  any  time  subject  to  the  terms  of 
any  agreement, and  are  also to  terminate on the 
1  Company  and  Community  ( 1964)  by  P.  Derrick 
and  The Democratic Firm  (1964), by N.  Ross (Fabian 
Research Series). 
2  Liberal Part)' Manifesto, February 1974. 
Industrial Democracy, op. cit., p. 37. 
"'  Company Law: Position of Employees. 
1  'Legal  rights  plan  for  employees  turned  down' 
Financial Times, 31.1.1974. 
6  House  of Commons  Bill  52,  18  December 1973, 
clause 53. 
7  The Community and the Company, op. cit., p.  10. 
s  Companies  Act  1948,  section  176.  'Director'  is 
left almost completely undefined. 
"  Companies Act 1958, section 184. 
~<'  Articles 75, 89, 90, 91,92 and 95. 
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are further empowered to  confer upon a manag-
ing director or directors extensive powers to such 
an  extent  that  they  can  delegate  for  the  time 
being  the  whole  of  their  own  powers.  Such 
delegations  can  be  revoked  or  amended  at  any 
time.
1  Accordingly,  the  distinction  between 
executive  and  non-executive  directors  does 
appear in  English company laws, if only in Table 
A,  and  there  is  no  provision  in  the  law  which 
prohibits  the  adoption  of  articles  of association 
which  implement  the  dualist  system  to  a  much 
greater degree. 
Present Practices 
Most companies in the United Kingdom  have  not 
felt  the  need  to  constitute  formally  a  two  tier 
system of organization.  But most have  adopted 
articles  to  a  great  extent  similar  to  those  con-
tained in Table A,  and have  appointed a manag-
ing  director.  They have  also  often appointed  a 
number  of  their  directors  to  executive  offices, 
and  sometimes  all  the  members  of  the  board 
have been so appointed. 
In  1971, a survey was carried out for  the  British 
Institute of Management in  relation to 243 of the 
larger  British  companies.
2  A  typical  board 
included between six and  fifteen  members and  in 
80%  of  the  companies,  the  board  included 
non-executive  directors.  Where  non-executive 
directors were  appointed, they  were normally in 
a  minority  of  one  quarter  to  one  third  of  the 
board.  Moreover  in  the  five  years  prior to  the 
study, the number of non-executive directors had 
increased  noticeably.  The consensus of  opinion 
among  the  larger  companies  surveyed  was  that 
the  non-executive  director  was  a  guarantor  to 
the  shareholders,  and  to  some  extent  to  the 
public,  that  the  company's  executive  hierarchy 
was  accountable  to  persons  other  than . them-
selves.  This  view  was  endorsed  by  the  CBI  in 
1973.
1 
Thus,  in  a  sense,  many  English  companies  do 
operate  a  two  tier  system  in  functional  terms, 
and  in  some  economic  areas  the  two  tiers  are 
particularly  noticeable,  for  example  in  banking, 
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'insurance  and  in  certain  very  large  compa-
nies.  Nevertheless, it  must be  stressed that each 
such  arrangement  has  been  agreed  voluntarily 
and can of course be freely amended subject only 
to  the  limitations  which  those  concerned  have 
placed  upon themselves.  Furthermore, it should 
perhaps also  be  observed that in most companies 
the effectiveness of the guarantee provided by the 
non-executive  director  can  be  exaggerated. 
There are practical limitations on the capacity of 
the  non-executive  directors  to  act independently 
of the executive directors, deriving in many cases 
from  their  minority  position_,  their  dependence 
on those who  can  in  fact  secure  a majority at a 
general  meeting,  and  lack  of  time  and  informa-
tion.4  Many  non-executive  directors  in  smaller 
companies  are  in  fact  appointed  to  provide 
special  expertise  such  as  expert  accounting ad-
vice  and  are  not  there  to  exercise  control  at 
all.'  Moreover,  except  for  the  largest  compa-
nies,  the  non-executive  director  is  often  not an 
objective  outsider,  but a friend  and  colleague of 
the executive directors, particularly of the  Chair-
man."  In  these  situations, the  amount of  effec-
tive supervision will  be  limited. 
Policy 
The  Labour  Party  has  not  adopted  a  definite 
policy  in  this  connection  although,  as  we  have 
seen,  it  is  committed  in  general  terms  to  an 
extension of  industrial democracy involving ma-
jor changes in  company law.'  A working group 
of the  party's industrial policy subcommittee has 
recommended  that  companies,  beginning  with 
the  largest;  should  be  obliged  to  have  a two tier 
1  Articles 107 and 109. 
2  The  Board  of  Directors,  British  Institute  of 
1'v1anagement.  Management  Survey  Report  No  10, 
1972, carried out by Political and Economic Planning. 
1  The  responsibilities of the  British public company, 
op. cit. 
4  The Board of Directors, op. cit., p. 13. 
'  The  British  Institute  of Management study found 
this  to  be  the  case  in  25%  of  the  companies  sur-
veyed.  The Board of Directors, op. cit., p. 12. 
6  Labour Party Manifesto, September 1974, p. 13. 
101 system.
1  However,  this  proposal  was  made  in 
the context of the debate on employee participa-
tion and  as  we  have  also  seen,  the  recent rue 
Congress resulted in doubt being cast on the way 
in  which  policy  in  the  labour  movement  will 
develop in  this respect. 
The Conservative Party while in office indicated 
that it was not convinced that the two tier board 
was  particularly  suitable  in  the  .British  con~ 
text.  The  party  indicated  a  somewhat  greater 
liking for a requirement that non-executive direc-
tors  sit on the  boards of all  companies above a 
certain size.
2 
The CBI/ the Stock Exchange; the Law Society's 
Standing Committee on Company Law  ,S  the City 
Company Law  Committee
6  and the British Insti-
tute of Management's Study Group on Company 
Affairs/ have  all  issued  statements opposing the 
general  imposition  by  law  of  a  two  tier  sys-
tem.  However, development of the  role of the 
non  -executive  director  is  regarded more favour-
ably  by  a  broad  range  of interest groups in  the 
business  and  financial  worlds including the CBI 
and  the  Stock  Exchange,  though  the  precise 
manner in which this role should be developed is 
often  left somewhat vague.  In  1971, a  private 
member's Bill  which would have made it obliga-
tory for larger companies to appoint a minimum 
number  of  non-executive  directors  who  would 
make an annual report to the shareholders failed 
to pass through Parliament.  R 
The Community and the Company, op. cit., p. 13. 
2  Company Law  Reform, Department of Trade and 
Industry.  Cmnd. 5391, July 1973, paragraph 60 and 
61. 
3  The responsibilities of the  British  public company, 
op. cit., pp. 40 to 42. 
4  Company  Law  Reform  - The  Stock  Exchange's 
View, November 1973. 
5  Observations  on  points  of principle  on  the  draft 
proposal for a fifth directive, March 197  4. 
6  Employee Participation, op. cit., paragraph 6. 
Final Report, March 1974. 
House of Commons Bill182, 9.6.1971. 
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Companies  which  are 
members  of a group 
The suggestion has been made that whatever the 
general desirability of forms of employee partici-
pation, special rules are required if  it is desired to 
apply  the  systems  to  companies  which  operate 
according  to  coordinated  policy  as  a  group, 
particularly  if  the  group  includes  companies 
which  are  incorporated  in  different 
States.  There  is  indeed little doubt that special 
rules  are  required,  and  that  the  problem  is 
complex, because there are a variety of situations 
which  have  to  be  considered.  As  indicated 
towards the beginning of this paper, preparatory 
work on a  proposal for a  directive coordinating 
the  laws  of  the  Member  States  in  relation  to 
groups of companies has been going on for some 
time, and  it  is  in  that context that proposals for 
Community  legislation  affecting  companies 
incorporated  in  the  Member  States  will  be 
made.  However, certain general considerations 
can appropriately be stated here.  Moreover, the 
proposed  Statute  for  European Companies con-
tains provisions to deal with the problem when a 
European  Company  is  a  member  of  a  group. 
These  provisions  embody  certain  principles 
which are capable of a more general application. 
The  emergence  of  groups  of ·legally  distinct 
companies and firms  which operate according to 
certain  centrally  determined  policies  has  been 
one of the most significant modern developments 
as  regards  the  structure  of large  industrial  and 
commercial  enterprises  in  the  Community, and 
indeed throughout the world.  However, with a 
few  exceptions,  company  laws  generally  take 
little  account  of  the  reality  of  this  situa-
tion.  The group companies remain legally inde-
pendent and  separate entities, while  in  practice 
they  operate  in  a  coordinated  fashion.  Situa-
tions  may then arise  in  which the  requirements 
of  group  policy  have  harmful  effects  on  an 
individual  group  company.  Such  situations 
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may  entail  unfortunate  consequences  for  the 
employees  of  that  company  among  others. 
Concern  about  the  problems  arising  from  the 
activities  of  groups  of  companies  has  been 
mounting in  recent years, and interested groups 
have  begun to make proposals, for example, the 
recent  proposal  of  the  Executive  Committee of 
the EuropeanTrade Union Confederation for the 
passing  of legislation  to require  the  creation of 
an institution for the information and consulta-
tion of a group's employees at group level.
1 
The main requirement therefore is  the creation of 
legal  systems  which  recognize  the  reality  of 
group  situations  and  permit groups  to  operate 
according  to  centrally  coordinated  policy,  but 
subject  to  rules  which  safeguard  the  legitimate 
interests of those concerned, in  particular mino-
rity shareholders, creditors and employees. 
As  far  as  employee  participation  is  concerned, 
the  major  problem  is  that  of  ensuring  that  a 
parent company, if  it wishes, can have sufficient 
control  over  the  affairs  of  its  subsidiaries  to 
enable  the  group  to  operate  according  to  a 
coordinated  policy,  when  systems  of  employee 
participation have been introduced which impose 
legal  constraints on the freedom of action of the 
management  of  a  subsidiary.  This  problem 
exists  even  in  the  case  of  a  group  made  up  of 
companies  incorporated  within  a  single  legal 
system.  Situations  of  conflict  may  arise,  for 
example, if  the  management of a  subsidiary can 
take  certain  decisions  only with the  consent of 
employees' representatives, or with the approval 
of a supervisory body which the parent company 
cannot in  practice  be  sure  of controlling.  Ac-
cordingly,  where  employee  participation  in  the 
supervisory  body of  a  subsidiary  takes  a  form 
which  leaves  shareholders'  representatives  in  a 
clear majority, the problem should not normally 
arise.  However, the problem does arise where a 
majority of the members of the supervisory body 
are not appointed or dismissed by the sharehol-
ders, as under the Netherlands law of 1971, or in 
a  situation  where  employees  and  shareholders 
1  Resolution  of  the  Executive  Committee  of  the 
European Trade Union Confederation of 6.2.1975. 
103 appoint  equal  numbers  of  members,  or  in  a 
system  with  a  co-opted  final  third  such  as  that 
proposed  in  the  revised  European  Companies 
Statute. 
In  the  Netherlands,  the  exercise  of  coordinated 
policy in a group cannot normally be endangered 
by  the  application  of  the  legal  provisions  on 
employee  participation with  regard  to  supervis-
ory bodies.  For subsidiaries are  exempted from 
those  provisions  once  they have  been applied  by 
the  parent company.  The  Dutch  legislator  has 
deemed  it  sufficient that in  group situations this 
form  of  employee  participation should  be  effec-
tively  implemented  at  group  level  only.  How-
ever,  if  the  parent  company  does  not  have 
employee participation in  the  appointment of its 
supervisory body,  because  it  is  the  holding com-
pany of a group with a majority of its employees 
abroad, a  matter  considered  further below, then 
the  employees of a subsidiary in  the Netherlands 
will  participate in  the appointment of the  super-
visory  body  of  the  subsidiary.  But  in  this  par-
ticular  case,  the  coherent  functioning  of  the 
group  has  been  ensured  by  providing  that  the 
management of  the  subsidiary can  be  appointed 
and  dismissed,  not  by  its  supervisory body, but 
by  the general assembly of shareholders, i.e., the 
· parent  company.  It  should  be  pointed  out, 
however,  that this  provision  does  not solve  the 
problems  of  a  possible  conflict  between  the 
parent company and the supervisory body of the 
subsidiary.  The  parent  company  will  not  be 
able  to  impose  its  views  on  a  subsidiary  with 
regard  to  a  management decision for  which  the 
supervisory  body  has  withheld  its  legally 
required approval. 
It  seems  questionable  whether  subsidiaries 
should  be  exempted  generally  from  systems  of 
employee  participation as  to the  composition of 
their boards.  In group situations, decisions may 
be  and  are taken at the level of the subsidiary on 
matters  which  are  of  immediate  interest  to  the 
employees of that subsidiary, without there being 
any  intervention  by  the  parent  company.  In 
principle  therefore,  the  employees  should  have 
their  say  in  the  decision  making,  both at  group 
level  and  at the  subsidiary's level.  This partici-
pation  should  probably  also  relate  to  the 
104 
appointment of  the  management of  the subsidi-
ary.  Once  it  is  accepted  that employees should 
participate in  the  appointment of the directors of 
an  individual company through their representa-
tion  in  the  supervisory  board,  then  the  same 
should  apply  in  group  situations.  This  of 
course  may  create  problems  for  the  functioning 
of  the  group,  but these  can  be  solved  by less  far 
reaching  devices  than  exempting the  subsidiary 
completely  from  the  legal  regime  or  preserving 
the  right  of  the  parent company to  appoint the 
management of  the  subsidiary  through the  gen-
eral meeting of shareholders. 
In  the  revised  European  Companies  Statute,  it 
has  been  provided  that  an  enterprise  which 
wishes  to  be  able  to  direct the  affairs of one  or 
more  dependent  companies  constitutes  a  group 
in  which the parent can give  binding instructions 
to  the  subsidiary,  provided that instructions for 
decisions  which  require  the  approval  of  the 
subsidiary's  supervisory  board  and  which  have 
not  been  so  approved,  are  given  by  a  parent 
which  is  orga:·tized  in  such  a  way  that  the 
interests of employees of  the  group are protected 
at group  level  in  a manner which is  the  same  as 
or  at  least  equivalent  to  that  required  of  the 
subsidiary.  For example, if  the  parent is  itself a 
European  Company,  measures  requiring  the 
approval  of  the  subsidiary's  supervisory  board 
can  be  made the  subject of a binding instruction, 
if  such  approval  is  refused,  provided  they  have 
been  approved  by  the  supervisory  board  of  the 
parent.  It should  be  recalled  that according to 
the  revised  proposal, employees'  representatives 
on  the  supervisory  board  of  a parent European 
Company are  to  be  elected  by  the  employees  of 
all  the  members of  the  group, including those of 
the  parent  company  itself.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  parent  is  formed  under  national  law 
then  such  binding  directions  can  be  given  to  a 
subsidiary European Company only  if  the  inter-
ests of  the employees of the European Company, 
and  of  any  other companies  controlled through 
the  European  Company,  are  protected  at  the 
level  of  the parent company in a manner equival-
ent  to  that  required  where  the  parent is  itself  a 
European Company. 
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is  in  one respect on similar lines.  An  enterprise 
which  has  negotiated  a  contract of  domination 
with  a  company,  in  a  case  in  which  that  com-
pany's  supervisory board has not consented to  a 
particular decision,  may  give  a  binding  instruc-
tion  to  that  company's  board  of  management 
which the board must carry out even against the 
wishes  of  its  supervisory  board.  But  this  sol-
ution  solves  the  problem  of  ensuring  that  the 
dominant  enterprise  has  sufficient  control  in  a 
way  which  can  result  in  the  participation  of 
employees  being  substantially  weakened,  and 
indeed,  if  the  dominant  undertaking  does  not 
have  a  supervisory  board  to  which  employees 
elect representatives, it can  be  completely elimin-
ated. 
The  most  hopeful  line  of  approach  as  far  as  a 
Community directive  on  groups  of  companies is 
concerned  thus  seems  to  be  one  based  on  the 
principle  that a parent company incorporated in 
a  Member State  should  be  able  to  give  binding 
instructions  to  a  subsidiary  which  is  part  of  a 
group  operating  according  to  a  coordinated 
business  policy,  provided  that  legal  forms  of 
employee  participation  in  the  subsidiary  have 
equivalent  counterparts  at  group  level  which 
have  given  the  necessary  approval.  In  concrete 
terms, this  means  that a group supervisory body, 
and  perhaps  a  representative  institution  for  the 
employees  of  the  group, have  to  be  organized  in 
a way which permits the employees of  the group 
to  participate  in  the  decision  making  at  group 
level  in  a  manner which  is  at least equivalent to 
the  way  in  which the  employees  of  a subsidiary 
participate in  its  decision  making.  If such insti-
tutions  do  not  exist,  the  parent  will  have  to 
accept  the  risk  of  a  subsidiary  going  its  own 
way.  However,  since  the  decisions  which 
require  the  consent  of  employees'  representa-
tives,  unlike  those  requiring  the  approval  of  a 
supervisory board, to a great extent concern only 
the  internal  and  local  affairs  of  the  subsidiary, 
the  necessity  for  a  group  level  representative 
institution  may  well  be  less  acute  than  for  a 
group supervisory body.  Indeed, a strong argu-
ment can be  made that certain matters may be of 
such  essentially  local  significance  that  a  group 
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representative  institution  should  not  have  the 
power  to  overrule  a local  institution, for  exam-
ple,  as  to  the  settlement of  a  social  plan  in  the 
case  of  a closure.  Accordingly, the  revised  Eur-
opean Companies Statute confines the  powers of 
a  group  works  council  to  issues  which  concern 
the  group  or  a  number  of  undertakings  within 
the group. 
A second  problem  concerns  those  multinational 
groups  of  companies  which  are  based  in  the 
Community  but  have  a  number  of  subsidiaries 
outside  the  Community.  The  argument  has 
been  made that in  view  of  its  multinational role, 
the  parent  company  should  not  be  required  to 
have  a  system  of  employee  participation which 
would  be  confined  to  employees situated  in  the 
Member State  in  which  it  was  incorporated, or 
at  most  to employees  within  the  boundaries of 
the  Community.  It  is  argued  that  to  do  so 
would  be  to  interfere  improperly ·with the  inter-
national  character  of  the  group  and  thereby 
place  it  under  a  serious  disadvantage  as  com-
pared  with  groups  based  outside  the  Commun-
ity. 
Indeed,  the  law  of  the  Netherlands  appears  to 
have  been  based on this view, and excludes from 
the mandatory provisions as to employee partici-
pation  in  the  appointment  of  the  supervisory 
body,  all  Netherlands  holding  companies  of 
international  groups  with  most  of  their 
employees abroad.  On the other hand, German 
law  does  not provide for  such an exception, and 
employees'  representatives  are  appointed  to  the 
supervisory  bodies  of  certain  companies  which 
are the  parent companies of  large, multinational 
groups. 
The European Companies Statute provides that a 
European Company which  is  a holding company 
must  have  members  on  its  supervisory  board 
elected  by  the  employees of the  parent company 
and  of  all  its  subsidiaries  within  the  Commun-
ity.  Employees of  subsidiaries outside the  Com-
munity  cannot participate.  To  permit  them  to 
do  so  was  considered  to  be  impossible  for  a 
number  of  legal,  political  and  practical  reas-
ons.  In  particular,  there  seemed  to  be  a  real 
danger of  producing conflicts  with the laws and 
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Community  in  which  a  subsidiary  might  be 
incorporated.  The  solution  proposed  is  admit-
tedly not perfect, but neither are the alternatives, 
and  the  choice  involves  a delicate  balancing of 
relative advantages and disadvantages. 
As  far  as  Community legislation  is  concerned, a 
relatively clear political choice has to be made. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  economic  and  social 
importance of  multinational groups based in  the 
Community  can  be  regarded  as  so  great,  that 
they should  be  exempted from  a regime  which is 
ultimately  to  apply  to  all  other  large  and 
medium-sized  companies,  on  the  ground  that 
they  would  be  put at a  serious  disadvantage  as 
compared  with  multinationals  based  outside the 
Community.  But  the  logical  extension  of  the 
argument in  favour of their exemption  is  that no 
regulation  of  European  multinational  groups 
which has an  effect on their competitive position 
should be  undertaken until multinationals can be 
regulated  on  a  world-wide  basis.  Such  regul-
ation  is  not likely to happen very quickly, and  it 
is  extremely  doubtful  whether  the  Community 
should  content  itself  with  waiting  to  see  what 
develops. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  economic  and  social 
importance  of  multinational groups  can  be  seen 
as  a  particular reason  for  ensuring that there  is 
some  regulation  of  their  activities.  Moreover, 
Community  legislation,  applying  as  it  will  to 
nine  countries  with  integrated  markets, seems  a 
peculiarly  appropriate  method  for  such  regu-
lation.  Finally, the representation of employees, 
and perhaps of other general interests also, seems 
to  be  in  itself  a  desirable  form  of  regulation as 
far  as  multinational groups based  in  Europe are 
concerned,  for  it  will  ensure  that  the  broader 
implications of  certain important decisions, such 
as  decisions on major investments, are taken into 
account. 
Furthermore, to exempt certain companies incor-
porated  in  a  Member  State  on  the  ground  that 
they  are  the  parent companies  of  multinational 
groups with most of their employees outside the 
Community,  would  be  to  discriminate  unfairly 
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between enterprises and  between employees.  A 
large  company  which  is  the  parent of  a  multi-
national  group  operating  mostly  within  the 
Community  would  be  subject  to  a  regime  of 
employee  participation,  while  a  similar  enter-
prise,  also  active  within  the  Community,  but 
having  most  of  its  activities  outside,  would 
not.  This  hardly seems  fair  either  to  the  multi-
national  group  operating  mostly  within  the 
Community,  or  to  the  employees  of  the  group 
operating  mostly  outside.  Moreover,  there 
would  perhaps  be  an  unfortunate  incentive  for 
European  m  ul tina tionals to transfer activities  to 
countries  outside  the  Community  and  so  gain 
exemption. 
Finally, reference should be made to the problem 
of those companies inside  the  Community which 
are  subsidiaries  of  parent companies outside the 
Community.  It  is  not at present possible, legal-
ly  or  politically,  for  the  Community  to  require 
such  parent companies  to  implement systems  of 
employee  participation,  but of  course  the  subsi-
diary will  be  subject to  a regime  and  as  regards 
the  employee participation, the  parent will  be  in 
the  same position as  any  other controlling share-
holder. 
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Proposed  functions 
of  a European  works  council 
The Statute for  European Companies, as  revised 
on  the  basis  of  the  opinion  of  the  European 
Parliament, requires  the  management board of a 
European  Company  to  fulfil  the  following obli-
gations.1 
First, the  management board must meet regularly 
with  the  European  works  council,  and  in  any 
event  not less  than  four  times  a year.  At  least 
once  a  quarter, a  report must  be  submitted ?n 
the  general  position  of  the  company  and  I.ts 
future  development.  The  report  must  co.ntam 
full  and  up-to-date information on gener.al dev.el-
opments in  the  sectors of  the economy m whteh 
the  company and  its  subsidiaries operate; on the 
economic and  financial  position of  the  company 
and  associated  enterprises;  on  the  development 
of  the  company's  business;  on  the  state  of  its 
production  and  marketing;  on  the  employme.nt 
situation  of  employees  of  the  company  and  Its 
subsidiaries  and  its  future  development;  on  the 
production  and  investment  program.me;  on 
rationalization  projects;  on  production  and 
working methods, especially the  introduction of 
new  working methods; and on any other fact or 
project which may have an appreciable effect on 
the interests of the employees of the company. 
The management must also inform the  cou.n~il of 
every event of  importance, and  the  council  IS  to 
receive  the same communications and documents 
as  the  shareholders,  including  the  annual 
accounts  and  report.  Finally,  the  council  may 
require the management to provide written infor-
mation  on  any  matter which  in  the  opinion  o~ 
the  council  affects  the  fundamental  interests  of 
the company or its employees. 
Second  the  management must consult the  coun-
cil  bef~re  taking  a  decision  concerning  job 
evaluation,  rates  of  wages  per  job  or for  piece 
work, or the introduction and application of any 
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technical  device  intended  to  control the conduct 
or  performance  of  employees.  Consultation 
must  also  take  place  before  the  management 
decides  to  close  or  transfer  an  establishment or 
substantial parts thereof; substantially to  curtail, 
extend  or alter the  activities of the enterprise; to 
make  substantial  organizational  changes  within 
the  enterprise; or to  establish or terminate long-
term cooperation with other undertakings. 
Moreover,  in  these  cases,  the  council  is  given a 
reasonable  time  to  express  a  view  before  the 
supervisory  board  may  give  its  approval  of  the 
decision,  and  if  the  council  considers  that the 
employees'  interests  will  be  adversely  affected, 
provision  is  made  for  the  negotiation  or settle-
ment by  arbitration of  a social plan in the same 
way as  is  provided in the  amended proposal for a 
third directive on mergers of 'societes anonymes', 
and  the  draft  directive  on  the  retention  of  the 
rights and advantages of employees. 
Finally,  the  management  are  obliged  to  make 
certain decisions  only with the  agreement of the 
council, namely decisions  concerning rules relat-
ing  to  recruitment,  promotion and  dismissal  of 
employees;  the  implementation  of  vocational 
training; the fixing of terms of remuneration and 
the  introduction  of  new  methods  of  computing 
remuneration;  measures  concerning  industrial 
safety,  health and  hygiene;  the  introduction and 
management  of  welfare  facilities;  the  establish-
ment  of  general  criteria  for  the  daily  times  of 
commencement  and  termination  of  work;  and 
the  establishment of  general  criteria for  prepar-
ing holiday schedules. 
1  See  Title  V,  Section  One, Sub-section  Five  of the 
amended proposal, Supplement 4/7 5- Bull. EC. 
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